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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis presents a reassessment of the ‘inner image’ as a dimension of 
subjectivity and cultural production. Recent artistic practice – object- and time-
based as much as relational – does not position subjects that have anything like the 
phantasmata that were central to pre-modern thought or the mental imagery of 
modern psychology and philosophy of mind. Dominant discourse of ‘the image’, 
meanwhile, is not of something ‘in’ individual consciousness, but constitutive of a 
material, monist flux. Against such doxa this thesis argues that the inner image - as 
an unverifiable and incommunicable perception-like experience - has a critical-
utopian function: critical in its evasion of communicative rationality and 
naturalized externality, utopian in its non-realization and incongruity with the 
immediate.  
My procedure is to conduct close readings of episodes in theory and 
practice where the notion of an inner image is at stake. I begin by discerning the 
inner image in G E Lessing’s Laokoon essay, and the utopian valence it holds; the 
plays of Villiers de L’Isle-Adam are then taken to dramatize a confrontation of 
‘metaphysical’ inner images with Naturalist theatre; Roland Barthes’s punctum is 
referred to cinematic montage – Eisenstein’s, Brakhage’s, and the single-shot films 
of de Rijke and de Rooij; I explore two modes of language in Conceptual Art - 
Marcel Broodthaers non-semantic materiality and Robert Barry’s semantic 
immateriality. Lastly I turn to nueroscientific practice, and suggest the inner 
image’s fate in recent attempts via brain-imaging to communicate with humans in a 
vegetative state.  
The concerns of the written thesis are also those of my art practice of 
video, sound and writing; what is implicit in the latter is articulated explicitly in the 
former. The arguments developed here are intended, in turn, to contribute to the 
wider discussion of how to continue to think critical difference and the constitution 
of subjectivity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Status of the Inner Image 
 
 The following introduces the notion of an ‘inner image’ or phantasma in 
negative: by examining recent practices and critical discourses from which it is 
absent. The inner image’s absence from a disparate range of forms – ‘relational’ 
and  ‘installation’ art as much as the appearance of language per se in art’s visual 
field – is both conceptual and empirical. That is, these forms are both predicated on 
their subjects not being subjects with ‘inner’ images, and, as apparatuses, do not 
permit ‘inner’ images. The section concludes with the discussion of an artwork that 
illuminates these assumptions by refuting them.  
 
Imagination seems like a prosthesis affixed to the real so as to produce more 
intercourse between interlocutors1  
 
 Art premised on inter-human, or inter-subjective engagement – called 
variously ‘relational’, ‘socially engaged’ or ‘dialogic’ - does not position subjects 
who have inner images, as will be demonstrated in reference to the work of Rirkrit 
Tiravanija and Nicholas Bourriaud’s critical account of it, and the work of artist 
group WockenKlausur, as explicated by Grant Kester. 
 The mainstay of Rirkrit Tiravanija’s practice, from Untitled 1992 (Free) to 
its recreation as Untitled (Free/Still) (2007), is the cooking and serving of meals 
for gallery visitors. The practice is exemplary of the “convivial” relations that 
Nicolas Bourriaud identifies in art of the nineteen-nineties, defined most famously 
as  
 
 an art that takes as its theoretical horizon the realm of human interactions and its 
 social context, rather than the assertion of an independent and private symbolic 
 space [1998, p14] 
 
Art like Tiravanija’s rejects modernism’s other tenets, not least the attempt to form 
the “imaginary and utopian”; the meals instead are “ways of living and models of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Bourriaud, 1998, p80 
2 Pertinent here is Boris Groys’s recently translated (though written in 2000) Under 
Suspicion: A Phenomenology of Media. With critique of the media – where suspicion that 
the media disguise and conceal truth is fundamental - as the point of departure, Groys 
posits “ontological suspicion”, where to regard is to suspect: “[e]ssence, substance, God, 
force, matter, or Being are just a few of the many names for this hidden Other that 
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action within the existing real” [1998, p13], or “everyday micro-utopias” [1998, 
p31]. As they dine and converse, the humans taking part in - or constituting - work 
like Tiravanija’s are not privately imagining ‘something else’: in their public 
presence and interlocution, they are that something else. 
 Relational art, moreover, foregrounds the inter-subjective dimension of 
‘art’ in general: the art exhibition, uniquely among cultural forms, “produces a 
specific sociability” in that it allows “immediate discussion”: “I see and perceive, I 
comment, and I evolve in a unique space and time” [1998, p16]. Relational art 
turns this capacity of the art gallery – for its objects to be talked over, rather than 
contemplated in “private symbolic space” - into an operational mode. Liam Gillick 
considers his own work “a backdrop to activity. … If some people just stand with 
their backs to the work and talk to each other then that’s good.” [Gillick, 2000, 
p16] 
 While the fault of television and literature is to “refer each individual … to 
his or her space of private consumption” [Bourriaud, 1998, p15], what is essential 
to Bourriaud’s conception of relational art is not the co-existence or co-presence of 
its subjects (theatre and cinema “bring small groups together”, albeit “before 
specific, unmistakable images” [1998, p16]) but that these subjects speak. 
“Thought,” as Bourriaud quotes Tristan Tzara, “is made in the mouth” [1998, p40]; 
“[r]eality is what I talk about with a third party.” [1998, p80]. Thought is 
inseparable from speech, experience from its articulation. It is not only a 
disinclination for attendees to Tiravanija’s exhibitions to appreciate the taste of 
soup in silence; it is that relational art’s subjects do not have unsaid thought: their 
interior is subsumed by and assimilated to the exterior. Thus behavior or activity is 
only that which is external and publically observable. The non-speaking 
contemplative subject appears to relational art as the novel-reading owner appears 
to the dog: 
 
 [H]ow insensible, each of us, to all that makes life significant for the other! … As 
 you sit there reading the most moving romance you ever fell upon, what sort of a 
 judge is your fox-terrier of your behavior? With all his good will toward you, the 
 nature of your conduct is absolutely excluded from his comprehension. … What 
 queer disease is that that comes over you every day, of holding things and staring 
 at them like that for hours together, paralyzed of motion and vacant of all 
 conscious life? [James, 2010, p146] 
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Such a “queer disease”, then, is what the inner image looks like from the outside, 
and what practices like Tiravanija’s, conceptualized by Bourriaud, are intent on 
curing.2  
 
Discursivity without Remainder 
 
 Another variant of art that takes human interaction rather than perception 
as its operative mode is exemplified by the practice of Austrian artist group 
WochenKlausur. Where the work described by Bourriaud takes place in art 
galleries, WochenKlausur’s projects (though sponsored and initiated by art 
institutions) take place ‘in public’, working directly with local populations. And 
while Bourriaud’s relational practices therapeutically purge their subjects of 
interiority3, it is sociopolitical ills that WochenKlausur’s projects set out to cure.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Pertinent here is Boris Groys’s recently translated (though written in 2000) Under 
Suspicion: A Phenomenology of Media. With critique of the media – where suspicion that 
the media disguise and conceal truth is fundamental - as the point of departure, Groys 
posits “ontological suspicion”, where to regard is to suspect: “[e]ssence, substance, God, 
force, matter, or Being are just a few of the many names for this hidden Other that 
ontological suspicion presumed in the interior of the world.” [2012, p41]. The suspected 
interior of the human subject, meanwhile, “can manifest itself only in the phenomenon of 
sincerity, testimony, and self-revelation” [2012, p49]. If sincerity entails saying what one 
“really” thinks internally, thinking and speaking co-incident, what, asks Groys, is thinking? 
 
 Evidently, the hypothesis of thinking is nothing but the effect of the observer’s 
 suspicion that the speaker does not “think” what he says – or, in other words, that 
 things are different inside the speaker from the way they appear on the medial 
 surface of his speech. Thinking as such cannot be defined other than by means of 
 this possible discrepancy between exterior and interior, that is, as the hidden Other 
 of language. [2012, p51] 
Thought, then, is only the suspicion “spontaneously aroused in the observer when he 
watches the other speak” [2012, p51]. What Groys expresses ironically is something of the 
“behaviouristic” attitude exhibited as much by this relational art as the by the 
neuroscientific assessment of consciousness discussed in chapter 5. 
3Except Douglas Gordon, whose practice emphasizes self-division both thematically and 
performatively, and Bourriaud calls “the “wild” dimension of … interactivity” – “acting 
parasitically and paradoxically in the social space” [1998, p32]. 
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 Typical of the latter took place in 1994. Invited by the Shedhalle in Zurich 
to conduct a project involving drug issues, the group set up a shelter for homeless, 
drug-addicted sex workers. To obtain support for the intervention, experts in the 
field of drug issues – as well as the mayor and chief of police - were sent out on 
Lake Zurich in a boat, where they were able to exchange views without any public 
exposure. A modest consensus was achieved, and the plan for the women’s shelter 
was realized. More recently (and ultimately less successfully), was an Intervention 
to Overcome Social Barriers (2006) in Leeds, to where WochenKlausur were 
invited “to implement a proposal to improve the communication between diverse 
quarters of the city” [WochenKlausur, 2006]. Advantaged and deprived districts 
were joined in the undertaking of “small projects” [ibid.], facilitated by the artist 
group, that involved local associations, NGOs, businesses and politicians from both 
wealthier and poorer areas.  
 Grant Kester [2004] understands these small projects, and specifically the 
Zurich boat trips, as what Jürgen Habermas, in his attempt to construct a model of 
subjectivity based on communicative interaction, calls “ideal speech situations”.  In 
these, "every subject with the competence to speak is allowed to take part in 
discourse," "everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatsoever," "everyone 
is allowed to introduce any assertion whatsoever," and "everyone is allowed to 
express his or her attitudes, desires and needs."[Habermas, 1991, p89] Habermas's 
concept of an ideal speech situation captures that aspect of the Zurich boat trip 
whereby those on the boat were unmonitored and free to speak outside their official 
capacities and a priori ‘positions’. What is assumed by the ideal speech situation 
so applied, then, is that the participants have ‘real’, ideologically uninflected 
“attitudes, desires and needs”, and that these can be expressed and understood. 
Such “universal communicability” is, however, according to Theodor Adorno, a 
“liberal fiction” [1974, p80] and moreover, a form of oppression: that which is not 
already known, inasmuch as it is not heard, is censored. The ideal of full, 
transparent communicability is yet defended by Michael Dummett, for whom it is 
the essence of “thought” - as opposed to other “private” objects of mind such as 
mental images - that it be transferable: 
 
  I can convey to you exactly what I am thinking. … I do more than tell you 
 what my thought is like – I communicate to you the very thought. Hence 
 any attempt to investigate thought which culminates in a study of what is in 
 essence private, that is, of inner mental experience, must have missed their mark.” 
 [1978, pp116-7] 
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Dummett’s suggestion is that thought can be fully communicated and understood 
by anyone – is essentially public - because it excludes the non-discursive. But as 
Jay Bernstein (following  Adorno) points out, 
 
 If my thought about an object is somehow dependent on a mental image, if 
 my experience of an object enters essentially into my thought about it, then 
 any proposition about the object will include something not transparently 
 communicable or fully expressible. [2001, p220] 
 
In these terms thought cannot be so easily handed over “like a trinket” [ibid.]: the 
non-discursive is unexpressed and private, a “remainder”.  On WochenKlausur’s 
boat, then, are subjects engaged in total communication, “exchanging views” and 
freely expressing “his or her attitudes, desires and needs" - and subjects without 
mental images. 
 
The most important part of the experience is that you do not know what is 
inside and outside your head 
 
 There are other modes of artistic production that aim at reversing 
psychological and egological assumptions about aesthetic experience. The 
immersive installation is one of these where, put crudely, rather than there being an 
object that causes something to happen ‘in’ the subject, the subject is ‘in’ 
something happening. The immersive installation is concerned not with 
participation in a social field, however, but with immersion in a sensory field, from 
which language is prohibited, rather than obligated. The following will briefly 
suggest the status of inner images in such situations. 
 The immersive installation hyperbolically articulated is the mist room: a 
brightly lit enclosed space filled with a constantly-replenished fine spray of water, 
amongst which ‘viewers’ move about.  Ann Veronica Janssens’s Blue, Red and 
Yellow (2001) is one example, Anthony Gormley’s Blind Light (2007) is another. 
Entering one of Janssen’s rooms, Mieke Bal finds that “the dense, impenetrable 
mist packed into the space”, whose limits she “could not even guess”, is so bright 
and luridly coloured that “it seemed made out of kitsch fantasies of heaven.” As 
her eyes and proprioceptive sense adjust the “absolute opacity of the white that 
surrounded” her recedes and she becomes  “aware of [her] own dissolution” [Bal, 
1999, p20]. Gormley’s installation is couched in terms of contained environmental 
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experience - “[y]ou enter this interior space that is the equivalent of being on top of 
a mountain or at the bottom of the sea … inside it you find the outside” - but the 
intended result is the same: “you become the immersed figure in an endless 
ground, literally the subject of the work.” [Gormley, 2007]  
 Dissolution of the self – literally forming a solution with the work – is the 
priority, and is putatively achieved by not representing space, light and so on, but 
by presenting these elements directly. Sensory immediacy is the result: coloured 
light without, or at least deferring, subjectivity’s determinations. If, as Adorno 
suggests, “[d]istance is a phenomenon of works of art that transcends mere 
existence: their absolute proximity would mean their absolute integration”  [1973, 
p460], the attempt here is explicitly to integrate with that mere existence. The 
‘aesthetic distance’ refused in the symbiosis of observer and work is not only the 
refusal of a Kantian disinterestedness, nor of the possibility of conceptual ‘grasp’ 
or ‘overall view’, but of the distance in which the subject searches for any ‘inner’ 
images - hypotheses, recollections, and associations.4  
 An exhibition by James Turrell in 2010 includes a work in the mist room 
vein, Dhatu (2010), where what from the outside appears to be a luminous pink 
screen is in fact the open side of a recessed, brightly lit room, which the subject 
enters, then being putatively ‘in’ the colour. One of the artist’s Ganzfeld, or ‘total 
field’ series, Dhatu is, according to one commentator, “much better when you can 
see the block colour without other people standing in the way” [Gompertz, 2010]. 
If with Dhatu, the presence of other subjects impedes the loss of self to pure 
sensation, then Bindu Shards, presented in the same exhibition, achieves it by 
being constructed to be individually experienced. The work is what Turrell calls a 
‘perceptual cell”: an enclosed globe – evoking both medical technology and trade 
fair gimmick - in which the participant lies and for several minutes and is 
bombarded with strobing lights that trigger hallucinations of space and depth,5 or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Michael Fried’s notion of ‘absorption’ should not go with mention here. Absorption, for 
Fried, is an effect of the artwork ‘ignoring’ the beholder, producing a “perfect trance of 
involvement” or enthrallment and prolonged concentration [Fried, 1988,  p103]. Self-
consciousness compromises absorption, resulting in ‘theatricality’, of which 
postmodernism in general is guilty. 
5 A phenomenon well accounted-for, not least by William Burroughs, who in the 1960s 
produced his own stroboscopes or “Dream Machines”. “I looked into it,” writes Alan 
Ginsberg, “it sets up optical fields as religious and mandalic as the hallucinogenic drugs – 
it’s like being able to have jewelled biblical designs and landscapes without taking 
chemicals’ [quoted in ter Meulen et al., 2009, p319]. Worth noting is the contrasting 
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as one critic experienced, of “an ever-changing pattern of flowers, crystals, 
galaxies, quasars and nebulae … defined by colours that change convulsively”. The 
same writer, Jonathan Jones, continues: 
  
 [T]he most important part of the experience is that you do not know what is inside 
 and outside your head. I saw a space, or rather an ever-changing succession of 
 spaces, but these were independent of any actual material reality – they existed 
 only in my head. … The whole of space seems compressed into your skull. [Jones 
 2010]6 
The grammatical choice is suggestive: rationalized retrospectively as being “only 
in my head”, in the present tense of the experience “you do not know what is inside 
and outside your head”. As quasi-perceptual (like perception but occurring without 
the stimuli that would cause the perception, or “independent of any actual material 
reality”), the representations and colours are ‘inner’. But the localizing happens 
after the fact: the experienced totalization of the inner image – intensive and 
extensive amalgamated - cancels ‘inner’ as predicate. As such, the images are not 
introspected. Enacting the logic of the spectacle that, as Jonathan Crary observes, 
“prescribes the production of separate, isolated, but not introspective individuals’ 
[2001, p79], Bindu Shards turns ‘inwardness’ inside out.   
 
Depthlessness 
 
 Several of film-maker Emily Wardill’s works are understood to foreground 
the materiality of language over semantic transparency, or as Wardill puts it, to 
pursue the “idea of there being a materiality to communication which is impossible 
to ignore and which can be used for political ends” [Wardill 2009]. Formal 
stuttering draws attention away from informational content and toward the “grain”7 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
directions: Ginsberg looks “into it”; with Bindu Shards, “space seems compressed into your 
skull” – it looks into the percipient. 
6 Ironically – or maybe appropriately – for something absolutizing the ‘1st-person’, the 
experience of Bindu Shards was largely known to the public second-hand, ekphrastically, 
through accounts like Jones’s - booked-out as it was weeks in advance by the artworld elite 
[see Jones 2010].  
7 Barthes’s famous “grain of the voice” is specifically associated with sound’s expression 
of the body  “the tongue, the  glottis, the teeth, the mucous membrane, the nose” - rather 
than the soul.  
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of the voice itself: the actors in Sick Serena and Dregs and Wreck and Wreck 
(2007) are asked “to deliver their lines as though they were allergic to what they 
were saying” [Wardill 2010]; a non-native-English speaker provides a stilted, 
robotic-sounding voiceover for The Diamond (Descartes’s Daughter) (2008). 
Foregrounding the voice-over’s sound or form inhibits its denominative function, 
its ‘framing’ of the diegesis, the identifying of “the elements of the scene and the 
scene itself” [Barthes, 1977, p32]. Rather than functioning to frame the represented 
objects, the voice becomes an object in its own right and one of “the elements of 
the scene”. This is really the “political ends” Wardill speaks of: the voice is 
demoted from a position of invisible, omniscient mastery, determining the 
perceptual field, to a position in the perceptual field itself.  
 In this manner Wardill continues the modernist avant-garde practice of 
emphasizing the spatial and acoustic qualities of linguistic signifiers over the 
signifieds they refer to: from the typographical and topographical constellations of 
Mallarmé’s Un Coup de Dés Jamais N’Abolira Le Hasard (1897), Russian Zaum 
glossographia and Hugo Ball’s glossolalaic Dada performances, through concrete 
poetry and sound poetry, Marcel Broodthaers’s ‘rebus’ films and plaques, and 
onwards. Focusing on Anglo-American conceptualism – centrally Robert 
Smithson’s A Heap of Language (1966) - Liz Kotz suggests the subversion of 
emphasizing materiality is, in that it is   
 
a way to wreck language and wreck art, and perhaps to disassemble and disable 
the larger systems of publicity and propaganda that used words and images to 
create fantasies of consumption and falsify reality. [Kotz, 2010, p2] 
 
Frederic Jameson understands the foregrounding of spatial and acoustic materiality 
as a trait of the postmodern, following on the discreditation of the hermeneutic or 
‘depth model’ of meaning, where what “in its inert, objectival form, is taken as a 
clue or a symptom for some vaster reality which replaces it as its ultimate truth” 
[Jameson, 1984, p195]. 8 Effacement of depth means that the isolated signifier 
becomes ever more material or “literal”:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Cognition – or rather, recognition – as offence against material objecthood is well 
articulated in Alphonso Lingis’s descriptions of the Andean Quechua people:  
 
 You can wander the high Andes and, by night, hear the murmurs of the people 
 around the fire, hear their Quechua tongue without understanding it, hear the light, 
 subtle, supple tripping of their sounds, hear their intonations and their murmurs, 
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 [I]n normal speech, we try to see through the materiality of words (their strange 
 sounds and printed appearance, my voice timbre and peculiar accent, and so forth) 
 towards their meaning. As meaning is lost, the materiality of words becomes 
 obsessive … [A] signifier that has lost its signified has thereby been transformed 
 into an image. [Jameson, 1982, p550] 
 
It is these terms that Wardill’s films are at least in part received. Dieter Roelstraete 
appeals to an “antiquarian shard of postmodern theory” when he offers that 
“writing composed of concrete images is a fairly accurate way of describing what 
Wardill does, even if … we are only half the time able to decipher, let alone 
understand.” [2011, p77] Such writing is “not necessarily meant for comprehension 
… the question as to what lies behind it all is rendered profoundly problematic, if 
not meaningless entirely” [ibid.] This is all to say that, as Roelstraete’s critical 
performance suggests (and to the detriment of the work’s analysis), the postmodern 
refusal of the depth model is now assumed: it is not seen as a contingent critical 
move but as naturalized, as a given.  
 In what is arguably the primordial version of the depth model - Aristotle’s 
formulation of the human voice as semantikos psophos, 'significant sound' [1987, 
420b] – speech is differentiated from animal noises by being accompanied by 
phantasmata.9 Without phantasmatic accompaniment, the sound is not voice but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 hear it as the very resonance of their substance, their gentle, unassertive, vibrant, 
 sensitive way of vocalizing together. [… ] But if you were to drink some magic 
 potion, some cocktail of coca tea and whisky, and suddenly understood their 
 language, and abruptly understood that they are speaking about "transporting 
 cocaine into the hands of the Colombian agents," then abruptly you have subjected 
 yourself to the codings of imperial society; you have suddenly related their sounds 
 not to their own throats and substance but to the international code established by 
 the reigning barbarian empire in Washington and Bonn and Tokyo, where cocaine
 means the same thing—crime. [Lingis, 1994, p112] 
 
In Lingis’s account, to understand is to have “subjected yourself to the codings of imperial 
society”: comprehension equals domination. This entails a manifest primitivism:  the 
Quechua have “intonations and … murmurs”, rather than the language which is being used 
to describe them, as “the very resonance of their substance”; like Aristotle’s non-human 
animals, their sounds “belong” to their own throats. 
9 The hyperbolic articulation of the belief in language’s phantasmata is Joseph Addison’s: 
“The reader finds a scene drawn in stronger colors and painted more to the life in his 
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the bare “impact of inbreathed air against the windpipe” [ibid.]. “Wrecked” 
language, then, is psophos minus semantikos, which does not evoke phantasmata 
in the listener, let alone convey the speaker’s inner images. The images of such 
writing, as signifiers without signifieds, are all ‘outer’, ‘concrete’, or empirical.  
 Roelstraete’s characterization of Wardill’s project, however, (in an 
urgency to fall back on “postmodern” meaninglessness) downplays language’s 
other roles, as exemplified by Sea Oak (2008). Developed from interviews with 
members of the Californian think-tank the Rockridge Institute, Sea Oak consists of 
a 51-minute soundtrack on imageless black leader, playing on a spot-lit film 
projector. The interviewees discuss their research into contemporary political 
rhetoric, and its tendency to “create within peoples' minds frames which relate to 
their own sense of identity” [Wardill 2009]. Wardill agrees in interview that it was 
necessary that Sea Oak have no visual image-track because the Rockridge project 
is “about language on its own conjuring up images in the minds of individual 
listeners” [ibid.]. In his ‘postmodern’ drive, Roelstraete dismisses Sea Oak as 
merely confirming – like the decommissioned obsolescence of its projector – that 
the “left-wing enterprise of the analysis of language as a primary site of power has 
gone out of business” [2011, p73]. But removal of the visual track, surely, urges 
the viewer to attend to the acoustic track, and to what is being said: it is to confirm 
the importance of the analysis of language and its power of “conjuring up images 
in the minds of individual listeners”. Attending to verbal analyses of verbal 
imagery, moreover, forces a kind of introspection on the listener, as they are made 
aware of how what they are listening to informs their own thought.  
 While the influence of Peter Gidal’s Close Up (1983) - an almost entirely 
imageless film with a soundtrack of interviews with Nicaraguan revolutionaries – 
is manifest, Sea Oak displays the importance of structuralist film’s exploration and 
exposure of how ‘images’ are arrived at. Disjunction of sound and visual image – 
the voice-over describing not the current picture in a series but the next – in Hollis 
Frampton’s Nostalgia (1971), or in the same artist’s Poetic Justice (1972), where 
written directions for shooting a film are placed one at a time before the camera, 
foregrounds the differences between putative verbal images and visual images 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
imagination by the help of words than by an actual survey of the scene which they 
describe” [Addison, ‘The Pleasures of the Imagination, VI’, Spectator, no. 416, 1712, 
quoted in Mitchell, 1984, p515]. This pictorialism would come to be seminally refuted in 
Lessing’s essay on the Laokoon. 
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projected on a screen.  
 When compared to the stuttering verbal deliveries of Sick Serena … and 
The Diamond, Sea Oak’s interviews suggest, moreover, a consequence of 
‘wrecking’ language in punishment for its part in the ‘falsification’ of reality and 
creation of “fantasies of consumption” 10. The process that withdraws from systems 
of communication is the same process that removes language’s phantasmatic 
accompaniment: reification of the sign results. As Benjamin Buchloh points out, 
 
 This insistence on the autonomous physicality and pure semiotic presence of 
 functionalized speech acts and commodified objects transformed the very 
 opponent of reification – poetic language – into plasticity and objecthood.' 
 [Buchloh, 1988, p74] 
  
That is, reification of the sign both inhibits language’s capacity to “create fantasies 
of consumption and falsify reality” and limits its capacity to transcend or negate 
reality. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The preceding sketch of the inner image’s status in recent artistic practice 
has shown how one variant of ‘relational’ art assumes that its subjects only speak, 
or interact: they do not have unsaid thought. With their interior subsumed by and 
assimilated to the exterior, there is nowhere for inner images. Another variant of 
relational art assumes the full communicability of its subjects’ thoughts because 
‘thought’ is discursive and therefore wholly public. No non-discursive, 
inexpressible, private remainder is countenanced. The ‘immersive’ installation, 
meanwhile, emphasizes sensory immediacy at the expense of the cognitive distance 
that allows for hypotheses, recollections, and associations. In the name of ‘self 
transcendence’ these works demand an absorption that renders intensive and 
extensive undifferentiated, and introspection invalid. 
 It is critically assumed that language, as it appears in art’s spatial field, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 As the historical avant-garde does. For Hugo Ball, as the instrumental reason articulated 
by mass, industrialised warfare extended to - and is conveyed upon - language, it is by 
verbal means that Ball can respond: poetic glossolalia like “gadji beri bimba …” is “a 
chance to get rid of all the filth that clings to this accursed language [of] this humiliated 
age” [1996, p8]. 
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enjoys a characteristically postmodern depthlessness: that the materiality of the 
verbal signifier effaces any kind of signification. The reified sign, now an object 
among others, is inhibited from evoking images by the same politically-motivated 
disabling of its conceptual, denominative function.  
 
* 
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Defining and Accounting for phantasmata 
 
 Given the preceding examination of recent artistic practices, how might the 
putative ‘inner image’ in question be defined? Provisionally, as that which 
 
 a) has sensory content, making it ‘quasi-perceptual’: like a perception but 
 occurring in the absence of the stimuli that would cause the perception,  
 
and  
 
 b) is ‘private’, in the sense of being incommunicable and in the sense of 
 being empirically (‘outwardly’) imperceptible and unverifiable.  
 
This thesis will call this sensory-private image a phantasma, after that described by 
Aristotle. This is in the knowledge that Aristotle’s hylomorphic epistemology 
makes phantasmata not ‘inner’ in the way that Descartes’s or Locke’s ideas are 
inner representations11. Rather, Aristotle’s phantasma is taken in its capacity as a 
response to the problems created by the Empedoclean doctrine that things are 
known “by reference to something in soul which is like them" [1987, 410a12], or 
that like knows like. If there must already be an elemental correlation of soul and 
thing in order for the soul to know or perceive that thing, then where there is no 
correlation there is no thought or perception - all appearances must be true. ‘Like 
knows like’ means that perceiving and thinking can only be about their cause. 
Perceiving p will only be brought about by that object, p; believing b will be 
brought about by that state of affairs, b.12 Aristotle thus introduces phantasmata – 
stored and reproduced by the phantasia - to account for – and allow - thought and 
perception to be other than correlative with the immediate environment’s stimuli, 
to deviate from the way things are: (a) in the above definition.  
 The phantasma’s afterlife in psychoanalysis (Phantasie as opposed to the 
philosophers’ Einbildungskraft) is only partly relevant here. What is taken on is the 
‘therapeutic’ effect of the phantasma’s excision or cancellation, as in Breuer’s 
claim to regularly relieve Anna O., “of the whole stock of imaginative products 
which she had accumulated since my last visit” [1895, p30]. Extraction of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 see Rorty, 1979, p45-6. 
12 This argument from the phantasma’s intentionality is Victor Caston’s, made, amongst 
other places, in Caston, 1996.  
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phantasma in this sense could be said to return thought and perception to the way 
things are, while resistance to this would emphasize (b), the phantasma’s non-
discursive incommunicability. 
 The inevitable association of phantasmagoria - the early nineteenth-
century magic lantern displays, that concealed from the audience the means used to 
create the illusions - is also noted. The association of course connects up with the 
mystified fabrications and total sensory envelopment of James Turrell’s special 
effects, and with the technological visual spectacle more generally. 13 
Phantasmagoria would then entail, as it does for Turrell, a cancellation of any 
inner images, via their emulation and assimilation, rather their positing.  
 
Proximate Accounts   
 
 How, then, to account for the phantasma and its status, as suggested in the 
first part of this introduction? The place of ‘imagination’ in visual aesthetics and 
literary theory is too well described; rather, it seems prudent to appeal to accounts 
that pertain to the characteristics of the ‘inner image’ in question.  
 Frank Kermode’s Romantic Image (1957) is helpful in this regard. 
Kermode considers the formation of such an image – which is at heart Yeats’s 
symbol – to be impelled by the twin beliefs in “a radiant truth out of space and 
time, and in the necessary isolation or estrangement of men who can perceive it” 
[2002, p4]. Its origins lie in criticism of societal materialism; its truth has “nothing 
to do with the intellect of scientists”, but exists “in a condition of perfect unity and 
vitality' [2002, p124]. For the artist, to be “cut off from life and action … is 
necessary as preparation for the 'vision'” [2002, p9], which is what the poetry 
relays as image:  
 
 utterly original and not in the old sense 'imitated'; 'concrete', yet fluid and 
 suggestive; a means to truth, a truth unrelated to, and more exalted than, that of 
 positivist science, or any observation depending upon the discursive reason; out of 
 the flux of life, and therefore, under one aspect, dead; yet uniquely alive because 
 of its participation in a higher order of existence, and because it is analogous not to 
 a machine but to an organism; coextensive in matter and form; resistant to 
 explication; largely independent of intention, and of any form of ethical utility … 
 [2002, p53] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The phantasmagoria “figures Benjamin’s Marxist-Freudian theory of base-superstructure 
relations in a society ruled by the commodity form” [Cohen, 1989, p87] 
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Kermode’s sketch is useful in several ways. It suggests the assumptions of recent 
artistic practices that would excise exactly such an image: its critiques of 
originality and transcendent truth, its demand to include images in – if not make 
them constituent of – the “flux” of life, its concomitant intention to end subjective 
isolation. Meanwhile, it prepares us for the work of Villiers de L’Isle-Adam, which 
we will encounter in chapter 2, and the art-for-art’s-sake aestheticism feeds into 
high modernist ‘autonomy’, which will inform our understanding of the inner 
image throughout.  
 Also important to my conception of the ‘inner image’ is Giorgio 
Agamben’s reconstruction of medieval 'phantasmology' in Stanzas: Word and 
Phantasm in Western Culture (1993). Agamben presents Aristotle’s “organic 
psychological theory" [1993, p75] as the first to explicitly posit the autonomous 
production and location of ‘phantasms’, and emphasizes the centrality of the 
phantasm to a wide variety of phenomena - indeed, the soul does not think without 
it – to imagining, remembering, dreaming, speaking and divination. It is Aristotle’s 
phantasm that, "dramatized and enriched by borrowings from Stoicism and 
Neoplatonism” goes on to occupy “a central position in spiritual firmament of 
Middle ages" [1993, p77].  The contrast to the putatively rationalized present is 
noted:  
 
 We moderns, perhaps because of our habit of stressing the rational and abstract 
 aspect of the cognitive processes, have long ceased to be amazed by the 
 mysterious power of the internal imagination ... that animates our dreams and 
 dominates our waking moments more than we are perhaps willing to admit. [1993, 
 p77] 
 
Two art-historical narratives are suggestive of this loss of amazement. One is 
Rosalind Krauss’s identification of a change in mid-twentieth-century art’s mode 
of address from ‘private’ to ‘public’. Rhetoric of 1950s abstract expressionists 
made the work’s ‘meaning’ to be the transcription of the artist’s inner emotions. 
Predicated on an analogy “between the psychological interior of the artist and the 
illusionistic interior of the picture”, the surface of the work acts as a map of the 
artist’s “inner, inviolable self” [Krauss, 1977, p256] - Rothko’s “tableau vivant of 
human incommunicability” [Rothko, 2002, p571-3].14 Minimalist sculptors, claims 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  A more charitable (and here more pertinent) version of abstract expressionism’s 
individualistic, almost ascetic aspect, is socio-historical: “internal exile was a way of 
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Krauss, reverse this: “in both their choice of materials and their method of 
assembling them, were intent to deny the interiority of the sculpted form” [Krauss, 
1977, p254], and, hence to “refute the uniqueness, privacy, and inaccessibility of 
experience” [1977, p259] itself.   
 In positing a minimalist refutation of individualized interiority - which is 
arguably reiterated in the more recent move from hermeneutic reception to 
impersonal affect (see Alberro, 2009) - Krauss’s concern is with an artistic ‘inner 
self’ and the artwork’s expression of it, rather than the work’s reception, or the 
subject ‘positioned’ by the work. However ‘public’ and dismissive of private 
interiority, these sculptures are still viewed by individuals: perceptions that leave 
meaning lodged in the subject. 
 Another pertinent account is intimated by John Roberts in The 
Intangibilities of Form (2007), who finds in certain art practices of the 20th-century 
a progressive movement away from ‘first person’ expression, aesthetics, and “the 
whole panoply of possessive individualism inherent in the Cartesian Theatre” 
[2007, p125]. Modernism’s “aggressive Cartesianism and asocial aestheticism” 
[2007, p128] is radically undermined first by Duchamp and again by Warhol’s 
‘Factory’, to be fully rejected by Conceptualism, with its repertoire of techniques 
borrowed from manifold non-artistic fields of production. This demonstrates to 
Roberts that “the artist’s voice becomes subordinate to the forces of reproducibility 
and general social technique” [ibid.].  
 Again, Robert’s thesis is specifically concerned with the figure of the artist 
and artistic labour, rather than any receptive or specular labour: the trajectory 
charted is toward collective practices that have no place for a viewer as such. Both 
accounts, however, are indicative of a generalized refutation of the ‘inner’ or, 
better, Hegelian Innerlichkeit: that which is both a thing’s essence and a person’s 
subjective, self-conscious withdrawal associated with Socrates, Protestantism, 
Descartes and Romanticism.15  
 Accordingly, I want to ‘step back’ and suggest a historical account of the 
phantasma’s cancellation which also provides the theoretical frame for the 
following investigation. I propose two, opposing, logics: totalization of the concept 
and totalization of the image. The crux of the latter is Henri Bergson’s declaration 
of material reality to be an “aggregate” of images; the crux of the former, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
avoiding subservience to, and maintaining some independence from, the dominant culture” 
[Harrison and Wood, 2002, p558]. 
15 See Inwood, 1992, p142. 
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will be described now, is the recognition of a social-historical truth in Kant’s 
transcendental subject.16   
 
Totalization of the Concept  
 
 A totalization of the concept is integral to Adorno and Horkeheimer’s 
account of societal rationalization in Dialectic of Enlightenment. There, the 
dynamic of conceptual thought’s progressive domination is articulated through a 
re-functioning of Kantian ‘transcendental subjectivity’. That is, Kant’s 
epistemology is seen to summarize and model the historical rationalization of 
reason, in the following manner.  
 The ‘Copernican revolution’ of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787) 
is to take the categories that allow experience - substance, causality, space, time, 
and so on – out of the world and make them features of cognition, of reason itself. 
This ‘transcendental subjectivity’ is then the framework of concepts within which 
experienced pains, pleasure, perceptions, etc., are not only understood but 
experienced at all: 
 
 experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I 
 have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, 
 which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience 
 must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. (1998, Bxvi-
 xviii)  
 
Thus reason as conceptual framework takes priority over nature and gives law to 
nature. Objects are only recognized through categories that have their source in the 
subject; thus it is that Kant's philosophical judgment "aims at the new yet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 It is noted that this thesis moves in the ‘opposite direction’ to the popular philosophical 
movement away from subjectivity and “correlationism” - “the idea according to which we 
only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either 
term considered apart from the other” [Meillassoux, 2008, p5] - to the postulation of 
objects independent of human perception (Harman). If these projects refute the 
anthropocentrism of Kant’s Copernican revolution, whereby objects conform to the mind of 
the subject – this project recognizes, with Adorno and Horkheimer, the socio-historical 
significance of Kant’s move, and the continuing need to interrogate what the mind of the 
subject does to its objects; the notion of an ‘inner image’, I suggest, is a means to do so.      
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recognizes nothing new, since it always repeats what reason has placed into objects 
beforehand" [2002, p20].  
 Adorno and Horkheimer take ‘transcendental subjectivity’ as a socio-
historical model of reason’s rationalization: what was to be the instrument of 
freedom, on becoming total, drives out all other forms of reasoning (there is also 
'mimetic' reason) and reverts to domination. The prioritized abstract concepts of 
transcendental subjectivity stand for the socially mandated precedence of abstract 
categories (i.e., of exchange) over their objects: 
 
 Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes dissimilar things comparable 
 by reducing them to abstract quantities. For the Enlightenment, anything which 
 cannot be resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one, is illusion; modern 
 positivism consigns it to poetry [2002, p5] 
 
Since the part of reason that systematizes and quantifies has a subjective source, it 
can only find what it itself has placed into objects beforehand, and when thought is 
only mathematical, the world is only measurable.  
 Adorno and Horkheimer remind readers, however, that some conceptual 
abstraction is necessary to thought. The concept is the medium of reasoning and 
cognition generally -  “mental representation is only an instrument”:  
  
 In thought, human beings distance themselves from nature in order to arrange it in 
 such a way that it can be mastered. Like the material tool, which, as a thing, is 
 held fast as that thing in different situations and thereby separates the world, as 
 something chaotic, multiple and disparate, from that which is known, single and 
 identical, so the concept is the idea-tool which fits into things at the very point 
 from which one can take hold of them. Thought thus becomes illusory wherever it 
 seeks to deny its fruition of separating, distancing, and objectifying. [2002, p31] 
 
While “[a]ll mystical union remains a deception, the impotently, inward trace of 
the forfeited revolution” [ibid], the damage the concept does to the object, as well 
as the distance it stands the subject from it, must be admitted. Moreover, when the 
results of conceptual abstraction are systematically detached from what is 
abstracted, and reified as independent, the resulting reasoning masters the object, 
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which is then only what reason determines it to be: a token or example of what is 
already known.17 
 
Positivism 
 
 ‘Positivism’ as Dialectic of Enlightenment uses the term, is really the 
ideology of Enlightenment, its “belief” system, and the “judicial office of 
enlightened reason” [2002, p19].  As the ideology of that which was developed as a 
means of self-preservation, out of fear, its “ultimate product” is “pure immanence”, 
which is  
 
 nothing other than a form of universal taboo. Nothing is allowed to remain 
 outside, since the mere idea of the "outside" is the real source of fear." [2002, p11]  
 
It is positivism that dictates that “[a]ll gods and qualities” – i.e. that which cannot 
be resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one - “must be destroyed” [2002, 
p5].  
 There is a strong critique of positivism in much of the Frankfurt School’s 
work. Horkheimer uses the term frequently, for example in the 1937 essay The 
Latest Attack on Metaphysics. There it is argued that insofar as logical empiricism 
“holds only to what is, to the guarantee of facts” [1972, p133], science is robbed of 
its emancipatory possibilities, because brute facts can only grasp the present, and 
the possibility for changing the status quo in the future is lost. Adorno’s 
introduction to the “Positivismusstreit” papers of the 1960s re-iterates the point: 
positivism’s refusal to recognize subjectivity’s power in creating the world makes 
it complicit with a politics which accepts the world as finished reality.  
 In the same text it is argued that the actual goal of positivist prohibitions is 
“fantasy” [1976, p51]. Comte's sociology, which reveals an "apologetic, static 
orientation" is "the first enemy of both metaphysics and fantasy simultaneously" 
[ibid.]. As that which is not sensuously realized, without “hastily realized 
facticity”, fantasy retains a halo of indeterminacy. Positivism thus attempts to reify 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Thus Adorno's epistemology aims to re-instate the object, to demonstrate how the object 
of cognition is more than, different from and non-identical with how it appears in the 
context of rationalised reason. His aesthetics, meanwhile, will posit modernist art as critical 
of abstract rationality by being beyond exchange, repositories of mimetic rationality and 
sensuous particulars. [see de Duve, 2010] 
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it and set in abstract opposition – rather than dialectical relation - to reality. This 
however (at least potentially) is positivism’s undoing: 
 
 The defamation of fantasy, and the inability to conceive of what does not yet exist, 
 become sand in the mechanism of the apparatus itself, as soon as it finds itself 
 confronted with phenomena not provided for in its schema. [1976, p50]  
 
The Words We Use Will Remain Concepts 
 
 Language is directly implicated in conceptual domination. It is language 
that partakes, not in the "manifold affinities between existing things", but in "the 
single relationship between the subject who confers meaning and the meaningless 
object, between rational significance and its accidental bearer" [2002, p7]. Like 
abstraction itself, language’s relationship to its objects is one of "liquidation" 
[2002, p9]. As Negative Dialectics asserts: 
 
 [N]o matter how hard we try for linguistic expression of ... a history congealed in 
 things, the words we use will remain concepts. Their precision substitutes for the 
 thing itself, without quite bringing its selfhood to mind; there is a gap between 
 words and the things they conjure. Hence the residue of arbitrariness and relativity 
 in the choice of words as well as in the presentation of the whole. [1973, 52f] 
 
The 'nominalist tendency' [2002, p17] of Enlightenment is to identify and 
categorize - hence the complicity of language in conceptual dominance. The belief 
in a link between the name and the essence of the thing named - that naming in 
some way captures, masters, encompasses the thing named – is demonstrated by 
the Judaic prohibition of naming God: "The pledge of salvation lies in the rejection 
of any faith which claims to depict it, knowledge in the denunciation of illusion" 
[ibid.]. Language, however, has a double character – it is both nominalist or 
classifying and mimetic, both ‘sign’ and ‘image’: 
 
 As sign, language must resign itself to being calculation and, to know nature, must 
 renounce the claim to resemble it. As image it must resign itself to being a likeness 
 and, to be entirely nature, must renounce the claim to know it. ... The separation of 
 sign and image is inescapable. [2002, p 13] 
 
Language as sign works on the side of science, at a distance; language as ‘image’ 
“is” nature. Their relationship must be dialectical; if it is “hypostatized over again, 
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then each of the isolated principles tends towards the destruction of truth." [ibid.] 
‘Image’ alone can impart no conceptual knowledge, while language purged of its 
gestural, poetic dimensions – the positivist dream of “[t]hought … completely 
extirpated [of] its mimetic impulse” would “end up in madness" [1994, p40]. 
 
Publicness of Mind 
 
 The social-historical truth that Adorno saw in Kant's epistemology is 
recognised again by more recent sociological philosophy. The theorists of the 
Italian Autonomia movement note the dominance of abstract concepts, and like 
Adorno, attempt to dis-identify subjectivity with them.18  It seems that Paulo 
Virno’s discussion of ‘publicness of mind’ and the “general intellect’ extends - and 
should be understood in terms of – Adorno’s account of the totalization of the 
concept.  
 Virno contends that a "publicness of mind" is symptomatic of a political 
economy in which previously separate aspects of life have blended. What was 
interior - "intellect" - has merged, along with "labour", into the exterior of public, 
political "action". This is the field of the "multitude": Virno's attempt to account 
for the post-Fordist work force for whom – as opposed to Fordism’s repetitious and 
segmented assembly-line labour - production or labour is immaterial, and rests on 
the cognitive ability and intellectual engagement to produce socially.  
 Both reflecting on what “resources” the multitude might “count on for 
protection from the dangerousness of the world” [2004, p34] (recalling 
Enlightenment’s development as a means of self-preservation, out of fear) and 
accounting for their predicament, Virno appeals to the Aristotelian concept of topoi 
koinoi. For Aristotle, says Virno, the topoi koinoi or ‘common places’, or are “the 
most generally valid logical and linguistic forms of all of our discourse”, common 
because “no one can do without them” [2004, p35].  These places, however, are 
inconspicuous. The connection between more and less, the opposition of opposites, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The differences must also be admitted, and are instructive. Firstly, Adorno is not 
concerned re-theorizing the proletariat, as the Autonomists are. Secondly, regarding the 
place of art - for Adorno it is modernist art’s autonomy that makes it critical of abstract 
rationality; for the autonomists art can only operate in addition to an already existing logic, 
already embedded in the abstractions of exchange. And this marks the real influence on the 
thinkers of Autonomia: it is Deleuze and Guattari that leads to Antonio Negri's desire to 
exploit the communicative capacity – rather than interrupt it - in the formation of a 
connective, multitudinous new proletariat.  
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the category of reciprocity and so on, structure discourse, but do not appear. The 
forms that can be seen are "special places", or “topoi idioi”. These are visible 
expressions - 'metaphors, witticisms, allocutions, etc.' - that are appropriate only to 
particular areas of social life, to certain audiences. Historically, they are the 
province of substantial communities who attempt to secure an interior as a refuge 
from exterior threat. The multitude, however, are "exposed omnilaterally to the 
world” with no specific discourses of refuge with which to orient themselves. They 
witness the "special places" of discourse receding, submerging, and the generic 
"common places" moving to the foreground, to the surface. Everywhere, regardless 
of context, we speak and think in the same way; we have only general logical-
linguistic constructs, rather than “sectorial ethical-communicative codes” at our 
disposal [2004, p37]. Orientation, 'rhetorical topography' is lost - and the formerly 
private, hidden structures of thought and speech, the "common places" which make 
up the "life of the mind", are made exterior and public.  
 Likewise the 'general intellect': Virno, again using Aristotle, aligns the life 
of the thinker with the stranger: the thinker cannot be "at home" amidst the agora. 
If today, says Virno, reversing the analogy, being a stranger, having no sense of 
"home", is the normative condition, it demands that the stranger become a thinker,  
 
 because they turn to the most essential categories of the abstract intellect in order 
 to protect themselves from the blows of random chance, in order to take refuge 
 from contingency and from the unforeseen. [2004, p38]  
 
Those without a home put their trust in the "common places"': the abstract or 
"general intellect".19      
 This general or public intellect which the multitude draws upon is the point 
of departure for opposing developments. While it can give way to a “non-
governmental public sphere, far from the myths and rituals of sovereignty”, the 
situation of thought, language, self-reflection, the capacity for learning coming to 
the forefront can equally take on an “oppressive appearance” [2004, p40]: “If the 
publicness of the intellect does not yield to the realm of a public sphere, of a 
political space in which the many can tend to common affairs, then it produces 
terrifying effects.” [ibid.] That is, the unifying "common places" of the mind, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  Which, for the post-Fordist worker, “comprises formal and informal knowledge, 
imagination, ethical inclinations, mentalities and language games” [Virno 2007, p5]. 
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linguistic-cognitive faculties, which came to the forefront as a form of protection, 
when unchecked, leads to an "omnipotence of thought" [2004, p41].  
 This omnipotence is the teleological end point of one dynamic that, I 
suggest, cancels the ‘inner image’; the other movement that does so is in the 
opposite direction, towards a totalization of the image, which I will describe now.     
 
Totalization of the Image - Dualism and interiority 
 
In "affirm[ing] the reality of spirit and the reality of matter", Henri 
Bergson’s Matter and Memory is self-confessedly "frankly dualistic". Bergson’s 
hope is rather “to lessen, if not to overcome” dualism’s “theoretical difficulties” 
[1911, xi]. One method of doing so, whilst maintaining a duality, is to shift the 
dimension of the Cartesian dichotomy from the spatial to the temporal. Rather than 
spirit or mind being ‘in here’ and body being ‘out there’, as it is for Descartes, the 
realm of Bergson’s spirit is the past, as unrecollected, virtual or ‘pure’ memory, 
while the body is ‘actual’ and in the present. There is then no interior that 
transcends and excludes an exterior.20  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The other move towards image-totalization, initiated contemporaneously with Bergson 
and in the same anti-dualist spirit, is Edmund Husserl’s appropriation of Franz Brentano’s 
concept of ‘intentionality’ - the necessity for consciousness to exist as consciousness of 
something other than itself - on to his own phenomenology. For Jean-Paul Sartre, writing in 
1939, Husserl’s move is revolutionary: consciousness and the world are now “given at one 
stroke”: thus, 
 
 We are delivered from Proust. We are likewise delivered from the “internal life”: 
 in vain would we seek the caresses and fondlings of our intimate selves, … for 
 everything is finally outside: everything, even ourselves. Outside, in the world, 
 among others. It is not in some hiding-place that we will discover ourselves; it is 
 on the road, in the town, in the midst of the crowd, a thing among things, a human 
 among humans.” [2002, p384] 
The intentionality thesis entails, then, the erasure of an ‘inner image’: everything is outside, 
“even ourselves”. When it comes to L’Imaginaire (1940) the primary characteristic of the 
image Sartre describes is that it is not a thing in consciousness – this is the ‘illusion of 
immanence’ – but that it is a consciousness. However, when the intentional object at which 
the image aims is the subject’s own knowledge of an external (absent or non-existing) 
thing, we have a mental image which is complete at its inception and ‘teaches nothing’ 
[2004, p7]. This is because 'the existence of a psychic phenomenon and the meaning that it 
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Another strategy in Bergson’s project, and the one that concerns us here, is 
to redefine or reposition the ‘image’. The image of Matter and Memory is 
 
a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a 
representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing — an existence 
placed halfway between the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation’. [1911 xi-xii] 
 
An image, then, is not something mental, formed ‘in’ the consciousness of the 
perceiving subject; but neither is it ‘out there’. It is instead “self-existing” [1911, 
xii], the neutral word for that makes no ontological distinction between mind and 
body. An “aggregate” of these images [1911, xi] is what constitutes material 
reality, or matter. Positing such an aggregate of images annuls psychological 
interiority: "every image is within certain images and without others; but of the 
aggregate of images we cannot say that it is within or without us, since interiority 
and exteriority are only relations among images" [1911, p13].  
 
No Images ‘In’ Consciousness 
 
 Matter should not be reduced, says Bergson, “to the perception we have of 
it”, and neither should it be thought of as something “able to produce in us 
perceptions, but in itself of another nature than they” [1911, xi]. Matter, that is, is 
already perception – “pure perception, which is the lowest degree of mind – mind 
without memory – is really matter” [1911, p296] – and if matter is an aggregate of 
images, then perception is of images, not of matter that then becomes an image ‘in’ 
consciousness.21 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
has for consciousness are one' [2004, p19]. The image’s self-containment, where its 
existence and its meaning are identical, is also the source of freedom. It is not determined 
by anything outside itself; it is free from the constraints of the objective world.   
21 Another consequence of images pre-existing perception is that the world corresponds 
exactly to our idea of it. We cannot be mistaken about an image. Bergson defends his 
redefinition of images by appealing to Berkley’s definition of things as ideas:  
 
 The word ‘idea’ ordinarily indicates an existence of this kind, I mean to say a 
 completely realized existence, whose being is indistinguishable from its seeming, 
 while the word ‘thing’ makes us think of a reality which would be at the same time 
 a reservoir … that is why Berkeley prefers to call bodies ideas rather than things. 
 [2007, p137]  
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 Perception and memory are counterparts: “Our perceptions are 
undoubtedly interlaced with memories and inversely, a memory … only becomes 
actual by borrowing the body of some perception into which it slips” [1911, p72]. 
Recollecting or imagining is when ‘pure’, virtual memory is actualized in 
perceptual qualities. As the perception is always already of the image aggregate, 
recollection’s or imagining’s images are amongst that aggregate.  
 
The Body 
 
 The body, being matter, is part of the aggregate, and hence an image 
amongst other images. From the outside it is not distinct from the rest of matter – 
but the body is the one image “that contrasts with all the others in that I know it 
from the outside by perceptions, but also from the inside by affections” [1911, 
p16]. To be known from the inside by affections is not to say that those affections 
are created ‘in’ the body / brain. As an image itself, the brain cannot create images. 
The “physiologists and psychologists” claim that, just as “the centrifugal 
movements of the nervous system can call forth a movement of the body or of parts 
of the body, so the centripetal movements, or at least some of them, give birth to 
the representation of the external world” [1911, p2]. But for Bergson, “[t]he 
afferent nerves are images, the brain is an image, the disturbance travelling through 
the sensory nerves and propagated in the brain is an image too” [1911, p3]. All 
images being on a single plane, one cannot create another. The problem, when 
considering the aggregate, is that the body is naturally isolated as constant and 
centred, which leads to ’inner / outer’ distinctions.  
 
 But if, on the contrary, all images are posited at the outset, my body will 
 necessarily end by standing out in the midst of a distinct thing, since they change 
 unceasingly, and it does not vary. The distinction between inside and outside will 
 then be only the distinction between the part and the whole. There is, first of all, 
 the aggregate of images; and then, in this aggregate, there are ‘centres of action’, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
A world consisting of Berkley’s ideas or Bergson’s images is fully knowable. As Leonard 
Lawler puts it, “matter is precisely what it appears to be” [2003, p5] – which is also the 
effect of the Empedoclean doctrine of ‘like knows like’, and why Aristotle introduces the 
phantasma: for thought to diverge from the way things are.  
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 from which the interesting images appear to be reflected: thus perceptions are born 
 and actions made ready. [1911, p44] 
 
The body is not something that gives “gives birth” to representations - it is instead 
a “centre of action”. 
 
The Utopian Uniformity of the Aggregate 
 
 The ultimate goal of Matter and Memory is “to seek experience at its 
source”, before it is utilized and “becomes properly human experience.” [1911, 
p240] The aggregate’s ‘centres of action’, which are gaps and arrests in the 
continuum, form according to the needs of human utility.  It is “[b]y unmaking that 
which these needs have made” that “we may restore to intuition its original purity 
and so recover contact with the real.” [1911, p241] When the discontinuity of 
needs is dissolved into the uniformity of the aggregate, the human is restored to    
 
the material universe itself, defined as the totality of images ... a kind of 
consciousness ... in which everything compensates and neutralizes everything else, 
a consciousness of which all the potential parts, balancing each other by a reaction 
which is always equal to the action, reciprocally hinder each other from standing 
out. [1911, p312] 
 
The “totality of images” is then what counts as utopia in Bergson’s project.  
 
The Hatred of Interiority and Generalized Exteriority 
 
 When Gilles Deleuze comes to revivify Bergson’s project in the later 
twentieth-century it is as an expression of a “hatred of interiority” [1995, p6] – of 
essences as much as psychological subjectivity – and as a strategy in the anti-
humanistic effort to “get rid of our selves, and demolish ourselves” [1986, p69]. 
With Bergson, Deleuze insists on the hypothesis of a pre-personal ‘pure 
perception’, a plane of images that do not represent, a totality of appearances 
without essence:   
 
There are images, things are themselves images, because images aren’t in our 
brain. The brain’s just one image among others. Images are constantly acting and 
reacting on each other, producing and consuming. There’s no difference at all 
between images, things, and motion [1995, p. 42].  
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As for Bergson, the brain is what interrupts the flow of images, splitting it into the 
‘virtual’ and the ‘actual’. For example, when reading a verbal description, or when 
a sound or smell prompts a Proustian association, the ‘image’ experienced is 
virtual. Just as memory images are not in the brain, verbal images are not ‘in’ the 
sounds of language. They exist – they are real – but exist virtually, alongside the 
actual.  
  The Cartesian ego cogito that represents an outside world to itself is not 
the only hated interiority. Deleuze argues for a generalized exteriority, for “[e]very 
thing, that is to say every image, [to be] indistinguishable from its actions and 
reactions” [1986, p58]: things understood in terms of the relations between them, 
not in terms of any intrinsic or essential meaning or value.  
 
Interiority and Utopian Thought 
 
 Bergson-Deleuze’s assimilation of ‘inner’ images to a pre-personal plane 
and totality of appearances without essence correlates structurally with the claims 
of Jean Baudrillard’s hyperbolic critique of commodity culture. Baudrillard’s 
Simulacra and Simulations (1981) declares the invalidity of distinctions between 
object and representation, thing and idea. A world of self-referential signs or 
‘hyperreality’ undermines any contrast to the real by absorbing the real within 
itself - the TV newscast is the example. This is developed in Les Strategies Fatales 
(1983) into the claim that the culture of enlightened modernity in its contemporary 
stage has in effect made reality itself utopian, a no-place.  
 While totalizing, and excessively extrapolating from cyber-space, 
Baudrillard’s reversal of the real and utopian makes Andreas Huyssen ask: 
 
 When reality can no longer be represented, understood, or conceptualized in terms 
 of a stable episteme, when the modernist problematic of language and 
 representation is no longer limited to the aesthetic realm, but, because of the 
 spread of the media, has become all-pervasive, what are the consequences for 
 utopian thought? [1995, p91] 
Utopian thought, after all, has to ground itself in perceptions and constructions of 
what is in order to project what might be. Dialectic between given reality and the 
desire for imagined other worlds – not assimilation to the infinite recycling of 
simulacra – is, claims Huyssen, constitutive of utopian thought. 
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 The totalization of the image - Bergson-Deleuze’s assimilation of 
interiority to a pre-personal totality of appearances without essence - forsakes the 
contrast of interior to the surrounding external world, and with it, any utopian 
valence interiority may have had. Utopia is then realized, and annulled, as the 
“material universe itself”.  
 
 
* 
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Chapter Outline 
 
 With the dynamics of the image’s and concept’s totalization as theoretical 
frame in place, my first turn in the pursuit of an inner image and its critical-utopian 
function is to the work of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81). 
 ‘Utopia’ in Lessing is usually taken to be what Karl Mannheim calls the 
“liberal-humanitarian Idea”, the end point of Die Erziehung des 
Menschengeschlechts / The Education of Humankind’s (1780) unilinear historical 
progress and evolution. Utopia as the apotheosis of conceptual thought is 
illustrated by the conclusion of Nathan der Weise, where ethnic and religious 
difference is effaced in the formation and depiction, moreover, of a perfected state: 
Christian, Jew and Muslim ‘united’ as members of the same family, aligning with 
the “ideal commonwealth” tradition of Plato’s Republic, More’s Utopia, and 
Bacon’s New Atlantis. As such, Lessing would seem to contribute to, if not define, 
the cultural logic of totalized conceptual thought and the concomitant 
rationalization of the inner image.  
 This chapter argues instead for the utopian character of the Laokoon 
essay’s Einbildung: the immaterial counterpart of the material Bild. Lessing sets 
out the Einbildung in reaction to the excesses of ut picture poesis and descriptive 
poetry – hence the Einbildung does not describe; rather, it is an image that leaves 
its object, like Homer’s gods, unseen. As variously Theodor Adorno and Ernst 
Bloch, as well as Karl Mannheim and Paul Ricoeur suggest, it is the phantasiae's 
non-spatiality, its “nowhereness”, its refusal to describe a place, that grants this 
‘inner image’ its utopian function.  
 After being integral to modernist theorization of medium-specificity and 
aesthetic autonomy, and after being deconstructed in turn, not least by W J T 
Mitchell [1986], the Laokoon essays’s binary prescriptions – of which the 
Einbildung is a consequence - are now held in low regard by a resolutely ‘post-
medium’ field of art. What this reassessment of Lessing and the Laokoon essay 
urges, however, is not a return to modernist delineations or even to Jacques 
Ranciere’s ‘representational regime’, but a renewed attention to the tensions and 
non-consensus, rather than happy connectivity, between language and images.  
 Chapter 2 begins by describing how Naturalist theatre of the mid-
nineteenth century, predicated on positivist anti-metaphysical repressions, 
determinedly refuses its audience ‘inner’ images. I read Villiers de L'Isle-Adam’s 
La Révolte [1870] as an attempt – both explicitly, in theatrical form, and implicitly, 
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in textual content – to challenge this, and explore what the challenge entails for the 
putative ‘inner’ image’s utopian function.       
 Set in "le salon d'un banquier", La Révolte is a one-act melodrama in 
which the protagonist, Elizabeth, announces to her husband, Felix, that she is 
leaving him. Her announcement, the reasons for it, and Felix's remonstrations make 
up the majority of the play. The eventual departure is followed by a short "dumb 
scene" representing the passing of a few hours, where upon she returns, in apparent 
capitulation, and the play ends. I suggest that the protagonist’s declared intention to 
leave is taken up as an image – of “where” she will go - by the audience. The 
image of this “elsewhere” then exists in tension with the material presence of the 
stage, and is consequently ‘utopian’ in both form and content. I then show how in 
the writings of Remy de Gourmont and Maurice Maeterlink this inner image 
becomes totalized ‘intertextually’, and the utopian function – dependent on a 
differential relation with the non-utopian - is lost.  
 Meanwhile, the limits of the utopian valence of the inner image asserted in 
La Révolte are discerned via the protagonist’s references to Arthur Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, and the modernist recognition of the utopian valence of his aesthetics. 
Schopenhauer’s conception of music as abstract leads Bloch to consider it the 
“inwardly utopian art, completely beyond the scope of anything empirically 
verifiable”, and Adorno to declare it outside the rationale of exchange or 
commerce.  Although ascetic and will-less, Elizabeth’s utopia is yet depictive and 
hence tied to the pecuniary. The blame is on her husband and the positivist, 
materialist ethics he stands for: “His accounts have crippled my mind”.  
 Chapter 3 reconsiders the question Roland Barthes asks himself  - and 
answers in the negative – in Camera Lucida [1980], to consider the possibility of 
an inner image of cinematic spectatorship. The chapter proceeds by establishing 
two conceptions of the viewer’s engagement: that in which there is an ‘extra’ 
image, existing in the realm of the spectator, which is not the cinematographic 
material itself, and that in which there is ‘only one’ image, which is a unification of 
the spectator’s thought and cinematographic material. Barthes, I suggest, asks his 
question in fear of the latter, in which cognitive autonomy is lost to the medium, 
and in answering negatively passes over the ‘added’ or ‘extra’ images of soviet 
montage because their addition is not the voluntary prerogative of the viewer. 
Soviet montage’s extra image or Obraz is, moreover, made by instrumentalizing 
the viewer’s ‘innate’ logical, meaning-making faculties. Eisenstein attempts to put 
this ‘Kuleshov effect’ to pedagogic ends, as in Strike (1925); later cinema and its 
theorization, as Gilles Deleuze [1985] articulates, attempt to refute the effect as 
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both manipulative and logocentric, and in doing so, eliminate the ‘extra’ image 
from the realm of the spectator and make cinematic experience monist.  
 I use a critical dispute over Stan Brakhage’s The Animals of Eden and 
After (1970) to demonstrate the difficulties of such a strategy, and to emphasize the 
apparently irresistible, involuntary character of these extra images, before 
suggesting two further tactics of their prevention: by speeding up the cuts to a 
flicker or slowing them down to complete continuity. I take Brakhage’s own 
Persian Series [1999] as exemplary of the former, and Jeroen de Rijke and Willem 
de Rooij Of Three Men [1998] as exemplary of the latter. Even with these works, 
however, some mode of ‘adding’ to the images yet persists; Of Three Men, in 
particular, presents itself as an occasion - that Barthes saw provided by 
photography - to close one’s eyes, recollect, and let the “detail … rise of its own 
accord into affective consciousness”. 
 Chapter 4 pursues the relationships between language, image and 
interiority back into visual art and specifically Conceptual Art’s late-sixties-early-
seventies zenith, in a comparative discussion of the work of Marcel Broodthaers 
and Robert Barry, via the criticism of Rosalind Krauss. Those relationships – and 
specifically the role of an inner image – are framed by these artists’ invocation of 
different aspects of the work of Stéphane Mallarmé.  
 Broodthaers takes on Mallarmé’s spatialization of the material elements of 
language, via surrealist écriture, to form a rebus which is language’s material form 
exaggerated to inhibit semantic ‘content’. Barry’s sentences, meanwhile, are 
conventionally ‘meaningful’, but exhibit Mallarmé’s auto-destructive, “negative 
logic” whereby what is evoked is immediately ‘erased’ or collapses in “resonant 
disappearance”: ‘pictures’ are promised but what is offered is unpicturable. While 
Broodthaers’s engagement with Mallarmé is of course explicit – as in 1969’s 
Exposition Literaire autour de Mallarmé – Barry’s is, rather, an application of 
Mallarméan logic to the interrogation of the art object’s ontology.   
 What both practices contribute to – through paradigmatically opposing 
deployments of language - is a critique of the dominance of conceptual thought 
over experience. Barry’s texts challenge universal communicability: the notion that 
every thought can be expressed, and that thought is therefore primarily – 
necessarily – conceptual. Broodthaers’s rebuses, in their resistance to being read, 
offer experience that refuses to be conceptualized.  
 The chapter begins with an instructive misreading by Krauss of 
Broodthaers's 1974 Studio International cover, that allows the development of two 
notions of the ‘rebus’: one that Broodthaers professes, which is a combination of 
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the visual and verbal to the semantic annulment of both, and one that Krauss 
applies to Broodthaers, which, counter to her post-structuralist avowals, entails the 
verbal-conceptual determination of the visual. It is at the latter effacement of the 
non-conceptual, in fact, that both artists’ practices take aim. The conclusion then 
moved to is that if Krauss’s critical work entails a totalization of the concept, and 
Broodthaers’s rebus represents a reification of the sign that cancels language’s 
phantasmata along with its conceptual determinations, Barry’s negative logic of 
evoked blanks presents an alternative and utopian dynamic.  
 The final chapter is presented both as an epilogue and as a perspectival 
shift on the question of the inner image - from the field of art history, theory and 
practice to that of neuroscience. I suggest, however, that the same issues – of 
verbal phantasmata, of refuted interiority, of the inner image’s instrumentalization 
– are at stake, not least because the neuroscientific test-subject takes up the 
position of the reading and viewing subject of the previous chapters.    
 Since the late 1990s, developments in brain scanning technology have 
enabled clinicians to detect neural activity and infer cognitive processes among 
brain-damaged people whose impairments prevent outward signs of cognition. The 
protagonist of this movement is the British neuroscientist Adrian Owen, who has 
pioneered and publicised the use of neuro-imaging as a diagnostic and even 
communicative tool for patients in a 'vegetative state', that is, 'awake' but not 
(apparently) 'aware'. This chapter examines the processes and conclusions of 
Detecting awareness in the vegetative state, the 2006 paper in which Owen and his 
research team first claim - against medical and clinical consensus on the 
automaticity of vegetative brain activity - to have demonstrated the presence of 
consciousness in a patient previously diagnosed as vegetative. The reported 
experiment was conducted on woman who, when asked to imagine performing 
certain activities, produced fMRI scans indistinguishable from those of 'healthy' 
subjects imagining the same activities. The experimenters conclude that this 
correlation, plus the patient's apparent understanding of, and compliance with, the 
verbal request, means that the patient is 'conscious'. 
 What is at stake in the experiment, and reflects back on the previous 
chapters’ art-historical case studies, is not only a relationship between language 
and ‘imaging’ (ascription of subjecthood hinges on whether the instruction to 
imagine by itself causes the image) - it is the nature and ethics of ‘imaging’ itself. 
As the ‘Momus glass’ of the chapter’s epigraph suggests, if the fMRI scan’s 
representation of increased cerebral blood flow coincides with the subject 
imagining something, it is then an image of imagining, and as the unobservable 
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rendered observable, and the private, public, a step closer to realizing the positivist 
dream of full communicability (parodied for example by Barry’s attempts at 
telepathy in the previous chapter). To make neural activity into observable 
behaviour is, moreover, to take something involuntary as a voluntary: to take a 
‘fingerprint’ as a ‘confession’; the experimental apparatus, meanwhile, gives the 
test-subject no means to actively refuse.  
 
* 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Einbildung: Lessing’s other utopia 
 
Introduction 
 
 ‘Utopia’ in the work of G E Lessing is usually taken to be represented by 
the conclusion of Nathan der Weise: an Enlightenment, liberal-humanist 
representation. The following suggests an alternative. The Einbildung, immaterial 
counterpart of the Bild and consequence of the Laokoon essay’s dichotomies, can 
be understood in terms of a modernist ‘utopian function’.  
 
1.1. Lessing’s Utopia / Laokoon’s Utopian Function 
 
The conclusion of Lessing's Nathan de Weise shows man – and here 
Arnold Hauser may not be too broad – to be 'inwardly free, … free to choose his 
means [and] accountable for his actions to none but himself' [1999, p87-8]. It is the 
climax of that play, where the protagonists renounce difference for Enlightenment 
universality, ethnic and religious identities forgotten as if disrobed, that is most 
often taken to stand for ‘utopia’ in Lessing22. This utopia is liberal-humanist, in 
both in form and content, and as the portrayal of a good society - Christian, Jew 
and Muslim ‘united’ as members of the same family - aligns with the “ideal 
commonwealth”23 tradition of Plato’s Republic, More’s Utopia, and Bacon’s New 
Atlantis: the Ideal realized and pictured. There can be identified in the Laokoon 
essays’s Einbildung, however, a form of utopian thought which is not a perfected 
state didactically described as in liberal-humanist literature. The Einbildung 
maintains the utopian as (aesthetic) experience, as utopian function. As that which 
is not described, the utopian function of the Einbildung is owed to Lessing’s 
denigration of description in poetry, of which the following provides an account. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See, for example, Hill (2008) 
23As Ruth Levitas (1990) suggests: the 'liberal-humanist tradition ... a literary genre, even ... 
visions of ideal societies' [p68] 
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1.2. Descriptive Poetry 
 
 From the passages describing mythical nature and landscape in Spenser’s 
Fairie Queene (1590)24 a trend develops through 17th century English poetry that 
reaches its apogee in James Thomson’s Seasons, published in 1726. Thomson's 
blank verse poem consists of four extended evocations – mythifications in turn - of 
seasonal effects; a typically eulogistic scene from the 'Winter' section being: 
 
 Thro' the hush'd Air, the whitening Shower descends, 
 At first, thin-wavering; till, at last, the Flakes 
 Fall broad, and wide, and fast, dimming the Day, 
 With a continual Flow. See! sudden, hoar'd, 
 The Woods beneath the stainless Burden bow,  
 Blackning, along the mazy Stream it melts; 
 Earth's universal Face, deep-hid, and chill, 
 Is all one, dazzling, Waste. [...] 
Seasons was soon translated into German, where it was popular and influential; its 
influence can clearly be seen in Albrecht von Haller's Die Alpen, from 1732:  
  
 Der Blumen helles Gold, in Strahlen umgebogen, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Of, for example, Mammon's cave:  
 
 In all that rowme was nothing to be seene  
 But huge great yron chests, and coffers strong,  
 All bard with double bends, that none could weene  
 Them to efforce by violence or wrong;  
 On every side they placèd were along.  
 But all the grownd with sculs was scattered  
 And dead mens bones, which round about were flong;  
 Whose lives, it seemed, whilome there was shed,  
 And their vile carcases now left unburièd.  
 [2006, p99]  
 
Kaske and Stoll note in their introduction the extent to which the descriptions of hell in 
Milton’s Paradise Lost owe many of their details, and even some phrasings, to Spenser, 
while James Thompson’s The Castle of Indolence (1748) amalgamates several of Spenser’s 
spaces and revives the Spenserian stanza, adopting both the form and manner of The Faerie 
Queene (xxvi).  
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 Thuermt sich am Stengel auf, und kroent sein grau Gewand, 
 Der Blaetter glattes Weiss, mit tiefem Gruen durchzogen, 
 Strahlt von dem bunten Blitz von feuchtem Diamant. 
 
 [The bright gold of the flowers, refracted into rays, 
 Towers up the stalk and crowns his grey mantle, 
 The smooth whiteness of the leaves, streaked with a deep green, 
 Glistens with the bright lightening of a moist diamond.25 
  
1.3. Against Description, Against Matter 
 
 In his essay on the Laocoön Lessing takes up against this “mania for 
description” in poetry - Die Alpen is his contemporary example - along with a 
“mania for allegory” [1962, p5] in painting. They are, he contends, the results of a 
pernicious belief in ut pictoria poesis. The principal of the inherent similarity 
among art forms has mutually deformed the verbal and visual arts,  
 
by attempting to make the former a speaking picture, without actually knowing 
what it could and ought to paint, and the latter a silent poem, without having 
considered to what degree it is able to express general ideas without denying its 
true function and degenerating into a purely arbitrary means of expression. [1962, 
p5] 
 
While Lessing's own earlier works were not without fashionable attempts to “paint 
poetically”26, the demotion of description is central to the argument of his essay on 
the Laokoon sculpture. Verbal description is devalued for aspiring to the material, 
empirical Bild or picture; the 'properly' poetic evokes the immediately experienced, 
internal, subjective, Einbildung. The latter, says Lessing 
 
 is not necessarily something that can be converted into a material painting; but 
 every detail, every combination of details by which the poet makes his subject so 
 palpable to us that we become more conscious of the subject than of his words, is 
 picturesque, is a picture. [1962, p74-5]  
 
A poetic picture, as opposed implicitly to a description's picture, cannot necessarily 
be painted. It is to this end that “the ancients” maintained the illusory status or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Trans. David E Wellbery in Wellbery, 1984, p219 
26 see McCormick, p258 
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'enargia' of such poetic 'phantasiae'; if modern treatise on poetry had kept this 
terminology, 'poetical phantasiae would not have been so readily confined to the 
limits of a material painting' [1962, p208]. Then a poetic picture is the state in 
which the reader is 'more conscious of the subject than of [the] words', or when the 
words disappear before that which they evoke. Once that which is written or 
spoken is dematerialized, poetry fundamentally consists of 'incorporeal … forms' 
which may 'exist simultaneously without concealing or damaging each other,' in 
direct opposition to 'objects themselves or their natural symbols in the narrow 
confines of space or time.' [1962, p40] What is evinced is a poetic picture that 
cannot be translated into - is the obverse of, is repelled by - matter.27  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For Lessing, to approximate matter via description, “to give the reader an idea of the 
whole, the poet enumerates one by one several parts or things” [1962, p91]. But these 
remain only parts: the resultant image has nothing of the 'liveliness and likeness that poet 
and painter are capable of offering us in their images' [1962, p103]. Die Alpen’s lines, says 
Lessing, “might be very lovely to recite if one has the flower itself in hand; by themselves, 
however, they say little or nothing” [1962, p104]. That numerating the parts, accumulating 
predicates, risks losing the described object al together, causes the modernist turn to 
metaphor: Cecil Day-Lewis, in his book on the The Poetic Image, will look in 
commiseration upon passages in Gerard Manley Hopkins's journals where “he describes an 
object with such minute and scrupulous accuracy of detail that the object itself completely 
disappears” [2011, p24]; it is metaphor that meets the need for “expressing the relationship 
between things and the relationship between things and feelings” [ibid, p25]. What is 
considered description’s failing – making Hopkins’s object “completely disappear” and the 
lines of Die Alpen say “nothing” – is what blurs Lessing’s prescriptive dichotomy and 
grants description a utopian function. 
 The descriptive writing of Raymond Roussell – an “aberrant modern”, as Frederic 
Jameson [1991, p135] calls him, considering various modernist aesthetics’ ideologies of 
perception - is a case in point. Roussell describes “at lengths interestingly intolerable for 
most readers” [ibid.]: the descriptions of machines in Impressions d’Afrique (1910) and 
Locus Solus (1914) exhaust the reader and the object equally. The interminably complex, 
exposited and explained does not permit the formation of “whole” ideations of, for 
example, the “balloon-powered paving apparatus” that fashions a mosaic out of extracted 
teeth in Locus Solus or Impressions d’Afrique’s “apparatus, made of metal, [that] looked at 
first glance distinctly like a loom.”  In the middle of it, “parallel to the current, was 
stretched a horizontal warp, consisting of an infinite number of blue threads, placed side by 
side in a single row, which took up no more than six feet by reason of their extraordinary 
fineness. … In front of them a batten, a sort of huge metal comb ...” [2010, p15] Another 
“contraption”, meanwhile (in an excerpt admittedly too short to serve), “consisted of a sort 
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1.4. Rendering the Gods 
 
 If the descriptive nature poetry to which Lessing is reacting attempts to 
engage with matter (albeit in eulogy), it is literally 'of the earth'. Lessing advances 
his argument for a poetic picture by appositely taking the heavens and their 
occupants, rather than profane landscape, as 'subject'. When Homer writes of the 
gods fighting “the entire battle is represented in the poem as being invisible” 
[1962, p66]. In painting, however, “everything is visible in but one way” [ibid.]: 
invisibility is conveyed by “a thin cloud veiling the side of the object that is turned 
toward the other persons in the pictures” [1962, p68]. When in Homer, Athene 
picks up a stone to throw, it is “black and rugged and huge, one which men of a 
former time had set there as a boundary mark of the cornfield” [XXI 403-5]; when 
Mars is thrown to the ground, “[h]e cover[s] seven acres” [XXI. 407]. If the painter 
gives the god this extraordinary size, argues Lessing, “it is no longer Mars … who 
is lying on the ground, but a common warrior.” Poetry 'exalts the gods' by not 
describing them, by leaving their 'size, strength, [and] speed' 'unseen':     
 
The invisibility leaves the imagination free rein to enlarge the scene and envisage 
the persons and actions of the gods on a grander scale than the measure of ordinary 
man. [1962, p66] 
 
Moreover, because the poet works with the imagination's incorporeal forms, 
“[i]nvisibility is the natural condition of his gods … an enlightenment, an increased 
power of mortal vision is required, if they are intended to be seen.” [1962, pp69-
70] When painting - and by implication, painterly writing – represents the gods,  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of large grindstone, which was worked by a pedal and which set in motion a whole system 
of wheels, rods, levers and springs, forming an extricable tangle of metal; from one side 
extended an articulated arm, which ended in a hand armed with a foil” [2010, p35]. 
 Such descriptions parody the positivist aspirations of nineteenth-century literary 
projects such as Emile Zola’s, where the “hypertrophy of real detail”, as Zola calls it 
[Hanon, 1981, p11] is a prime strategy of anti-idealist, polemical realism. The process that 
should bring the object to observation renders invisible.   
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everything which in the poem raises the gods above godlike human creatures 
vanishes altogether. Size, strength, swiftness qualities which Homer always has in 
store for his gods in a higher and more extraordinary degree than that bestowed on 
his finest heroes – must in the painting sink to the common level of humanity. 
[1962, pp67-68]  
 
Thus poetic pictures are distinguished from descriptive pictures, by making the 
gods’ invisibility and ineffability equivalent: what cannot be said, cannot be seen.  
 
1.5. The Einbildung as both Psychological and Transcendent 
 
 This is not, or not only, a duplicitous play of words; the words are of 
secondary importance to the Einbildung that they evoke. As such the Laokoon 
entails an application to language of the Neoplatonic notion that artworks connect 
directly with the transcendent Ideal. For Plotinus, rather than making copies of 
copies as Plato would have it, the artist by-passes the sensible world and imitates 
the transcendent Ideas themselves. The claim makes images radically truthful 
whilst retaining the structure of the Platonic cosmos in which they had been 
fundamentally deceptive. Furthermore, it made the work of art superior in its 
reflection of the Ideal than imperfect Nature itself: 
 
Still the arts are not to be slighted on the ground that they create by imitation of 
natural objects; for … we must recognize that they give no bare reproduction of 
the thing seen but go back to the Ideas from which Nature itself derives … Thus 
Pheidias wrought the Zeus upon no model among things of sense but by 
apprehending what form Zeus must take if he chose to become manifest to sight. 
[cited in Abrams, 1953, p42] 
 
Lessing's Einbildung entails this by-passing of the sensible in the elucidation of 
originary 'Ideas'. But whereas for Plotinus, Zeus could feasibly be rendered in 
stone, Lessing would find Pheidias fundamentally ill-qualified, in fact going 
further than Plotinus in his claim that only the poet, who works in ideas, the 
medium of the gods, can render them. Plotinus's argument served to elevate art 
over all human pursuits, to make it a bridge to the Ideas and to God himself (the 
result being that the artist turns from craftsman to creator, from 'mirror', in the 
terms of M H Abram's classic study, to 'lamp'), the explicit implication being that 
Ideas resided both in the region of transcendental subsistence and within the mind 
itself: the arts “go back to the Ideas from which Nature itself derives,” and in a 
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statue “this form is not in the material; it is in the designer before it enters the stone 
…” [cited in Abrams, 1953, p43]. For Lessing however, stone – any matter - 
stultifies the imagination and interrupts the ethereal connection between artist, 
spectator and the transcendental subsistence.  
 
1.6. Autonomy and Instrumentalization of the Einbildung 
 
 It should be made clear that the Einbildung set out in the Laokoon essays is 
a poetic picture not only elevated above prevalent 18th century conceptions – that 
it can only be a peripheral, secondary structure, decoration or ornament - but also 
above Lessing's own previous conception, as set out in the commentaries on his 
Fabeln (1759). Here what poetry evokes is of central importance, but its 
importance is pedagogic, rather than metaphysical: evocation is instrumentalized as 
a tool for understanding. The commentaries claim that the fables require no 
explanation or explication of their moral because metaphoric and metonymic 
images convey the moral intuitively. Intuitive cognition results from the 
transformation of universal principles into localized instances, instances which, 
“when imaginatively attended to by the reader, immediately manifests the moral 
truth in question” [Wellbery, 1984, p193]. These localized instances are figurative, 
vivid and sensual, but, vitally – and in this aspect the treaties agree - not obscured 
by description. Foxes are not described as cunning, dogs not described as faithful: 
the symbolism of characteristics is implicit and imaginatively supplied by the 
reader in the process of intuition. The fable Der Besitzer des Bogens actually tells 
this story: a man has his prize bow carved with images to improve its appearance, 
but which only weaken it, causing it to break, putting end to the beauty of its 
efficacy28. The beauty of the bow's efficacy as a bow is also the beauty of the 
fable's utilitarian function prioritized over its ‘entertainment’ value. It is this 
functionalized, pedagogic role which ensures that the fabulist's poetic images 
remain earth-bound; the poetic image of the Laokoon essay, by contrast, must be 
fully autonomous, neither a vehicle for theoretical knowledge nor allude to 
anything in the world.  
 The difference between the images of the Fabeln and those proposed in the 
Laokoon essay is most marked by a change in the conception of the reader's 
imaginative engagement. Whereas the fabulist demands a linear input from the 
reader in intuiting a moral message, the onus in the Laokoon essay is on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 see Beate Allert (2005)  
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imagination's “free play” [Lessing, 1962, p16] In the latter, the imagination must 
be restricted neither by material things in the world nor representations of them29. 
It works through - almost despite - the body's material: when we find a work of art 
beautiful it 'is beautiful not to our eyes but to our imagination through our eyes” 
[1962, p41]. The eye is guilty by association with the world's visibility, another 
object that the imagination must negotiate or mitigate to allow fruition, on its 
passage to the transcendent.30  
  
1.7. The Einbildung Negates  
 
The Laokoon essay's primary claim, that verbal arts proceed in time and plastic arts 
exist in space, must be recalled to appreciate an important element of the 
Einbildung: that it negates. The sounds and written signs of poetry are material 
which is perceived, but, as verbal, exist in time and 'disappear' successively from 
view or audition. An imaginative experience arises of their content; the Einbildung, 
extended in time, occludes space's simultaneously present things (Lessing's space 
is Euclidean and atemporal, “what is seen in nature at once” [1962, p103]). David 
E Wellbery articulates this dynamic most clearly:  
 
The temporal movement of thought negates space, takes apart the confused 
simultaneity of things, and, by virtue of this negation, attains to mastery over the 
manifold impingements imposed by the world in its brute presence. …  For 
Lessing, the negation of worldliness accomplished by the successivity and 
discreteness of linguistic signs allows the imagination to return to itself from its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The argument is not, as Jacques Ranciere suggests, “grounded in the distance between 
real presentation and artistic representation” [2007, p126]; there is no distance between 
them as long as both partake of matter. What is important is rather the mode: the 
representative power of the immediately experienced Einbildung, or poetic, internal, 
subjective image, is far superior to that of the material, empirical Bild. 
30As David Wellbery (1984) points out, the ideal history of mind progressively detaching 
from worldliness, in which poetry occupies both a 'later' and 'higher' stage than the plastic 
arts, is projected onto human events in the Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts (On the 
Education of Mankind, 1780) which describes man's progress towards God and the truth of 
revelation as a progress from 'Bild' (image) to 'Begriff' (concept). At the end of this infinite 
path of the history of language, where man finally absolved from sin and has therefore 
achieved likeness with God, there is an imageless and wordless language of pure 
knowledge.  
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exile in space and exteriority …. [endowing poetry with] a syntax that conforms to 
the movement of the imagination.' [1984, p132-3] 
 
In other words, just as the poetic Einbildung renders present what is absent, it 
renders absent what is present.  
 
1.8. The Utopian Function of the Einbildung 
 
 The notion of a utopian function - as opposed to a (described, nominated) 
utopia - is articulated in 20th-century western Marxism, most prominently by Ernst 
Bloch. Central to Bloch’s notion, as it is for the Frankfurt School’s more 
generally31, is the Judaic taboo on idolatrous images, reworked in resistance to 
prematurely positive utopian thought. The efficacy of a utopian function within 
experience depends on utopia not being pictured or described. As Bloch, in 
discussion with Theodor Adorno, remarks,  
 
If I portray utopia, or an installment of utopia, in a book, ‘it has at least become 
real already and, as you said, ‘cast into a picture.’ One is thus deceived. It is 
diffused, and there is a reification of ephemeral or non-ephemeral tendencies, as if 
it were already more than a being-in-tendency, as if the day were already there. 
Thus, the iconoclastic rebellion against reification is now in this context 
completely correct. [2009, p11] 
 
Just as the utopian function must reject determinate content, it is also stipulated to 
be ultimately oppositional: ‘[t]he essential function of utopia”, writes Bloch, “is a 
critique of what is present’ [1988, p12]. Thus the not-pictured is critically opposed 
to the pictured, the undescribed to the described.   
While bearing Bloch’s formulations in mind, most pertinent here seems the 
notion of a utopian function suggested by Karl Mannheim, whose Ideology and 
Utopia (1929) was in fact the object of extensive critique by various members of 
the Frankfurt School, for re-assimilating the concepts to the idealist metaphysics 
from which Marx had rescued them32.  In Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim reverses 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 In The Aesthetic Dimension, for example, Herbert Marcuse thinks the utopian impulse 
through Freudian psychoanalysis as counterweight to the combined pressures of the so-
called “performance principle” and the institutional pleasures of “repressive 
desublimation”.   
32 see Martin Jay, 1974.  
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the standard Marxist understanding, which is that utopia prevents social change by 
imposing an ideal on reality: 
 
A state of mind is utopian when (a) it is incongruous with the immediate situation 
and (b) when passed onto actions, tend to shatter the order of things. [1936, p341] 
 
For Mannheim, utopia promotes social change; it is ideology that sustains the 
existing state of affairs. Both ideology and utopia are ideas that transcend their 
contextual reality, both being oriented towards the non-existent: utopia, to the 
future, and ideology to the past.  
 
1.9.  Utopias of Sense and Idea, Spatial and Temporal 
 
 Mannheim goes on to offer a typology of utopias. The first form of utopian 
“mentality”, the orgiastic chiliasm of the Anabaptists (Mannheim’s account owes 
much to Ernst Bloch's early work on Thomas Muenzer), is essentially experiential: 
action is not inspired by "ideas", but by forces with roots "in much deeper-lying 
vital and elemental levels of the psyche" [1936, p192], by the possibility of a leap 
over into ecstasy.  
 
Orgiastic energies and ecstatic outbursts began to operate in a worldly setting, and 
tensions, previously transcending day to day life became explosive agents within it 
... [This form of utopia] corresponded to the spiritual fermentation and physical 
excitement of the peasants, of a stratum living closest to the earth [ibid.]. 
 
The primary identifying characteristic of Chiliastic experience is “absolute 
presentness" [1936, p193]. For the Chiliast, "the present becomes the breach 
through which what was previously inward bursts out suddenly, takes hold of the 
outer world and transforms it" [ibid.]. Whereas the mystic describes his ecstasy as 
a situation that cannot be conceived of in spatial or temporal terms, the Chiliast has 
sensual experience present in all its robustness, which is inseparable from his 
spirituality and the immediate present. 
Mannheim contrasts the Chiliastic utopia with the “liberal-humanitarian 
Idea”. The latter is "a formal goal projected into the infinite future whose function 
it is to act as a mere regulative device in mundane affairs" [1936, p197]. As 
bourgeois liberalism loses sense for material things, ideals empty of content and 
their utopia correspondingly lacks depth or colour. This overemphasis on form 
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corresponds to "the manner of experiencing historical time as unilinear progress 
and evolution" [1936, p197] - one source of which, says Mannheim, is Lessing’s 
Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts / The Education of Humankind (1780), 
where religious history is traced as a progress from polytheism to monotheism, to 
the ethic of Christianity, to a world in which good is done for its own sake. Thus, 
“the religious idea of development may be understood as an ebbing away of the 
Chiliastic impulse - as a process in which abiding faith [Harren] becomes, in the 
German milieu a ‘waiting and anticipation’” [1936, p201], and the revolutionary 
Chiliastic time-sense merges imperceptibly into the evolutionary.  
 
1.10. The Glance from Nowhere 
 
 In his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia (1985) Paul Ricoeur sets aside the 
difficulty of applying Mannheim’s dichotomy (the utopian and ideological only 
appear retrospectively, where the former is found to have transformed the given 
social situation33), and develops the contrast into a subtler plurality of aspects. 
While the function of ideology is always legitimation, it may serve to integrate as 
much as distort or dissimulate; and while utopia’s function is always to challenge, 
its pathology is of escape. In Ricoeur’s account, the imagination is the force behind 
both these processes:   
 
On the one hand, imagination may function to preserve an order. In this case the 
function of the imagination is to stage a process of identification that mirrors the 
order. Imagination has the appearance here of a picture. On the other hand, though, 
imagination may have a disruptive function; it may work as a breakthrough. Its 
image in this case is productive, an imagining of something else, the elsewhere … 
Ideology represents the first kind of imagination; it has a function of preservation. 
Utopia, in contrast, represents the second kind of imagination; it is always the 
glance from nowhere. [1985, p286] 
 
A clear dichotomy forms when the foregoing concepts are returned to the Laokoon: 
the ideological and utopian map directly onto, respectively, the descriptive Bild and 
the (properly) poetic Einbildung. The “increased power of mortal vision” holds a 
utopian function only insofar as it remains a vision, empirically unrealized, or 
rather, remains a power, rather than a vision of anything. Remembering Lessing's 
insistence that “poetical phantasiae” should not be “confined to the limits of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 see Levitas, 1990, p69 
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material painting”, it is the phantasiae's non-spatiality, its “nowhereness”, its 
refusal to describe a place, that grants the utopian function. Meanwhile it is 
description's process of identification, giving rise to confirmation and recognition, 
that makes it the ideological legitimation of the status quo. Nature poetry like von 
Haller's, in a historical moment of incipient industrialisation, is that 'picture of ...', 
what Ricoeur would call a “symbolic confirmation of the past”; the properly poetic 
Einbildung is “a symbolic opening towards the future”.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The climax of Nathan de Weise unites a Christian knight, the adopted 
daughter of a Jew, and a Muslim ruler as members of the same family: difference 
subsumed under Enlightenment universality. This climax meets with that of 
Mankind’s, as described in the Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts: progress 
towards God and the truth of revelation as a progress towards the Begriff or 
concept, what Mannheim calls the “liberal-humanitarian Idea”.  The Einbildung is 
not this concept: it is an image, but an image that leaves its object, like Homer’s 
gods, unseen. Therein lies its utopian function.34 
* 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 For a recent counter-argument to such a claim, one may well look to the work of Jacques 
Ranciere. Rancière’s is, like W J T Mitchell’s (1986), a critical reaction to the Laokoon’s 
high modernist invocation34 as much to the implication of Lessing’s assertions. Ranciere 
recognizes Lessing’s essay as a decisively divisive moment: the “absence of common 
measurement”, the “registration of the disjunction between registers of expression and 
therefore between the arts” that Lessing’s Laokoon formulates, leads to a rationalization 
into spheres of autonomy within the arts and ultimately to a “loss of their power of thinking 
in common” [2007, p39]. According to Rancière, to claim that the means of artform x are 
inadequate to represent subject y’s singularity, is to lay claim to what is properly ‘sayable’ 
and properly made ‘visible’: Lessing's essay embodies the attempt to subject the image to 
hierarchical divisions and prescriptions. The argument that “the suffering of Virgil's 
Laokoon … is unrepresentable in sculpture, because its visual realism divests art of its 
ideality insofar as it divests the character of his dignity”, means that “[e]xtreme suffering 
belonged to a reality that was, in principle, excluded from the art of the visible.' [2009, 
p124-5] Moreover, the idea of the unrepresentable per se conflates, says Ranciere, two 
distinct notions: “impossibility and interdiction”, i.e. ‘can not’ and ‘must not’. Lessing’s 
argument is the same as that behind Burke’s declaration that Paradise Lost’s Satan was 
unrepresentable in painting: “its sublime aspect depended upon the duplicitous play of 
words that do not really let us see what they pretend to show us” [2009, p123]. A 
“duplicitous play of words”, then, would be all that the foregoing claims - for the utopian 
function of an image that leaves its object unseen - would amount to.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The Revolt of the Inner Image 
 
2.1. Naturalism incipient 
 
 Two years after Lessing's Laokoon essay, the Parisien theatre critic Louis 
Charpentier publishes the Causes de la décadence du goût sur le théâtre. This is 
one of several French tracts in the late 1760s and early 1770s that, like Lessing's 
essay, set themselves against the distasteful refinements of neo-classicism. For 
Charpentier, these are extolled by the courtly and 'decadent' plays of the Comédie 
Française, that, in formal terms, prioritize speech - the dramatic space of the text – 
over material, theatrical space. At the other end of the spectrum were the 'illiterate' 
commercial fairground theaters that foregrounded the stage and the player's bodies. 
Theatre's decline, it was perceived, was found in the increasingly wide division 
between the two; and Charpentier's answer – the opposite of Lessing's - is to 
aesthetically unify. French theatre could be renewed by the introduction of a 
dramaturgy based on classical comedy, updated to the contemporary moral 
situation. This entailed finding a mid-point between 'high' verbal representations 
and 'low' visual representations – in other words, the realization on the stage of the 
visual world of the text; and it is with this move that the naturalism of the 
bourgeois domestic drama is incipient.  
 
2.1.1. Naturalist theatre and Positivism 
 
 In the realization of the text’s visual world, naturalist theatre necessarily 
entailed a cancellation of the kind of “phantasaie” that Lessing had proffered. The 
motivation for the cancellation is there in the mid-century milieu of Darwinian 
determinism, Marxian materialism, but particularly Compte's positivism. By 1860 a 
Naturalist theatre – rising to dominance over melodramas, spectacle plays, comic 
operas, and vaudevilles – was fully formed on the precept of the truth of the 
phenomenal object-world. Emile Zola would concretize it as  
 
 the study of the human predicament within the framework of reality, the rejection 
 of all myths: people living in their true environment, a drama free from old wives' 
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 tales and tattered histories, from grand meaningless words and conventional 
 foolishness and bragging. [Zola, 1996, p72] 
 
The dramatic space or world of the text, then, was not something to be left to 
imaginative inference: it was to be brought 'within the framework of reality', 
realized in empirical space, made public, and observed. Emphatic empirical images 
– detailed costumes, three-dimensional, illusionistic sets - were the result. Speech, 
similarly, could not refer to the unobservable: it could not depart from the fully-
represented profane world of the stage. To do so would intimate an 'elsewhere' 
beyond positivist study. Thus exposition is always motivated, there are no 
soliloquies, no asides, and language includes no 'grand meaningless words'.  
 
2.1.2. La Révolte 
 
 On the 6th of May, 1870, the curtain rises at the Theatre du Vaudeville on 
the first performance of a one-act play named La Révolte, written by Villiers de 
L'Isle-Adam. The curtain rises - according to Villiers's script, published the same 
year - on "le salon d'un banquier" [Villiers, 1870, p19]: a large, opulent sitting-
room, richly decorated with carpets and chandeliers in red, black and gold. On the 
left of the stage is an office-table, covered with account-books and papers. A man 
and a woman sit opposite each other, examining documents, tallying bank notes. 
The ensuing plot of this short melodrama is simple. The woman, Elizabeth, will 
announce to her husband, Felix, that she is leaving him35. Her announcement, the 
reasons for it, and Felix's remonstrations make up the majority of the play. The 
eventual departure is followed by a short "dumb scene" representing the passing of 
a few hours, where upon Elizabeth returns in apparent capitulation, and the play 
ends.  
  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 This revolt must be marked off from others of the period. It is not the revolt of September 
that year, which led to the institution of the Paris Commune. Neither is it Peter Kropotkin's 
anarcho-communist journal, started in Geneva at the end of that decade. It comes several 
months before the sending of Mikhail Bakunin's Letters, with their demand for 'propagande 
par le fait': the revolt of Villier's protagonist's, if it is 'by the deed', is one not of violent 
action but of exit. This revolt is too soon, out of step: it runs for 6 nights before it closes. It 
is re-staged, novelized, assimilated, in the 1890s. 
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Introduction 
 
 In the following I want to explore in what way the eponymous revolt might 
also be one against the anti-metaphysical repressions of Naturalist theatre, and 
what this means for a putative ‘inner image’ and its utopian function.  This 
exploration takes two routes:  
 
 1. The protagonist’s declared intention to leave is taken up as an image – 
 of “where” she will go - by the audience. The image of this “elsewhere” 
 then exists in tension with the material presence of the stage. It is 
 consequently ‘utopian’ in both form and content. When this image, as 
 inner, becomes totalized ‘intertextually’ the utopian function is lost.  
 
 2. Via the protagonist’s references to Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy, 
 and the modernist appropriation of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics to utopian 
 ends, the limits of La Revolte’s – or at least of the inner image it asserts - 
 utopian  valence is suggested.  
 
2.2. Elizabeth’s Dream as (Utopian) Inner Image 
 
 In the last moments before Elizabeth leaves, she points to a crystal paper 
weight on the table and tells Felix it is a "souvenir" -  it is "polished, transparent, 
truthful - and icy cold. If you should ever think of me - look at it" [Villiers, 1901, 
p29]. But Felix and the audience also have another, quite different souvenir of 
Elizabeth. By the time she leaves, they know where she intends to go, in both 
abstract and concrete terms. The abstract terms of this extra-, or post-diegetic life 
are of a 'dream', both in contradistinction to the rational, waking present and in 
terms of a hope or wish. To dream is  
 
 to forget the tyranny of inferior minds, which are a thousand times more abject 
 than stupidity itself. To dream  is to escape hearing the moans of incurable misery. 
 It is to forget those humiliations we have to bear and to inflict on others, called 
 social life. It is to forget so-called duties, which are nothing but greed of profit, 
 and in whose name we shut our eyes to the lot of the weak and suffering. It is to 
 contemplate in the depths of our thought a hidden world only faintly reflected by 
 outside realities. It is to strengthen the ever conscious hope in death - death which 
 is at hand. It is to feel the mystery of the everlasting, to feel solitary but immortal. 
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 It is to love the Ideal, to love it as naturally as the river flows to the sea. And as for 
 the rest — the amusements and duties of the wretched age in which my lot is cast 
 —they are not worth a day's existence. To dream is to die — to die in silence with 
 a glimpse of heaven in one's eyes. [Villiers, 1901, pp20-21]  
 
Practically, concretely, she will re-open her "old books" and live in "silence" 
[1901, p26]. She will be able to achieve this because she has invested her share of 
their fortune so that she will be able "to count on a little bread and cheese for the 
rest of [her] life, without going through any further trials" [1901, p13]; and she has 
invested in property:   
 
 Far from here is Iceland, Sicily or Norway—it doesn't matter which—in a country 
 of my own choice stands a lonely house which I have earned, bought with my 
 money. Instead of being caged in this office, I shall retire to this delightful far-off 
 spot, where I shall get a glimpse of the horizon - that's something useful ... [1901, 
 p25] 
 
In the time before Elizabeth's departure these signifiers of an eschatological 
'elsewhere' are set out, for the audience to gather up, as an image. The elsewhere is 
posited as both spatially 'beyond' the Naturalist mis-en-scene - it is not here, not 
this - and temporally after it - she will go there.  
 
2.3. The Dumb Scene, Return and Soliloquy 
 
When Elizabeth does finally leave, Felix, alone on stage, delivers a panicked, 
breathless rant, before collapsing in a faint. A "dumb scene" follows: 
 
 The clock over the door strikes one. Slow music. Then from time to time after a 
 sufficiently long pause, two o'clock, then half-past two, then three, then half-past 
 three, and at length four o'clock strikes. Felix remains unconscious. The dawn 
 appears at the windows. The candles go out. The rim of a candlestick cracks. The 
 fire burns down. The door in the background is roughly opened. Elisabeth enters 
 trembling, deadly pale, holding her pocket handkerchief to her mouth. Without 
 seeing her husband, she goes slowly to the big arm-chair, next the mantelpiece, 
 throws off her hat, then covering her face with her hands, sits down and begins to 
 think aloud. She is cold and shivers, her teeth chatter. [1901, p31] 
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"To herself" Elizabeth explains her return: in the carriage, despite her longing for 
freedom, a "cold feeling of exile" came over her.  
 
 I knew that the sacred breath of life was around me - that I was conscious of it, 
 and yet I was indifferent. I enjoyed it no more. ... I had forgotten how to soar 
 above the world, how to shut my ears against the mocking laughter of mankind. .... 
 These four years of drudgery have broken my spirits. ... His accounts have 
 crippled my mind. [1901, p33] 
 
She concludes that her place is there, with Felix, and resolves to educate her 
daughter; "that is all - and tomorrow I shall recommence my old life." She takes off 
her cloak and arranges her dress to "appear as she was at first", goes to the table 
and opens the account books, then "sits down and takes up her pen in the same 
attitude as when [the] curtain rose." Felix wakes up. Realizing only four hours have 
passed, he is gratified, and takes her hand. For a moment, Elizabeth, "smiling, 
seems quite happy" before becoming "gloomy again" and "lost in thought". She 
concludes the play by "look[ing] at him with pity and sadness" and calling him, "in 
a slow and serious voice", a "[p]oor man" [1901, p34-5].  
 In Villiers's work the revolt against naturalism is internal. La Revolte's 
staging is a convincing illusion of bourgeois domesticity: a single room, richly 
detailed and coloured. The protagonists' behaviour and language are, similarly, true 
to their environment - but only initially. The "grand meaningless words" of her 
dream speech, the poetic "flight" precedes her own flight from the stage, the 
naturalism of which collapses behind her, in the form of the "dumb scene" / “scene 
muette” [Villiers, 1870, p52]. 
 In her absence, and with Felix lying unconscious on the sofa, time speeds 
up: its passing is indicated by the half-hourly striking of the clock, occurring "from 
time to time, after a sufficiently long pause"; and by the windows lightening, the 
candles going out, the fire burning down. The implied effect is similar to that 
experienced by the protagonist of H G Well's Time Machine (1895), for whom, at a 
greater speed, "[t]he night came like the turning out of a lamp, and in another 
moment came tomorrow. The laboratory grew faint and hazy, then fainter and ever 
fainter. Tomorrow night came black, then day again, night again, day again, faster 
and faster still" [2008, p22]. We now know this effect as the cinematic 'time-lapse' 
sequence - as indeed seen in Gene Warren's special effects for George Pal's 1960 
Time Machine.  
 The cinematic comparison is instructive. The cinema audience always 
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"shares time" with the screen: they accelerate and decelerate with it, submitting 
their own 'lived' temporality to that represented36. In the naturalist theatre, too, time 
is shared evenly between the auditorium and the stage. The actors move in the 
same time - and space - as the audience. La Revolte's dumb scene breaks with the 
mis-en-scene's naturalism, then, by staging a different time, or tempo, to that of the 
auditorium. For a few moments, while "slow", extra-diegetic music plays, the 
stage-time is not coextensive with the audience's. In these moments there are no 
subjectivities on stage: Felix, unconscious and motionless, is part of the mis-en-
scene. Then the bifurcated tempos re-join with a jolt when the "door in the 
background is roughly opened [and] Elisabeth enters".  
 Inasmuch as stage and auditorium are temporally united, Elizabeth's return 
means a return to naturalism. But there is an anti-naturalistic persistence: she "sits 
down and begins to think aloud". Thinking aloud means a soliloquy - not an aside 
or monologue - which, as an index of unobservable interiority, naturalism 
prohibits. Naturalism would have her sit in silence, continuing the dumb scene. 
Giving a diegetic description of what happened in the carriage, how the longed-for 
freedom turned to "exile", she explains her return to herself, but also, of course, to 
the audience. The soliloquy is thought made public: for its duration the audience 
are no longer naturalism's observers, but attendant, assimilated in thought. An anti-
naturalistic act, but, as thought made speech, externalized and realized, in 
positivistic spirit. When Felix comes to he speaks to her, while she is "lost in 
thought" [Villiers, 1901, p36] - thought retracted into the unobservable interior, 
and the terminus of her trajectory.  
  
2.4. Materiality of La Revolte’s Stage Prevents Full Idealization 
 
 As a dramatic production, La Revolte's material presence thwarts the 
aspirations of Elizabeth and her utterances. The bourgeois mis-en-scene – her 
husband's ideology, the living-room stage set, Euclidean space, space itself – 
prevents a full 'idealization'. We find, however, that this is achieved inter-textually, 
when a fictional La Revolte is staged in Remy de Gourmont's novel Sixtine, 
published in 1890. Gourmont's Revolte (it is not named directly, but the references 
are clear) suppresses the domestic, bourgeois staging of Villier's play; indeed it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 “When you read a text,” says Chantal Akerman, “you’re in your own time. That is not the 
case in film. In fact, in film, you’re dominated by my time’ [cited in Campany (ed.), 2007, 
p195] 
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mainly represented in the novel by paraphrasings of Elizabeth's 'dream' speech. 
And it this speech – pure text, cut off from the drama's mis-en-scene as much as it 
is, being in a novel, freed from the theatre's spatial occlusions -  which gives the 
audience an 'esthetic thrill': 
 
 They listened without letting a syllable of the magic prose escape their ears, and 
 they dreamed while listening; they forgot the omnipotence of inferior minds; they 
 deified each other, they ascended, supple and light, the mystic steps, summoned 
 now by the illusion of a very pure and very expanding air at the summit of a 
 narrow mountain above the clouds. [de Gourmont, 1922, p234] 
 
As Frantisek Deak [1993, p23] points out, the fictional production of La Revolte 
achieves a symbolism – or rather, a symbolist reception-as-deification - that the 
impoverished reality of the stage production could never do. Inasmuch as in 
reading a novel, imaginative experience entirely overrides the contingencies of 
embodiment; to the extent that George Poulet can assert (from a phenomenological 
standpoint) that objects are closed but the book demands our presence: 'You are 
inside it; it is inside you; there is no longer either inside or outside' (1969, p54). 
The consciousness is one with its object, thinks another's thoughts, speaks, feels, 
suffers as another: 'The work is a sort of human being … constituting itself in me 
as the subject of its own objects' (1969, p59). Moreover, its 'idealized' appearance 
in de Gourmont's novel, written twenty years after the play, contributed to the 
making of Villiers de L'Isle-Adam into a cult figure for writers in the late 1880s, 
including Maurice Maeterlinck.  
 
2.5. Maeterlinck Against Materiality: No Inner Image Because All is Inner 
Image 
 
 Maeterlinck, amongst others, recognizes a violent contrast with which a 
theatre built on Symbolist premises must deal – but then attempts to reconcile the 
symbol’s inner image to what is ‘outer’. We see this in his Menus Propos ['Small 
Talk'], published in September 1890 after the production of his play L'Intruse. 
 Maeterlinck is clearly concerned to continue Villiers' project. For the 
former, 'the theatre is a situation in which “[w]e must pay attention only to what we 
cannot properly assess” [1994, p144]. Moreover, what Maeterlinck perceives as 
theatre's “two traits”, which seem to each “cancel out the other”, should be 
understood in terms of an duality which is not only Villiers's but recognisable from 
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Lessing. For Maeterlinck poetry is that art which is “evasive and never speaks 
face-to-face … the temporary mask of the faceless unknown” [ibid.] but the theatre 
– material representation – “puts things back exactly where they were before the 
poet arrived” [1994, p145]. Theatre – and here Maeterlinck seems to have Diderot's 
realistic pictorial tableaux in mind – “produces just about what would happen if 
you were to give substance to the subject matter of a painting and in doing so turn 
it into everyday life”: an “inexplicable light would suddenly be extinguished” 
[ibid.]. 
 Moreover, because “the stage itself … is contingent … suddenly there is, 
by comparison with the passive subject of the poem, an extraordinary phenomenon 
of polarization”. Maeterlinck thus wants to eradicate both the objectivity of the 
stage and the subjectivity of the actor – both are impediments to the full attainment 
of the Symbol's 'ideality' – that inexplicable light - in the consciousness of the 
audience. While, 'in ordinary life I must see the man who is talking to me, because 
most of his words have no meaning whatsoever independent of his presence', a 
poem that Maeterlinck “see[s] being recited is always a lie” [ibid]. The actor 
interrupts the 'rays' that 'spread out towards infinity' from the 'shining centre' of the 
Symbol - because 'whenever man penetrates a poem, the immense poem of his own 
presence snuffs out everything around him' [ibid]. Maeterlinck's answer is to 
'eliminate the living being from the stage' [ibid], to depersonalize the actors, to 
make beings 'like us but visibly endowed with a dead soul' which 'cannot die', 
which inspire fear through 'their absolute lack of mystery … the absence of eternity 
about them' [1994, p146]: humans minus interiority, blended into the scenery. The 
result is that 'the atmosphere of terror in which [the androids] move is the very 
atmosphere of the poem' [ibid]; stage and poem, ‘outer’ image and ‘inner’ image, 
coalesce.  
 
2.6. From Naturalism to Panorama 
 
 If inner images – i.e., images that are not of what is immediately present – 
are eliminated from the naturalist theatre’s audience, it is because the play’s textual 
world has been fully realized on the stage, rather than being left to imaginative 
inference. Speech, which could potentially refer to or evoke images of something 
outside the mis-en-scene, would best be eliminated. Following this logic, naturalist 
theatre's visual, material aspect could dominate to the extent that the spectacle 
would separate off into textless panorama and diorama. That is to say, the full 
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extent of naturalist theatre’s logic is the panorama. As the dramaturg Hermann 
Bahr put it contemporaneously,  
 
 Suddenly in the nineteenth century the imagination of the audience was no longer 
 to be trusted. This would be another whole chapter, on the psychological history of 
 the middle classes: how they had hardly achieved power, when they began on all 
 sides to lose faith in their strength and sought aids to sustain it. So when 
 previously a stage-set had only said to the audience, ‘Imagine a castle or forest’, it 
 Is now filled with doubt about its ability to achieve this and instead tries to 
 reproduce such settings. The sign is replaced by a panorama. [1996, p162] 
  
Realistic scenery and costumes had been used to provide spectacular or picturesque 
backdrops at least since Robert Barker had patented his panoramic painting process 
in 1787, when the invention of a 360-degree viewing experience was claimed "to 
perfect an entire view of any country of situation as it appears to an observer". The 
panorama, however, as a speechless, subject-less naturalist stage set - extended 
laterally, in effect, to surround the audience - is the full articulation of the desire to 
cancel the inner image.  
 
2.7. Glory Machine 
 
 Indignant about the failure La révolte – which played only five times at the 
Theatre de Vaudeville in 1870 - Villiers writes one of his Contes cruels,  'La 
machine à gloire', in 1874. It concerns the claque, or paid troop of applauders, an 
institution in nineteenth-century Parisian theater. Humans, however, are too 
unpredictable, their responses contingent for such a role that, like the age, demands 
uniform efficiency. Hence inventor Bathybius Bottom’s ‘Glory Machine’, which 
automates the claque, producing a range of audience effects: 
 
 Screams of frightened women, choked Sobs, truly communicative Tears, little 
 brusque Laughs...Howls, Chokings, Encore!, Recalls, silent Tears, Threats, 
 Recalls with additional Howls, Pounding of approbation, uttered Opinions, 
 Wreaths, Principles, Convictions, moral Tendencies, epileptic Attacks, Childbirth, 
 Insults, Suicides, Noises of discussions (Art-for-art's-sake, Form and Idea), etc. 
 [Villiers, 1983, p. 108; trans Weiss, 2001, p8-9]  
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With the ‘Glory Machine’ in place, the success of the play need not be risked on 
incompetent humans, who might miss their cues. When the Glory Machine 
replaces the audience entirely, Dr. Bottom’s invention transforms the whole theatre 
into a machine for producing glory. 
 Conceived in revenge against the audience and critics who rejected his 
play, and the conventions of the theatre that staged it, what the Glory Machine 
entails, of course, is the removal an audience of human subjects who might have 
the inner image proposed in La Revolte. The result, as Allan S Weiss suggests, is a 
“countersublime, where … consciousness, subsumed by pure presence, eschews all 
transcendence; where the imagination exists in direct proportion to somatization” 
[Weiss, 2001, p9]: an audience without interiority, known only from the outside, 
by their behavioural – and largely non-verbal – responses: tears, laughter, howls as 
well as the ‘noise’ of discussion.  
 
2.8. Schopenhauer, Aesthetics and Asceticism 
 
 To Elizabeth's 'dream' speech Felix retorts, "You must have been reading 
some mischievous novel which has unhinged your mind" [Villiers, 1901, p21]. The 
speech will indeed enter a novel, as has been demonstrated, but the text marking it 
is philosophical, rather than literary: Schopenhauer's The World as Will and 
Representation (1818). A brief explication of this intertextual dynamic is 
necessary.  
 In Schopenhauer's idealism, informed by Plato, Kant and the Upanishads, 
the physical world is phenomenal and exists only for the subject of knowledge. The 
sharp division between appearance and thing-in-itself - "what we know is not a sun 
and an earth, but an eye that sees the sun, and a hand, that feels the earth" [1950, I, 
p3] - means that "all that exists for knowledge is only an object in relation to a 
subject, the perception of a perceiver, in a word, Idea" [ibid]. As well as 
perceptually experiencing phenomena, the subject is aware of themselves from 
within, as 'Will'. The Will is the inner being of both the human subject and all 
Nature. Everything in Nature is the appearance of what in itself is Will. Indeed the 
universe is a single, cosmic Will to Exist which sustains the phenomenal, spatio-
temporal world. And it is the Will which causes the world's wretchedness: its 
constant striving drives each part of the phenomenal world to survive at the 
expense of each other part. 
 There are, says Schopenhauer, two means of respite from this misery, of 
attaining  
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 the painless state ... of the gods; for we are for the moment set free from the 
 miserable striving of the will; ... It is in the beauty of both nature and art that we 
 can achieve this temporary release from the will." [1950, III, p38] 
 
The “beauty of ... art”, or aesthetic experience, is when knowledge and perception, 
normally instrumental to the Will's satisfaction, gain autonomy from it, in pure 
will-less contemplation. This affords a loss of individuality - the subject becomes 
an impersonal and universal pure subject of knowledge, perceiving not things in 
space but the (basically Platonic) Ideas by which the Will manifests itself. The 
other, longer lasting solution is to distance the self from worldly preoccupations. 
To become aware of the wretchedness and futility of manifesting the cosmic Will 
to Live and its push for existence and gratification leads to sanctity, becoming an 
ascetic in whom the Will denies itself. The ascetic has no concern for living and 
prospering; in them the Will merely, only just, sustains the phenomenal spatio-
temporal world. Both routes entail release from the binding constraints of a body 
rooted in and condemned to a world governed by space, time, and causal 
determination.37 
 La Revolte’s Elizabeth, then, espouses exactly Schopenhauer’s 
subjectivistic epistemology when she declares that "[t]he world has only the 
meaning the strength of words and the power of eyes give it" [Villiers, 1901, p20]. 
Her dream is the path of an ascetic saint, with its "escape" from the world's 
"incurable misery" through contemplating a “hidden world" and its "hope in death" 
in “the depths of our thought”.38  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Jonathan Crary has suggested that Schopenhauer's positing of an autonomous aesthetic 
experience is inspired by a growing awareness of the physiological in scientific discourse 
of the time. Schopenhauer's aesthetic subject is freed from the demands of the Will and a 
body increasingly understood as a complex of involuntary responses to stimuli: “If at the 
core of all Schopenhauer’s work is his aversion to the instinctual life of the body, to the 
ceaseless and monotonous repetition of its pulses and desires, his utopia of aesthetic 
perception was also a retreat from the anguish of a modernized world that was making the 
body into an apparatus of predictable reflex activity” [1992, pp77-8]. 
38 Felix makes a placating offer of twice-weekly trips to "the country" – they "brighten one 
up" and are “good for business". It is Felix’s offer that prompts Elizabeth's Schopenhaurian 
dream of escape, with which it works in opposition: Felix’s trips are incorporated into 
bourgeois 'life', and an extension of the present; the latter is an explicit breach with both. 
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2.9. Schopenhauer’s music 
 
 An aesthetic experience occurs, claims Schopenhauer [1950, I], when a 
person perceives an object, bypasses its spatio-temporal objectification and sees 
through to the universal Idea of the object. Since Schopenhauer's epistemology is 
basically correlative, ie. the quality of the subject of experience must correspond to 
the quality of the object of experience - this means that the subject takes on a 
universal quality. The individual loses themselves - literally, de-individualises - in 
absorbed contemplation of the Idea.39  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
What Felix has 'in mind', may be well illustrated by Renoir's La promenade - produced, like 
La revolte, in 1870.  
 La promenade depicts urban, bourgeois Parisians in felicitous intimacy with 
'nature' as much with each other: their hands entwined, just as the leaves and shadows of 
leaves play across their clothes and link them to the greenery. Exterior Nature is 
domesticated. This is surely a trip to ‘the’ country - carefully secured and rationalized - as 
Felix imagines it. However, in his monograph on the painting, John House [1997, p5] 
makes the point that la promenade was not submitted to the Salon but was made to appeal 
to private collectors, who, in the late 1860s, were refusing the idealizations of academic 
history painting in favour of genre pieces that featured and affirmed their own lifestyles as 
fashionable, contemporary city dwellers (we can well imagine Felix as one of these). These 
scenes, moreover, often had erotic connotations beyond their apparently benign subject 
matter - Manet's Dejeuner sur l'herbe being the prime example - and House goes on to 
contend that the Parisian audience of 1870 would recognise la Promenade as set in a locale 
upstream on the Seine that was infamous for anonymous sexual encounters. 
 Thus a double valence opens up: it is both an image of non-'Utopian' continuity 
with urban life, Nature's otherness assimilated, and of desublimated sexuality, operating 
outside rationalized structures. Meanwhile, just as the painting's execution is indebted to 
Monet and Courbet, in the feathery brushwork and palette respectively, what speaks 
through the depiction is Jean-Antoine Watteau's early 18th-century fête galantes: scenes of 
ideal courtship in (cultivated) pastoral settings from which all the cares of daily life seem 
excluded [see Cowart, 2001, p 470]. To the extent that we can speak of the idyll or pastoral 
as having a utopian valence, as Frederic Jameson recently has, it is as "rest": "relief from 
the frenzied anxieties of the actual social world, a glimpse of stillness and of transfigured 
human nature" [2005, p415]. Such rest significantly constitutes Elizabeth's dream; but 
Felix's trips to the country merely "brighten one up", rather than transfigure. 
39 It is prudent to mention Samuel Beckett’s early Schopenhaurian reading of Proust (1931) 
here. In it, Beckett contrasts involuntary memory, which yields a “revelation of reality”, to 
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 The arts are then ranked according to the extent to which this 
transcendence can take place, from architecture, through sculpture, painting, to the 
highest, 'tragedy' or dramatic poetry. All plastic and verbal arts, however, are 
limited by being concerned with human forms and emotions, that is, they are 
compelled by mimesis, they "copy the Ideas". Only music lies outside this scheme: 
the aesthetic superlative, it "copies the Will itself". Music presents no Ideas for 
contemplation; in the metaphysical schema, music instead is on a level with the 
Ideas themselves: it directly manifests - is an "immediate image [Abbild]" of - the 
Will. The Will, as the thing-in-itself, surpasses all representation, and puts music in 
the paradoxical position of being an image of what has no image.40  As an 
imageless image, then, it achieves autarky, not signifying a world but becoming a 
world in its own right. The problem is that we instinctively want to give images to 
it: 
 Music does not express this or that particular and definite joy, this or that sorrow, 
 or pain, or horror, or delight, or merriment, or peace of mind … Yet we 
 completely understand them in this extracted quintescence. Hence it arises that our 
 imagination is so easily excited by music, and now seeks to give form to that 
 invisible yet actively moved spirit world which speaks to us directly, and to clothe 
 it with flesh and blood … This is the origin of the song with words, and finally of 
 the opera …41 [1950, I, p52] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
voluntary memory – trying to remember – which is equivalent to imagining and which 
impedes revelation. Where the “abandonment” of involuntary recollection brings the object 
“as particular and unique and not merely the member of a family, … independent of any 
general notion and detached from the sanity of a cause, isolated and inexplicable in the 
light of ignorance” [1999, p11], the effort of imagining obscures its object: voluntary 
memory “provides an image as far removed from the real as the myth of imagination”. 
Voluntary imagination is the “dream of a madman” [1999, p55] and the “ineluctable 
gangrene of romanticism”. Beckett’s project is then shaped by the bind of attempting to 
excise this gangrene - to bring imagination to an end – by necessarily using further acts of 
imagination. Hence the logics of Imagination Dead Imagine (1965), and Worstward Ho 
(1983), where objects are negated only to be reconstituted by the act of negating them.  
40 This point is made by Ludger Luetkehaus [2006, p96]. 
41 The cinematizing effect of 20th-century personal audio devices is predicted: "This deep 
relation which music has to the true nature of all things also explains the fact that suitable 
music played to any scene, action, event, or surrounding seems to disclose to us its secret 
meaning, and appears as the most accurate and distinct commentary upon it. [...] Music 
makes every picture, and indeed every scene of real life and of the world, at once appear 
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Not only opera but "tonmalerei" or sound-painting, like Haydn's Seasons, is a 
"reproductive" and thus "reprehensible" form.  Just as Lessing was reacting to the 
word-painting of nature poetry - epitomized, indeed, by Thompson's Seasons - so 
does Schopenhauer take on his genre-distinctions.  
 
2.10. High Modernist Utopia and Schopenhauer’s Music   
 
 Schopenhauer’s articulation of an autonomous artistic perception makes, as 
Jonathan Crary suggests, a “crucial anticipatory statement of modernist aesthetics” 
[1992, p75]. Indeed Schopenhauer's essentially ascetic view of the purpose of art 
predicts the aesthetic autonomy and opposition of kitsch and avant-garde 
propounded by high modernist critics, while it is his conception of music as 
qualitively different aesthetic experience that appeals to 20th-century formalists. 
Clement Greenberg acknowledges that 
 
 [b]ecause of its 'absolute' nature, its remoteness from imitation, its almost 
 complete absorption in the very physical quality of its medium, as well as because 
 of its resources of suggestion, music had come to replace poetry as the paragon of 
 art. [1986, p31] 
 
Theodor Adorno, meanwhile, recognizes the critical-utopian implications, that "the 
conceptless, abstract moment [which] Schopenhauer recommended to irrationalist 
philosophy, makes [music] unreceptive to the ratio of the ability to be sold" [cited 
in Luetkehaus, 2006]. That is, word-less music is liberated from every cause but its 
own, from instrumental reason. It is Ernst Bloch that goes furthest in recognizing 
the utopian valence of Schopenhauer’s conception of music, as well as where it is 
compromised. Bloch considers Schopenhauer's idea, that music “is a language that 
reason does not understand”, a "crucial turning point" [1986, I, p153-4]. The 
problem is that in Schopenhauer’s hands it leads us merely into the "bottomless 
void" of subjectivity. For Bloch, the pure immanence of Schopenhauerian musical 
experience is no conduit to the “not-yet”: an object is needed for transcendence, for 
the self to be moved "to the new self". What Bloch does take from Schopenhauer is 
that music can reveal the thing-in-itself. What is revealed, however, is not the 
immanently desiring Will; Bloch's thing-in-itself is that “which is not yet; … 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with higher significance, certainly all the more in proportion as its melody is analagous to 
the inner spirit of the given phenomenon." [1950, I, p52]  
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utopia calling out to itself through goodness, music, metaphysics, but unrealizable 
in mundane terms" [1986, I, p158]. Thus for Bloch, music is the  
 
 inwardly utopian art, completely beyond the scope of anything empirically 
 verifiable [1985, p195]  
 
Free from the burden of representation, music can connect us sensuously with what 
is "otherwise unsayable" and again grant us the "sensory and even intellectual 
contact with transcendence" that now resides behind the curtain drawn by the "free, 
virile, operative, Luciferean, rationalistic" spirit of the Renaissance, Reformation, 
and modernity [1986, I, p159]. Bloch imagines a refunctioning of Romantic, 
bourgois Innerlichkeit that transforms subjective space into one that opens onto “an 
ethics and metaphysics of inwardness, of fraternal inwardness” [ibid]. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The above excursion through Schopenhauerian aesthetics and their 
modernist recuperation serves to adumbrate the specifically utopian function of the 
inner image evoked by Elizabeth’s dream. Its function is limited in two respects: 
by being depictive in a way that the “inwardly utopian art” of music is not, but also 
by remaining what Frederic Jameson, borrowing from Coleridge, calls utopian 
‘fancy’, as opposed to utopian ‘imagination’. Where fancy works with what is 
available, the imagination is radical. Elizabeth’s dream is predicated on money - 
she has invested her share of their fortune - and property - the “lonely house” 
which she has “bought with [her] money”; while it is pecuniary thought that 
renders her unable to realize those ambitions: “His accounts have crippled my 
mind”. As Jameson remarks,  
 
 The lived misery of money, the desperation of poorer societies, the pitiful media 
 spectacles of the rich ones, is palpable to everyone. It is the decision to abandon 
 money, to place this demand at the forefront of a political programme, that marks 
 the rupture and opens up a space into which utopia may enter … [2005, pp166-8] 
 
Elizabeth’s fatal binding to the ratio of exchange is then at one with the failure to 
attain the conceptless, imageless moment promised by her Schopenhauerian ratio. 
 
* 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Do I add to the images in movies?42 
 
Introduction 
 
 In pursuit of an inner image of cinematic spectatorship the following 
reconsiders the above question Roland Barthes asks himself  - and answers in the 
negative – in Camera Lucida (1980). I proceed by establishing two conceptions of 
the viewer’s engagement: that in which there is an ‘extra’ image, existing in the 
realm of the spectator, which is not the cinematographic material itself, and that in 
which there is ‘only one’ image, which is a unification of the spectator’s thought 
and cinematographic material. Barthes, I suggest, asks his question out of fear of 
the unification of thought and material, in which cognitive autonomy is lost to the 
medium. His negative answer passes over the ‘added’ or ‘extra’ images of soviet 
montage, which I detail here, because their addition is not the voluntary 
prerogative of the viewer. Soviet montage’s extra image or Obraz is, moreover, 
made by instrumentalizing the viewer’s ‘innate’ logical, meaning-making faculties. 
Eisenstein attempts to put this ‘Kulehov effect’ to pedagogic ends, as in Strike 
(1925); later cinema and its theorization, as Gilles Deleuze [1985] suggests, 
attempt to refute the effect as both manipulative and logocentric, and in doing so, 
eliminate the ‘extra’ image from the realm of the spectator and make cinematic 
experience monist.  
 A critical dispute over Stan Brakhage’s The Animals of Eden and After 
(1970) demonstrates the difficulties of such a strategy, and emphasizes the 
apparently irresistible, involuntary character of these extra images. I explore two 
further tactics in the prevention of extra (and, being only in the real of the 
spectator, inner) images: by speeding up the cuts to a flicker or slowing them down 
to complete continuity. I take Brakhage’s own Persian Series (1999) as exemplary 
of the former, and Jeroen de Rijke and Willem de Rooij Of Three Men (1998) as 
exemplary of the latter. Even with these works, however, some mode of ‘adding’ to 
the images yet persists; Of Three Men, in particular, presents itself as an occasion - 
that Barthes saw provided by photography - to close one’s eyes, recollect, and let 
the “detail … rise of its own accord into affective consciousness”. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans Richard Howard, p55  
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3.1. Adding with Eyes Closed 
 
 In his 1970 essay The Third Meaning: Research Notes on Several 
Eisenstein Stills the titular third meaning is that which is neither directly 
communicated by the image nor symbolized by any communally understood signs 
within the image. As this obtuse (as opposed to obvious) meaning is conveyed by 
features which are not part of any recognizable symbolic system, it is unique to the 
response of the individual viewer. The third meaning is the prototype of the 
‘punctum’ described a decade later in Camera Lucida. There, discussing how it is 
that affective meaning apparently not conveyed by the manifest depiction arises, 
Barthes comes to the conclusion that the punctum might best be revealed when “the 
photograph is no longer in front of me and I think back on it …   
 … as if direct vision oriented its language wrongly, engaging it in an effort of 
 description which will always miss its point of effect, the punctum. … Ultimately 
 – or at the limit – in order to see a photograph well, it is best to look away or close 
 your eyes. […] The photograph touches me if I withdraw it from its usual blah-
 blah … to say nothing, to shut my eyes, to allow the detail to rise of its own accord 
 into affective consciousness. [1982, p53-5] 
The punctum is best perceived by turning away from the photograph itself because 
the punctum is contributed by the viewer. The photograph “triggers” it, but the 
punctum is a subjective “addition”.43 The continued presence of the photograph 
prevents this addition. This is because, as Peter Wollen points out, the photograph 
for Barthes exists in space and the viewing subject exists in time – the viewer has 
time to “veer away on a train of thought, circle back, traverse and criss-cross the 
image [in a] free rewriting time rather than an imposed reading time” [1984, p108] 
Thus Barthes writes about film stills rather films, whose constant change imposes 
time on the viewer.  
 Do I add to the images in movies? I don’t think so; I don’t have time: in front of 
 the screen, I am not free to shut my eyes; otherwise, opening them again I would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43  The punctum is private. It is that which is resists theorization, classification, or 
representation. To successfully describe or name it, then, turns it into the studium. This, as 
Derek Attridge [1997] points out, is the fundamental problem of the theory’s application: if 
the punctum is ever communicated to anyone else, if Barthes is successful in his 
descriptions of the punctum, then he will have made them socially communicable and what 
is of the order of the socially communicable belongs to the stadium.  
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 not discover the same image; I am constrained to a continuous voracity; a host of 
 other qualities, but not pensiveness … [1982, p55]  
 
The viewer cannot be ‘thoughtful’ in front of the screen because thought is 
temporal and the changing image occupies that time, confirming the complaint of 
Georges Duhamel, as quoted by Walter Benjamin, that "I can no longer think what 
I want to think. My thoughts have been replaced by moving images" [Benjamin 
1977]. Camera Lucida’s ruminations express a humanist fear of loss of autonomy, 
the corrective to which is for the spectator’s thought to be separate to the moving, 
changing image. To ask if one “add[s] to the images in movies” is in this sense to 
ask if one can be cognitively separate from the images in the movies in order to 
add to them. In considering discreet film stills, Barthes passes over a way in which 
the images in the movies are ‘added to’, that is, in the experience of montage. 
Barthes passes over it, I suggest, because it is not freely added. The montage 
addition is not a “free rewriting” but is determined by the cinematographic 
material.44 It is, yet, an ‘extra’, existing in the realm of the spectator and not ‘in’ 
the images. The following details the way in which this ‘extra’ is central to theories 
of Soviet montage of the 1920s. 
 
3.2. Kuleshov’s Montage 
 Lev Kuleshov demonstrates that the relationship of shot to shot produces a 
semantic effect that overrides the actor’s performance, as in the experiment 
conducted in 1918, with the matinee idol Ivan Mozzhukhin. A long take in close-
up of Mozzhukin’s expressionlessly neutral face is intercut with various shots – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Raymond Bellour extends Barthes suggestion of “pensiveness” to describe the effect of 
stills in motion pictures.  Barthes doesn’t “have time” to “add to the images in movies”; 
but, suggests Bellour, when the spectator of a film is confronted with a photograph (as in 
Ophul’s Letter from an Unknown Woman (1948), Hitchcock’s Shadow of a Doubt (1943); 
Antonioni’s Blow-up (1966), or Lang’s Beyond a Reasonable Doubt (1956)) they are 
granted a respite from the film’s unfolding, distanced, and given time to “add”. The 
disruption of the filmic illusion allows one to “add”, paradoxically, “by subtraction. The 
photo subtracts me from the fiction of the cinema … creating a distance, another time, the 
photographs permits me to reflect on cinema … that is, to reflect that I am at the cinema. In 
short, the presence of the photo permits me to invest more freely in what I am seeing. It 
helps me close my eyes, yet keep them wide open” [1984, p120]. 
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bowl of soup, woman in a coffin, a child playing with a toy bear – and the audience 
(of students – it was shown to Kuleshov’s classes in the VGIK) marvels at the 
sensitivity of the actor, who appears respectively hungry, sad or lustful. Writes 
Kuleshov,  
 
 With correct montage, even if one takes the performance of an actor directed at 
 something quite different, it will still reach the viewer in the way intended by the 
 editor, because the viewer himself will complete the sequence and see that which 
 is suggested to him by the montage. [1974, p54]  
 
The radicality of this ‘constructive’ editing becomes apparent when contrasted with 
‘analytic’: whereas the latter, following an establishing shot, consists in close ups 
that merely convey the scene, the former conveys ideas – ‘hunger’, ‘sadness’, ‘lust’ 
- through the juxtaposition of shots, cut from entirely different films.  
 
3.3. Izobrazhenie / Obraz 
 
 Eisenstein combines Kuleshov’s findings with his own conviction that the 
“basic materials of the theatre arise from the spectator himself – and from our 
guiding of the spectator into a desired direction” which is the making “perceptible” 
of the “final ideological conclusion” [1943, p166]. The experiments of Kuleshov 
demonstrated how, through editing, the “anti-Naturalist, anti-psychologist trend in 
the theatre could also be introduced into cinema, using scientific, laboratory-tested 
and specifically cinematic methods” [Wollen, 1972, p24]. Over the twenties and 
thirties behaviourist notions of response, as suggested in early texts such as 
Montage of Attractions and A Materialist Approach to Film Form, give way to 
working terms such as “pathos”, and a new psychologism, the taking of spectator’s 
subjectivity into consideration, as it is in Montage 1938. There it is described how, 
before the film is made, there “hovers” in the mind’s eye of the director an image 
which “emotionally embod[ies] his theme.” The director’s task is  
 
 to transform this image into a few basic partial representations which, in their 
 combination and juxtaposition, shall evoke in the consciousness and feelings of 
 the spectator, reader, or auditor, the same initial image which originally hovered 
 before the creative artist. [1991, p34] 
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The partial representations or izobrazhenie are strongly demarcated from the 
global, theme-image or obraz that the spectator mentally unifies them into. The 
global logic in fact follows the local logic, which is that of the effect identified by 
Kuleshov:  
 
 [T]he juxtaposition of two separate shots by splicing them together resembles not 
 so much a simple sum of one shot plus another shot – as it does a creation. It 
 resembles a creation – rather than a sum of its parts – from the circumstance that 
 in every such juxtaposition the result is qualitively distinguishable from each 
 component element viewed separately. [1991, p18] 
 
Eisenstein is emphatic that juxtaposition produces qualitively distinguishable 
effects, effects that are ‘extra’ to the cinematographic components. 45  In the 
example of “a grave, juxtaposed with a woman in mourning weeping beside it”, 
from which “scarcely anybody will fail to jump to the conclusion: a widow” [1991, 
p16], the woman and the grave are “objectively representable”, but “‘a widow’, 
arising from a juxtaposition of the two representations, is objectively 
unrepresentable – a new idea, a new conception, a new image.” [1991, p19] This 
extra image is ‘in’ the viewer; the clear connotation is of impregnation: “[w]ithin 
me, as a spectator, this image is born and grown. Not only the author has created, 
but I also – the creating spectator – have participated” [1991, p36]. 
 
3.4. Involuntary Rationalizing 
 
 The fault of this ‘extra’ notion of cinematic experience is articulated by 
Gilles Deleuze in second of his cinema books. For Deleuze [1985], the “shocks” 
that Eisenstein’s montage produces are “intellectual”: they are premised on belief 
in the powers of rational and logical thought. The viewer is forced to synthesize, to 
overcome the manifest conflict between two shots – of for example Strike’s (1925) 
workers and cattle - and to “think the Whole”. To extend Deleuze’s point, we can 
name the source of the problem as the Kuleshov effect, which is really an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 This is not the only understanding of montage’s operation. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for 
one, considers it a temporal phenomenon where “the meaning of a shot … depends on what 
precedes it in the movie” [1964, p54]. Memory of the previous shot informs the perception 
of the current shot, rather than shots combining to produce a separate entity. 
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involuntary rationalizing; saying that it forces the viewer to synthesize is the same 
as saying that it activates their proclivity to synthesize.  
 The proclivity had been noted by Eisenstein. What “the ‘leftists’ of 
montage” (i.e. those without pedagogic intent) discovered, “[w]hile playing with 
pieces of film,” was “the fact that two pieces of film of any kind, placed together, 
inevitably combine into a new concept, a new quality, arising out of that 
juxtaposition” [1991, p16]. Eisenstein admits that he too was “charmed primarily 
with that newly revealed feature of the film strips,” that,  “no matter how unrelated 
they might be, and frequently despite themselves, they engendered a ‘third 
something’ and became correlated when juxtaposed according to the will of an 
editor.” [1991, p19] The automaticity of the correlations, moreover, appeals to a 
humanist essentialism: for Béla Balázs, “[s]eeking a meaning is a fundamental 
function of human consciousness and nothing is more difficult than to accept with 
complete passivity meaningless, purely accidental phenomena” [1952, p120]. The 
involuntary rationalization effected by montage later persuades Christian Metz of 
cinema’s logomorphism:  
 
 An isolated photograph can of course tell nothing! Yet why must it be that, by 
 some strange correlation, two juxtaposed photographs must tell something? Going 
 from one image to two images, is to go from image to language. [1974, p46]  
 
Potemkin’s lion statues sequence is “a magnificent syntagma”, an “unequivocal 
symbol of the workers' revolt”, and “a fact of language (fait de langue)” [ibid.]. 
Shots in sequence activate the synthesizing, rationalizing, linguistic subject; that it 
happens inevitably, despite themselves, confirms its essential nature, that the 
human is at heart rational: 
 
 It is as if a kind of induction current were linking images among themselves, 
 whatever one did, as if the human mind (the spectator's as well as the film-
 maker's) were incapable of not making a connection between two successive 
 images. [ibid.]  
 
It is of course exactly this kind of essentialism that Deleuze wants to overturn. But 
before examining his strategy for doing so, something of temporal juxtaposition’s 
irresistible force, as well as the desire to erase the ‘extra’ image and subtract 
cinematic experience to the cinematographic material, can be illustrated by turning 
to a critical dispute over the films of Stan Brakhage.  
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3.5. Eisenstein / Brakhage 
 
 ‘Camera Lucida / Camera Obscura’, Annette Michelson’s lead article in a 
1973 special issue of Art Forum,46 presents the work of Sergei Eisenstein and Stan 
Brakhage in parallel, both positioning the latter in the realm of, and showing his 
paradigmatic break from, the former. Intent on cementing Brakhage’s critical 
legitimacy, Michelson calls the two film-makers the “alpha and omega” of film art 
– Eisenstein the ‘lucida’, Brakhage the ‘obscura’. The former’s gaze of “analysis” 
is contrasted with the latter’s gaze of “fascination ... eluding analytic grasp” [1973, 
p2].  
 Brakhage’s films, then, are introduced as a paradigmatically different 
mode of practice: that which cannot be “grasped”. According to critic Victor 
Grauer, this is also true at the level of montage. For Grauer, the “true achievement 
of Brakhage's montage, the heart of his cinematic revolution” is the ability to 
“create juxtapositions which resist our need” – and Grauer quotes Rosalind Krauss 
- "for conceptual order … transcending the materials of experience". The images 
are organized “in such a way as to defeat any possible coding process before it can 
begin” [Grauer 1998]. 
 
3.6. The Animals of Eden and After 
 
 Grauer, however, is writing to correct the interpretation of Brakhage’s film 
The Animals of Eden and After (1970) by P Adams Sitney, the film-maker’s main 
critical exegete, who indeed claims a cognitive “grasp”. According to Sitney, the 
film "portrays the process of convalescence as a normalization or accommodation 
to socially dictated patterns of perception and thought." The “turning point of the 
film” is the birth of a goat, after which, 
 
 Brakhage cuts from the colour image of the animal’s labour to a black and white 
 image of a crying baby. The shift in film stock emphasizes the decisiveness of this
 moment. In the narrative of the film, this is the point at which the child, witnessing 
 the birth of the animal, imagines his own birth. [2002, p391] 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The issue includes ‘The Third Meaning: Notes on Some of Eisenstein's Stills’ by Roland 
Barthes, ‘For God and Country’ by Noel Carroll, ‘Montage "October": Dialectic of the 
Shot’ by Rosalind Krauss,  and ‘Stan and Jane Brakhage, Talking’ by Hollis Frampton. 
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At another point a caged bird is intercut with the crying child. According to Sitney, 
“the trapped bird now stands for the feeling of the weeping child." [ibid.] The 
Animals of Eden and After, then, has been read, the shots rationalized into the 
determination of a third something: ‘birth of goat + crying child = child imagining 
own birth’ just as ‘woman + grave = widow’ for Eisenstein. Grauer rejects Sitney’s 
account: 
 
 We see images of a young boy in bed. Nothing in the film informs us that he is the 
 protagonist of a narrative. We see a goat giving birth, but there is nothing in the 
 way this event presents itself that can lead us to understand it as a "turning point." 
 If a shot of the boy directly follows a shot of the goat, it is Brakhage's special 
 achievement, all but unique among filmmakers, that we will not fall victim to the 
 Kuleshov effect and automatically assume that the child is "witnessing the birth" 
 of a baby goat. Similarly, a juxtaposition of a shot of "the crying child" and the 
 caged bird cannot, in the context created by Brakhage, cause the bird to "stand for 
 the feeling of the weeping child.” [Grauer, 1998] 
 
What Grauer claims is that the viewing subject adds nothing to The Animals of 
Eden and After. “We see images of a young boy in bed … [w]e see a goat giving 
birth …”: all Grauer’s viewing subject perceives are the images presented to them 
(as if this itself involved no addition, as if seeing the image of a young boy in bed 
did not involve a “conceptual order … transcending the materials of experience"). 
The only images involved in The Animals of Eden and After are those on the 
screen. 
 How to reconcile the two accounts? If Sitney’s displays a submission to 
the proclivity to rationalize, Grauer’s seems a wilful refusal or repression of 
something that the perceived material makes involuntary. His claim could then be 
understood as a polemical refutation of the logocentric humanism implied by 
Sitney’s reading – (although Grauer’s appeal to notions of genius, uniqueness and 
mastery would suggest otherwise). 
 
3.7. Preventing Rationalization 
 
 If, contrary to Victor Grauer’s claims, The Animals of Eden and After 
cannot prevent the viewer “fall[ing] victim to the Kuleshov effect” it is due to the 
film being a sequence of perceivable representations: where the viewing subject 
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“see[s] images of a young boy in bed” and “see[s] a goat giving birth” conceptual 
ordering has already begun. 
On this logic, to in fact prevent the Kuleshov effect – and eliminate ‘extra’ images 
from cinematic experience – it is necessary to change the material so that it is 
prevented from stimulating involuntary rationalization.  
 This is indeed what Deleuze recommends in antidote to Eisenstein’s 
intellectual shocks: a cinema of continuously flowing images that – exactly 
Barthes’s fear - do not leave time for critical distance or contemplation, that acts 
immediately on a pre-reflexive, pre-verbal level. Artaud illustrates for Deleuze the 
kind of shock which is a radical dissociation, conflating multiple voices and 
viewpoints that cannot be synthesized into a unified whole. Instead of forcing 
logical thought, this cinema makes it impossible to think: one image replaces 
another at a rate that prohibits interpretation. This cinema reveals the subject’s own 
powerlessness, its own 'impower' ('impuissance'), which must be confronted to 
“produce a new image of thought” [1989, p168]. 
 
3.8. Persian Series 
 
 Brakhage’s hand-painted films, such as those of the Persian Series (1999), 
can be taken as an example of the attempt to prevent logical thought by presenting 
an ‘unrecognizable’ continuous flow of images: each frame is differently marked, 
producing when projected rapidly and constantly changing coloured forms, 
interspersed with the darkness of unmarked leader.  
 With the Kuleshov effect disabled, and no time for synthesis, there should 
be no ‘extra’ images, there should be only one image, which is a unification of the 
spectator’s thought and cinematographic material. The coloured frames of the 
Persian Series, indeed, seem to hyperbolize that unification by emulating thought – 
or at least by suggesting what Brakhage calls “so-called hallucinations … day-
dreams or night dreams”, but particularly “the abstractions which move so 
dynamically when closed eyelids are pressed” [1978, pp. 120-128]. The Persian 
Series’s flickering colour fields do suggest “closed-eye vision”: “those explosions 
you can see by rubbing; there's a whole world of moving pattern [1982, p115]. As 
such, there be no ‘extra’ image in the realm of the spectator, which is not the 
cinematographic material – because the cinematographic material here effectively 
pre-empts any such images.  
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3.9. Analagon of the Hypnagogic 
 
 The threat of recognition and conceptual determination, however, persists. 
If the frames of the Persian Series are emulating the “dots and moving patterns of 
closed-eye vision” then they are mimicking phosphenes or entoptic lights, within 
the eyeball itself. It is these that Jean-Paul Sartre in L’Imaginaire claims provide 
the ‘analagon’ for hypnagogic imagery. All imaginative acts, says Sartre, require 
some matter, or analagon to work on, whether it be external or an ‘internal’ to the 
subject: it is a question of  “animating a certain matter to make a representation of 
an absent or nonexistent object.” [2004, p50] In the case of the ‘hypnagogic’ 
imagery, that occurs on the verge of sleep, the analagon is within the eye. Sartre 
evokes the transition: 
 
 My eyes are closed. A field of relatively stable luminous spots of varying colours 
 and brightnesses appear. Movements begin, vague swirls, which create luminous 
 forms without definite contours. … [W]e try to follow them with our eyes. … The 
 result of these movements is indefinite and indefinable phosphorescent paths. 
 Then, all at once, forms with clear contours appear. … One does not posit these 
 forms as really existent outside oneself, nor even as existing in the entoptic field: 
 one only posits that one sees them at the moment. In a word: I do not see the teeth 
 of the saw (I see nothing but the phosphenes), but I know that what I see is a figure 
 of teeth of a saw. … Nothing new has appeared, no image has been projected on 
 the entoptic lights, but, in apprehending them, one apprehends them as teeth of a 
 saw or as stars. [2004, pp45-6] 
Sartre’s account of experiencing the lights themselves, before “forms with clear 
contours appear”, would appositely describe watching the Persian Series; that 
“forms with clear contours appear” to Sartre suggests that they may also appear to 
the viewer of Brakhage’s film, an expression of the involuntary urge to conceptual 
order. Sartre is emphatic, however, that images like the “teeth of a saw” are not 
‘extra’ to the analagon’s material: nothing new has appeared, no image has been 
projected. According to the intentionality of Sartre’s phenomenological view, the 
apprehension (as “teeth of a saw”) is the image: a unity of thought and material.  
The Persian Series, meanwhile, in both flickering form and abstract content, has 
strived to annul any ‘extra’ images the viewer might have. Whether the 
discernment of figurations counts as a subjective ‘addition’ or the thought and 
material remain indivisible depends on whether or not the situation is 
phenomenologically framed.  
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3.10. Continuity 
 
 The Persian Series exemplifies one strategy for undermining the Kuleshov 
effect and reducing cinematic experience to a single image, by effectively speeding 
up the rate of the cuts to the level of the frame rate. Making each frame a shot – 
each frame of abstract forms different to the next - renders the shots 
unrecognizable and interrupts the “induction current” that Metz referred to. There 
is no time for - and no object of - recognition and conceptual determination. The 
dynamically opposite strategy in preventing involuntary rationalization is to slow 
down the rate of cuts from shot to shot – to zero - and have only slight, 
permutational changes between frame content. 
 In the late 1990s Dutch artists Jeroen de Rijke and Willem de Rooij 
produce three films each consisting of ten-minute-long, static takes. One of these, 
Of Three Men (1998) begins with a fade-in from black, effected by a figure moving 
away from in front of the lens (perhaps in reference to the ‘concealed’ cuts of 
Hollywood films like Hitchcock’s 1948 Rope). The interior of a church is revealed, 
the centralized perspectival lines extending into the space of the room in which Of 
Three Men is projected. The eponymous figures can be dimly made out sitting 
down in the back ground, just off centre. Registering the bare floor and 
chandeliers, and that the figures are kneeling in prayer, the viewer slowly realizes 
that the church is in fact a mosque (see Loers, 2000). For the 10-minute duration of 
the film, only the barest movement is perceptible - the chandelier gently turns, 
rhomboids of sunlight form and dissolve on the floor.   
 Of Three Men, then, exemplifies second strategy suggested above, and in 
doing so consciously recourses to film-theoretical arguments of the 1960s, and the 
refutation of montage in favour of continuity by André Bazin. Eisenstein, says 
Bazin, puts “faith in the image” [2004, 24], his montage creating “a sense or 
meaning not objectively contained in the images themselves but derived 
exclusively from their juxtaposition” [2004, p25]. Bazin offers instead “faith in 
reality” [2004, p24]: 'shooting in continuity', with long takes and deep focus, “adds 
nothing to the reality, it does not deform it, it forces it to reveal its structural depth, 
to bring out the preexisting relations” [2004, p27]. Continuity and montage divide, 
moreover, in terms of spectator participation: montage is rejected as being 
inherently manipulative and coercive, the viewing is passive, if hypnotic; 
continuity requires attention and an active deciphering. For Bazin, where 'montage' 
cinema amounts to a kind of repressive, psychological conditioning, with the 
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continuous shot, like ‘reality’, the viewing subject is ‘free’ to perceive or choose 
their own level of reading.   
 Meanwhile, particularly in the context of its two companion films - Chun 
Tian (1994) and Bantar Gebang (2000) – Of Three Men suggests an atavistic return 
to the Lumiere brothers’ aiming of a stationary camera at a factory gate; or even of 
the early fiction ‘tableaux’ films, like Louis Feuillade’s Fantômas (1913), where 
the camera is set back from the drama, which is played out in prolonged shots and 
complex  choreography (see Bordwell, 1997). Of Three Men, however, sublates 
both this kind of synchronic montage (simultaneously presented elements in a 
single shot) and diachronic montage (separate shots in serial form). Rather than 
spatial or temporal juxtaposition, the operative mode is diegetic superimposition: 
as the church reveals itself beneath the mosque (or, as suggested above, the mosque 
‘appears’ from the church architecture), Bazin’s “structural depth” of “pre-existing 
relations” applies literally.47   
 Once this is understood, unlike the Persian Series’ simulation of closed-
eye vision, Of Three Men would seem to encourage the viewer to actually close 
their eyes.48 We recall that Barthes cannot shut his eyes and imagine at the cinema 
because, on opening them again, he would not “discover the same image”: Of 
Three Men’s ‘image’ does not change for the full ten minutes of its duration. The 
pervasive calm is the viewer’s reassurance that the image will not change (playing 
off both the religious claim to eternity and the manifest, contradictory, architectural 
change) – it will still be there on opening. And with the image’s centrally receding 
perspective conjoining and extending the projection space, the viewer is implicated 
as next to – even one of - the three men under the chandelier: prayer, closed-eye 
contemplation, would seem to be the appropriate behavior.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 It has been the aim of the above discussion to view cinematic experience 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Not forgetting, as Sven Lütticken has pointed out, the submerged art-historical scene of 
the seventeenth-century paintings that depicted the whitewashed interiors of Protestant 
churches that were once Catholic [2007, p115]. 
48 The many correlations between Camera Lucida and Sartre’s L’Imaginaire, to which 
Barthes book is dedicated, have been marked extensively elsewhere; for my purposes it is 
worth reiterating that the punctum best reveals itself with closed eyes, as a mental image, 
the “detail … ris[ing] of its own accord into affective consciousness”. 
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‘from the position’ of an image that is ‘extra’ to the cinematographic material, and 
as such ‘only’ the viewer’s addition, and inner. It has then been possible to 
consider in what way, and why, this image has been both asserted and annulled, or 
cancelled. A number of aspects revealed themselves:  
 Eisenstein’s extra image or Obraz is a putting of Kuleshov’s findings - that 
the image will “reach the viewer in the way intended by the editor, because the 
viewer himself will complete the sequence and see that which is suggested to him 
by the montage” - to pedagogic ends. It is made by instrumentalizing the viewer’s 
‘innate’ logical, meaning-making faculties. This extra image is refuted because it is 
perceived to be both manipulative and logocentric. Eisenstein’s metaphor is of 
impregnating the viewer, by recruiting or soliciting their imagination or creativity: 
“[w]ithin me, as a spectator, this image is born and grown. Not only the author has 
created, but I also – the creating spectator – have participated.” Christian Metz, 
meanwhile, confirms the extra image’s formation as a kind of involuntary 
rationalization, an “induction current … linking images among themselves, 
whatever one did”, the mind “incapable of not making a connection between two 
successive images. [ibid] Reactions to Stan Brakhage’s film The Animals of Eden 
and After confirmed the “induction current” of temporal juxtaposition’s irresistible 
force, as well as the desire to erase the ‘extra’ image and subtract cinematic 
experience to the cinematographic material. 
 Two forms of editing or montage presented themselves that might 
overcome the induction current of involuntary rationalization: one, recommended 
by Deleuze, consisted of speeding up the cuts to a continuous flicker that does not 
leave time for critical distance or contemplation, acting immediately on a pre-
reflexive level; the other, recommended by Bazin, for whom 'montage' amounts to 
a kind of psychological conditioning, is the continuous shot, without any cuts.  
 However, on examination of films taken to be exemplary of these two 
modes - Brakhage’s Persian Series [1999] and Jeroen de Rijke and Willem de 
Rooij Of Three Men [1998] respectively – it was found that some form of 
‘addition’ to the images yet persisted. Where the Persian Series appears to 
purposefully simulate ‘closed-eye vision’, Of Three Men, presents itself as an 
occasion - that Barthes saw provided by photography – to literally close one’s eyes 
and recollect, and in doing so, liberate one’s spectatorship of the changing image 
from “continuous voracity”. 
  
* 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Two Kinds of Blankness 
 
Introduction 
 
 In the pursuit of the relationships between language, image and interiority 
– here specifically in Conceptual Art’s late-sixties-early-seventies zenith - the 
following compares the work of Marcel Broodthaers and Robert Barry, via the 
criticism of Rosalind Krauss. The invocation of different aspects of the work of 
Stéphane Mallarmé by these artists provides a frame through which to perceive 
those relationships.   
 Broodthaers takes on Mallarmé’s spatialization of the lexical and 
typographic elements of language via the surrealist écriture’s rebus: language’s 
material form exaggerated to inhibit semantic ‘content’. Barry’s sentences, 
meanwhile, are conventionally ‘meaningful’, but exhibit Mallarmé’s auto-
destructive, “negative logic” whereby what is evoked is immediately ‘erased’ or 
collapses in “resonant disappearance”: ‘pictures’ are promised but what is offered 
is unpicturable. Broodthaers’s engagement with Mallarmé is of course explicit – as 
in 1969’s Exposition Literaire autour de Mallarmé – while Barry’s is, rather, an 
application of Mallarméan logic to the interrogation of the art object’s ontology.   
 What both practices contribute to – through paradigmatically opposing 
deployments of language - is a critique of the dominance of conceptual thought 
over experience. Barry’s texts challenge universal communicability: the notion that 
every thought can be expressed, and that thought is therefore primarily – 
necessarily – public. Broodthaers’s rebuses, in their resistance to being read, offer 
experience that refuses to be conceptualized.  
 I begin with an instructive misreading by Krauss of Broodthaers's 1974 
Studio International cover, that allows the development of two notions of the 
‘rebus’: one that Broodthaers professes, which is a combination of the visual and 
verbal to the semantic annulment of both, and one that Krauss applies to 
Broodthaers, which, counter to her post-structuralist avowals, entails the verbal-
conceptual determination of the visual. It is at the latter effacement of the non-
conceptual, in fact, that both artists’ practices take aim.   
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4.1. Krauss Reads Broodthaers's Studio International Cover 
 
 In black capital letters on white disks, in turn on a black ground, is the 
phrase "FINE ARTS". In place of the "E", however, is an image of an eagle, and 
the image of an ass replaces the 'A'. This is Marcel Broodthaers' 1974 Studio 
International cover. According to Rosalind Krauss, the combination of letters and 
images that Broodthaers had reproduced from a 19th-century alphabet game, is a 
'rebus', and two readings can be made of it. 
 In the first instance, Krauss takes the eagle to “symbolise” nobility and the 
ass to “present the lowliness of a beast of burden”, extrapolating that the larger 
“idea of Art” is contrasted with the “stupefying practice of actually making”. In the 
second instance, by ignoring the images, the phrase can be made to read “FIN 
ARTS”, or the end of the 'arts', of the “individual arts as medium specific” [2000, 
p.12]. Then, in a combination of the two readings, “the eagle itself will be folded 
into the hybrid or intermedia condition of the rebus, in which not only language 
and image but high and low and any other oppositional pairing one can think of 
will freely mix” [ibid.]. From there, the “eagle principle”, the “idea of Art” as the 
post-medium rebus, now functions anew, as the ubiquitous mixed-media 
installation. 
 
4.2. The Question of the Rebus  
  
 But when we come to ask in what way Broodthaers's magazine cover is 
presented, and understood, as a rebus, the answer can only be ambivalent. It must 
first be admitted that there is no rebus 'principle' at work, inasmuch as existing 
symbols - letters or words - are not being used purely for their sounds, regardless 
of their meaning, to represent new words. Neither "Fine-Eagle", "Ass-Arts', 
"F.I.N.-eagle", nor "Ass-R.T.S." have homophones. Compare L.H.O.O.Q., where 
the reader says the letters and listens to the sounds they make, to arrive at Elle a 
chaud au cul. 
 Because symbols are not being used for their sounds Broodthaer's "rebus" 
is not language-specific, that is, it could be in any language where those letters 
appear. Compare a French example, suggested by Authur Danto, showing a man 
holding in his hand a large green letter "I" - un grand I vert - which gives its 
homophone un grand hiver, "a long winter" [2001, p136]. In English "a big green 
I" has no phonetic tie.  
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 A rebus such as Danto's example is mono-logical. It is a puzzle with an 
answer, that means nothing unless it means un grand hiver.  And the answer is 
usually syntactically coherent - Elle a chaud au cul or Ieusous Christos Theou 
Hyios, Soter - if not an actual sentence. Compare this to Krauss's analysis of 
Broodthaer's rebus, which not only provides two readings, but is ultimately 
elaborated to stand in synecdoche for her whole discussion on the "post-medium" 
condition. Where the rebus, as puzzle, has a determinate meaning, and things in no 
way 'freely mix', Krauss / Broodthaers's is indeterminate.  
 
4.3.  The Communicating Rebus 
 
 What is rebus-like about Krauss's reading is that the images are not 
considered in their particularity, but treated instead as concepts. The particularity 
of the eagle image is the way it is rendered, wings spread, on a rock, in colour, etc. 
These sensual details are subsumed in a reading as reading, that treats the image as 
a linguistic concept, to stand for the abstract "eagle" (and from there another 
abstraction is attached: the eagle 'symbolizes' nobility), the problem being that 
reading entails identification.  
Meanwhile Krauss is disingenuous in saying that the ass "present[s]" the 
'lowliness of a beast of burden' - although Krauss wants to insinuate a contrast of 
'ideal' theory with material practice, the ass is as much a re-presentation as the 
eagle is. Further, they are graphic representations made iconic, given the traits of 
linguistic signifiers and made to communicate. The rebus-principle, then, is a 
principle of homogenization, a levelling, where, counter to the source phrase non 
verbis, sed rebus, the sensuous particularity of the objects and images is subsumed 
by linguistic concepts. '[L]anguage and image' do not 'freely mix': language, 
determinate meaning, takes over. Thus the contradiction of Krauss's analysis: in its 
indeterminacy, the magazine cover is no rebus, but, in the effacement of its images 
by linguistic conceptualisation, it is read into one.   
 
4.4. The Incommunicative Rebus 
 
 Krauss was most likely inspired to call Broodthaers's magazine work a 
rebus because it is what Broodthaers himself calls many of his works. However, 
what is rebus-like about Krauss's reading - the triumph of determinate, linguistic 
meaning over sensuous particularity, making images communicate - is exactly 
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refused by Broodthaers. Of his 1967 film Le Corbeau et Le Renard Broodthaers 
says: 
 
I had my text printed and placed before it various everyday objects (boots, a 
telephone, a bottle of milk) which were meant to form a direct relationship with 
the printed letters. It was an attempt to deny, as far as possible, meaning to the 
word as well as to the image. … [But] There was still too much distance between 
object and text. In order to integrate text and object, I would have to print on the 
screen the same typographic characters I had used in the film. My film is a rebus, 
something you have to want to figure out. It's a reading exercise. [1988, p36] 
 
A rebus, as we have seen above, is indeed something to be 'figured out': like an 
equation, there is a single answer. But for Broodthaers, his film is a rebus inasmuch 
as "you have to want to" figure it out, even while, as an attempt to "deny ... 
meaning to the word as well as to the image", there is no single answer possible. It 
only looks like a rebus: interpretative closure is an insinuated promise, "reading 
exercise" being a joke at the expense of the reader's patience. Broodthaers's 
vacuum-formed plaques are also "rebuses,  
 
[a]nd the subject, a speculation about a difficulty of reading that results when you 
use this substance. … Reading is impeded by the image-like quality of the text and 
vice versa. … They are intended to be read on a double level – each one involved 
in a negative attitude which seems to me specific to the stance of the artist: not to 
place the message completely on one side alone, neither image nor text. That is, 
the refusal to deliver a clear message – as if this role were not incumbent upon the 
artist, and by extension upon all producers with an economic interest. [1988, p41-
2] 
 
Broodthaers self-understanding of his rebuses, then, is contradictory - but 
contradictory in accord with his stated intention not to provide determinate 
meanings (Krauss cites Buchloh in calling these contradictory explanations 
‘blague’, willful double negations “in which a petrified language acts to mimic the 
present-day reification of speech itself at the hands of the consciousness industry” 
[2001, p34]. Just as the plaques' text and images have a "negative attitude" to each 
other in a mutual, visio-verbal denial of meaning, so do his artworks and his 
statements about them.  
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4.5. Strong and Weak Rebuses   
 
 The important point here is that Broodthaers's (weak) rebuses, in their 
mutual, visio-verbal refusal of meaning are in the lineage of the historical avant-
garde's resistance to what Benjamin Buchloh calls “the positivist and 
instrumentalist subjection of language to meaning and communication” [1988, 
p.76]. In practice, from Mallarmé though Duchamp to Broodthaers, this means 
foregrounding the space and material of language, its visual opacity. As Buchloh 
goes on to point out, however, insisting on the "autonomous physicality and pure 
semiotic presence of ... speech acts and ... objects transform[s] the very opponent 
of reification – poetic language – into ... plasticity and objecthood" [1988, p.74]. 
That is, both communicative language and poetic language rely on transparency: 
resistance to one risks loss of the other. I want to return to this, but for the moment, 
the fundamental contrast is between Broodthaer's 'meaningless', weak rebus and 
Krauss's strong rebus, strong because it pursues the principle of effacing the 
image's contingent particularity with linguistic concepts, rendering transparent 
what was visually opaque, rendering meaning-full. The two rebuses can be 
characterized as ‘weak’ – indeterminacy, heterogeneity, language enfeebled, 
systems of communication withdrawn from – and ‘strong’ - determinate meanings, 
homogeneity, language omnipotent, and subsumption by systems of 
communication. The weak rebus was the visio-verbal form of avant-garde 
production which, in an effort to resist communication, "freely mixed" not only 
language and image "but high and low and any other oppositional pairing one can 
think of". The strong rebus is the form of a landscape dominated by 
communication, coherently occupied by intellect's concepts.  
 
4.6. Language is not transparent49 
 
A more recent critical work on Broodthaers considers his 1969 Exposition 
Literaire autour de Mallarmé: Marcel Broodthaers a la Deblioudebliou / S at 
Antwerp’s Wide White Space gallery to amount to a critique of conceptual art’s 
consolidation of language as transparent, permutable, accessible, immaterial: 
 
Broodthaers’s works in the Exposition litteraire counter the notion of capitalist 
culture dissolving into spectral spectacle. They insist instead on the physicality of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Mel Bochner, various iterations, e.g. 1969 
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the word-image and the embodiment of our relation to it. They provide a counter-
example to uses of language that dissolve text into something that opposes the 
objecthood of art, aiming to “dematerialize” it. [Haidu, 2010, p85] 
 
I want now to turn to the work of Robert Barry, one of those to which Haidu claims 
Broodthaers’s is paradigmatically counterposed. I will suggest, however, that at 
least one of the ‘dematerializations’ that Barry’s works enact produces the same 
effects as Broodthaers’s ‘materializations’, which is a critique of communicative 
transparency.   
 
4.7. Telepathy 
 
In the first section of the catalogue for the 19 May - 19 June 1969 
exhibition at Simon Fraser University in British Columbia, Robert Barry’s 
contribution reads, 
 ROBERT BARRY / Telepathic Piece, 1969 / (During the Exhibition I will try to 
 communicate telepathically a work of art, the nature of which is a series of 
 thoughts that are not applicable to language or image.) [Seigelaub, 1969] 
 
This is followed by an entry in the “II. Presentation” section: “At the conclusion of 
the exhibition (June 19, 1969), the information about the work of art was made 
known in this catalogue.” [ibid.] 
 One understanding of Barry’s work of this period is that, as he says 
himself in the recently released interview, it “raises a lot of fundamental problems 
as far as the existence of a work of art is concerned: just how much is needed, and 
how much has to be known about a work of art, before it does exist” [2001, p86]. 
Here however I want to emphasize and pursue another aspect: as a parody of 
communication. The texts’ effect of a cognitive blankness make the point.  
 Telepathic Piece mocks expressivist aesthetics: that the artwork is an 
expression of thought, or interiority, which is then “received” by the auditor. 
Telepathic Piece, after all, is composed of thoughts “not applicable to language or 
image”.  There is no message – only confirmation of the Beckettian maxim that 
“there is nothing to express” and “nothing from which to express” [Beckett, 1999, 
p103]. If there is no message what does the receiver receive, and how do they 
know they have received it? Pressed by the interviewer Patricia Norvell, Barry 
suggests if someone has an ineffable experience – something which is “impossible 
to adequately describe” [Alberro et al., 2001, p96] - during the exhibition, they 
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may ascribe it to Barry  (the ascription would have to be retrospective – the 
catalogue announcing the work was released after the exhibition). Considered with 
others of Barry’s works from the period - where things are “not noted by the 
conscious mind”, or “not yet known to me”, things “I am not at the moment 
thinking” - what is asserted is the impossibility of expression – not least because 
the ‘interior’ thing to be expressed is not available to the artist themselves. 
Telepathic Piece forces recognition of the fact that  
 
you can never totally know what’s going on in my mind anyway; that any object 
which I present to you and you perceive … brings with it all the fantasies and 
everything else which you associate with those things and which I have no control 
over” [Alberro et al., 2001, p87] 
 
Barry is emphatic that one’s “personal experience” is incommunicable; “it’s like 
Sartre says: “Only you can experience your own death, your own making love, 
your own” … anything” [ibid.]. Language – that which otherwise might bring an 
end to the isolation - is for Barry “symbols devised by other people which I’m 
forced to use” [ibid.].  
 Barry illustrates a commitment to this kind of autarky with his contribution 
to Prospect 69 at the Kunsthalle in Deusseldorf was an interview in the exhibition 
catalogue. The interview is not the artwork, though. In the interview Barry declares 
that “[t]he piece will consist of the ideas that people will have from reading this 
interview” [Fischer et al., 1969, p121] The artwork is made of thought: when a 
person reads the interview in the catalogue, they will be experiencing the artwork. 
Because the artwork is not the transcribed and printed interview, the text on the 
page, the artwork will have as many different forms as there are readers of the 
interview - or as Barry puts it, “The piece in its entirety is unknowable because it 
exists in the minds of so many people” [ibid.]. So it is a single artwork – the, it – 
formed from the thoughts of each reader, but “[e]ach person can really know that 
part which is in his own mind” [ibid.]. They know that there is something in 
common that putatively spans all their minds, but can’t know what it is.  
 
4.8. Private / Public 
 
 Rosalind Krauss identifies and condemns this radical privacy. In Sense and 
Sensibility: Reflection on Post ‘60s Sculpture, Krauss claims that Minimalism’s 
rejection of traditional illusionism and anthropomorphism implies the rejection of 
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idealist models of consciousness and the concomitant psychological model of a 
“private self”. According to this latter model, just as illusionistic painting’s 
background exists before and supports the figures, the notion of the (artist’s) 
private self is a given, “exist[ing] replete with meanings prior to contact with its 
world” [1973, p47]. Illusionistic space equals an idealist “space” of consciousness.  
Minimalist art works to “deny the singular, intimate and impenetrable 
aspect of the experience” [1973, p50]: it does not suggest a private self beyond or 
behind the artwork, access to which grants the work its meaning. By using 
impersonal, non-mimetic, inexpressive forms, minimalist works refute origination 
from a hidden, private self; their insistence on literal readings is an effort to avoid 
idealist consciousness. They are instead fully “public”, their meaning available to 
anyone who can perceive them: the perception of them is their meaning.50 
Art of the late 1960s and early 1970s, says Krauss, should be understood 
not only in terms of its form but also by the extent to which it rejects or accepts this 
traditional model of the “a priori” private self. Mel Bochner and Richard Serra, like 
the minimalists before them, reject it: Bochner in particular, uses language in a way 
that banishes the fantasy of an expressed privacy in favour of “a linguistic space 
that is fully non-psychological” [1973, p51]. Others like Heubler, On Kawara and 
Barry embrace it, basing their work on an idea of individual experience as unique, 
mysterious and unverifiable.   
 
4.9. Communicative Transparency 
 
 What Krauss misses, however, is that if a private self is expressed, by, for 
example, Telepathic Piece, it is in terms “not applicable to language or image”: 
the private self evoked ‘in the mind’ of the receiving private self is a blank. Barry’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  Hal Foster questions Krauss’s position by pointing to the difficulty of reading 
minimalism phenomenologically – which Kraus does, particularly via Merleau-Ponty - or 
reading minimalism “as a phenomenology” [2001, p42], i.e. perception without history, 
language, sexuality, or power. Foster points out that phenomenology is attacked (not least 
by structural linguistics, Krauss’s other interpretative mode) because humanism and idealist 
consciousness were thought to be residual in it: “For instance, just as phenomenology 
undercuts the idealism of the Cartesian “I think”, so minimalism undercuts the 
existentialism of the abstract-expressionist “I express, ” but both substitute an “I perceive” 
that leaves meaning lodged in the subject.” [2001, p43]. In other words, minimalism’s 
refutation of the myth of transparent expression generates another myth: that of the pure, 
subjectless presence of the object. 
	   87	  
is a critique of communicative transparency and expressivist aesthetics, 
underlining disjunctions between thought, expression and interpretation that are 
irreducible.  
 In the catalogue for July, August, September 1969. Juillet, Août, Septembre 
1969. Juli, August, September 1969, which served as the guide to the location and 
description of works, each made in a different part of the world in the title’s time 
period, Barry’s entry appears as: 
 ROBERT BARRY / Psychic Series, 1969 / Everything in the unconscious 
 perceived by the senses but not noted by the conscious mind during trips to 
 Baltimore, during the summer of 1967. [Seigelaub, 1969b, p3] 
The text – which is repeated in French and German - shares its structure with 
several others of Barry’s, notably “All the things I know but I am not at the 
moment thinking – 1:36 PM, 15 June 1969, New York” (another catalogue entry, 
this time for the group show 557, 087 at Seth Siegelaub Gallery), and “Something 
which is very near in place and time, but is not yet known to me” (a work produced 
30 times between 1969 and 1972, the date of each exhibition’s opening added at 
the end of the sentence). In all, independent clause is followed by subordinate. An 
affirmative nomination –something, everything, all the things – precedes a 
conjunction and subordinate clause that mitigates – but is not, but I am not, but not 
noted by. In each, nomination invites ‘picturing’ before mitigation revokes the 
invitation.51 “Everything in the unconscious perceived by the senses” is notionally 
picturable, in pertaining to the sensory - but what are sensory impressions if not 
“noted by the conscious mind”? Grasp is eluded. Again, “something which is very 
near in place and time” provokes an ideation of proximity – there is a thing which 
is close – which is then ‘struck through’ as not ‘in’ the narrator’s awareness.52 It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Art and Language's 1967 Air Show - a proposal for the exhibition of an unspecified 
‘column’ of air - would be another example of description, or at least nomination, giving 
onto no 'graspable' object. [see Harrison and Wood, 2003, p868] 
52 In the latter sentence a utopian dynamic is inferred – explicitly, if we read the “not yet” 
as Ernst Bloch’s. The dynamic is heightened in 1970, for a solo exhibition in Turin, with 
Marcuse Piece: “Some places to which we can come, and for a while ‘be free to think 
about what we are going to do’.” Taken from Herbert Marcuse’s An Essay on Liberation, 
the quotation was composed for the occasion with adhesive letters on one of the gallery 
walls. Its utopian function is undermined, however – at least from a Blochean perspective - 
by naming something present: the (commercial) gallery is utopia, utopia is here, rather than 
elsewhere. See Buchloh, 1990, p142.  
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this rescinded promise to picture that mocks expressive and communicative 
efficacy: the reading subject is like a faulty television set that does not ‘get a 
picture’ from the broadcast signal.53 
 
4.10. Negative Logic 
 
 The logic is the “negative logic” that Sartre discerns in Mallarmé. Sartre 
emphasizes the poetry’s self-negating nihilism (presenting it as a kind of deferred, 
textualized suicide) whereby objects are evoked only to collapse back in “resonant 
disappearance” [1988, p140]:     
 
 how, by means of his pen, a lace bedspread abolishes itself, revealing only the 
 absence of a bed; … or how a grave is burdened only with “the very absence of 
 weighty wreaths.” [1988, p143] 
 
Barry’s texts follow the spirit – the eschewal of communication – if not the 
structure of phrases such as “Ma faim qui d’aucun fruits ici ne se regale / Trouve 
en leur docte manqué un saveur egale” [My hunger which feasts here on no fruit / 
Finds in their learned absence an equal flavour]. Meanwhile Mallarmé’s emphasis 
on the pleasures of “step-by-step discovery” and the evoking of an object “little by 
little, so as to bring to light a state of the soul or, inversely, to choose an object and 
bring out of it a state of the soul through a series of unravellings” [trans Dorra, 
p141] would seem well articulated (if literally) by Barry’s 1971 slide projection of 
eight sentences in rotation: “IT IS PURPOSEFUL. / IT IS VARIED. / IT IS 
DIRECT. / IT IS AMORPHOUS. / IT IS INFLUENCED. / IT IS REMOTE. / IT IS 
DEFINED. / IT IS INCONSISTENT.”54 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Contrast Yoko Ono’s 1964 “Build three thousand chimneys and line them up / So it will 
look like one from a certain point /And three thousand from another point” [Quoted in 
Sperlinger, 2005]. Here mental picturing is not only not negated but would seem to be a 
functional requirement of the work.  
54 It is worth remembering that the projections are not the art object. They follow the logic 
of the inert gas and radiation works, which were not visually perceptible, so required 
identifying wall plaques. If the catalogue entries identify the artwork in the exhibition and 
give information on it – that which these phrases identify and give information on is the 
“something”, the “everything” they refer to. On this rationale, the ‘IT’ of the projections 
refers to the (absent) art object, which may be “the ideas that people will have from 
reading” the sentence.  
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Conclusion 
 
 In the preceding the practices of Broodthaers and Barry were taken (from 
an obviously wide field of possible alternatives) to be indicative of two attitudes to 
language, the image and interiority in Conceptual art of the late 1960s and early 
1970s.  
 Examination of the notion of the ‘rebus’, as professed by Broodthaers and 
imposed by Krauss, produced ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ variants. Broodthaers’s ‘weak’ 
rebus is a combination of the visual and verbal to the semantic annulment of both, 
Krauss’s ‘strong’ rebus pursues the principle of effacing the visual image's 
contingent particularity with linguistic concepts, rendering transparent what was 
materially opaque, making the image communicate. Broodthaers’s rebus thus stood 
for the historical avant-garde's ‘wrecking’ of language in resistance to its positivist 
and instrumentalist subjection to meaning and communication' – in resistance, in 
fact, to precisely the kind of rationalization that Krauss imposes on Broodthaers’s 
rebus. 
 Taking as a frame the invocation of different aspects of the work of 
Stéphane Mallarmé, meanwhile, allowed the discernment of the artists’ different 
versions of what could be called ‘blankness’. Broodthaers’s blank is before – in 
place of - semiosis, taking on Mallarmé’s exaggeration of materiality that inhibits 
semantic ‘content’ or the structuring of a meaning ‘in’ the subject of 
consciousness. Barry’s sentences, on the other hand, are conventionally 
‘meaningful’ but exhibit Mallarmé’s auto-destructive, “negative logic” whereby 
what is evoked is immediately ‘cancelled’: the blank is after semiosis. 
 Given that a certain ‘blankness’ - not being pictured or described - is 
fundamental to the efficacy of a utopian function within experience, utopian 
functions can in this respect be drawn from the two approaches: the total and the 
differential. Broodthaers’s is a total withdrawal from systems of communication; 
Barry’s uses their means, remaining amongst perceptions and constructions of 
what is just as it opens onto what is not [see Huyssen 1995]. 
 With Barry’s Telepathic Piece, moreover, the liberal utopia of full 
communicability, without subjective mediation, without subjectivity’s 
inconvenient distortions, is successfully parodied – and leads us to the implications 
of the ‘mind reading’ neuro-imaging technology of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
The Momus Glass  
 
Introduction 
 
 Momus, the Greek god of satire, mocked Hephaestus for not having made 
humans with windows into their hearts, so that their secret thoughts and feelings 
could be discerned. “If the fixture of Momus's glass, in the human breast … had 
taken place,” reasons the narrator of Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy (1759),  
 
 nothing more would have been wanting, in order to have taken a man's character, 
 but to have taken a chair and gone softly, as you would to a dioptrical beehive, and 
 look'd in - view'd the soul stark naked; - observ'd all her motions, - her 
 machinations; - traced all her maggots from their first engendering to their 
 crawling forth; -watched her loose in her frisks, her gambols, her capricios; and 
 after some notice of her more solemn deportment, consequent upon such frisks, 
 &c. - then taken your pen and ink and set down nothing but what you had seen, 
 and could have sworn to: - But this is an advantage not to be had by the biographer 
 in this planet […]  - our minds shine not through the body, but are wrapt up here in 
 a dark covering of uncrystalized flesh and blood; so that if would come to the 
 specifick characters of them, we must go some other way to work. [1996, pp30-
 31] 
 
The following views the status and discourse of the inner image not from the 
position of art history, theory and practice but from that of neuroscience and neuro-
ethics, and considers the fMRI scanner used to determine levels of consciousness 
in the vegetative as just such a ‘Momus Glass’. As such, the implications for 
subjectivity’s construal of bypassing the typically hermeneutic “other way[s] to 
work” are adumbrated.  
 The following examines the processes and conclusions of Detecting 
awareness in the vegetative state, the 2006 paper in which - against medical and 
clinical consensus on the automaticity of vegetative brain activity – the claim to 
have demonstrated the presence of consciousness in a patient previously diagnosed 
as vegetative is first made. The reported experiment was conducted on a woman 
who, when asked to imagine performing certain activities, produced fMRI scans 
indistinguishable from those of 'healthy' subjects imagining the same activities. 
The experimenters conclude that this correlation, plus the patient's apparent 
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understanding of, and compliance with, the verbal request, means that the patient is 
'conscious'. 
 
5.1. The Behaviouristic Approach 
 
 Owen et al.'s [2006] experiment takes a behaviouristic approach to the 
ascription of consciousness55. That is, the assessment criteria excludes 'intrinsic' 
aspects: the phenomenal, 1st-person 'interior', the 'what it is like' to think or be 
conscious. It is excluded because it is inherently inaccessible to observation: 
 
 [O]ur ability to know unequivocally that another being is consciously aware is 
 ultimately determined not by whether or not he or she is aware but instead by his 
 or her ability to communicate that fact through a recognized behavioral response. 
 [2007a, p1099] 
 
According to the behaviouristic approach, not only is consciousness ascribed on 
the basis of 'extrinsic', observable, behavioural responses, but consciousness is the 
ability to produce behavioural responses adequate to certain stimuli. As a 2012 
biographical article in Nature, entitled 'The Mind Reader', claims, Owen “takes a 
"know it if you see it" approach” -   
 
 Responding to commands and questions - communication - is an undeniably 
 conscious activity, in his view. "In the end if [critics] say they have no reason to 
 believe the patient is conscious, I say 'fine, but I have no reason to believe you are 
 either,' he says. [Cyranoski, 2012, p180]  
 
As I will show, the behaviouristic or "know-it-if-you-see-it" approach is 
manifested in the experimental paradigm. We will find that, in the turning of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  And as such has Alan Turing’s theoretical test for machine intelligence as its 
methodological forebearer. Computing Machinery and Intelligence (1950) is a proposal for 
an experimental method of answering the question "Can machines think?", which to avoid 
defining 'thought', is quickly substituted for the question of whether a computer can imitate 
a human in conversation convincingly enough for an interlocutor to surmise that they are 
conversing with a human. If so, claims Turing, the computer can indeed be said to be 
thinking or 'intelligent'. For Turing, what is ‘behind’ the responses is immaterial; what 
matters is that the machine “play the imitation game satisfactorily” [1950, p446]. 
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mental activity into observable behaviour, the subject’s licence not to respond to 
commands and questions, to refuse to communicate, is revoked.  
 
5.2. Overcoming Hermeneutics  
 
 "The vegetative state", as Owen et al begin their report, is "one of the least 
understood and most ethically troubling conditions in modern medicine" [Owen et 
al., 2006, 1402].  The term was first coined in the early 1970s for an increasing 
number of people who, following damage to the brainstem or midbrain, and 
facilitated by improving life-support methods, had moved out of coma but were not 
fully conscious. The term is descriptive56: someone in a vegetative state has  - 
unlike in a comatose state - sleep-wake cycles and breathes without support, but 
their responses and movements are reflex, they show no signs of "purposeful 
behaviour in response to stimulation" [Owen et al 2006, 1402]. They are 
consequently taken to lack awareness of themselves or environment and therefore 
consciousness. Most troubling for the patient's family, inexperienced doctors and 
even ethical policy makers is that people in the vegetative state appear ‘awake’. 
They breath unaided, their eyes may be open, they may move their head and limbs, 
they may even smile or cry; but the gestures do not signify the patient's spiritual 
'presence'. What to the understandably credulist family member or friend is a smile 
at recognizing a loved one by their bedside, is in fact the involuntary contraction of 
facial muscles coinciding with the gaze coming to arbitrary rest: not an expression 
of emotion and not an effect of an intrinsic cause. 
 Reliably ascertaining the level of residual consciousness depends, then, on 
bypassing 'intuitive' readings of patients' behaviour. Fulfilling the objective criteria 
of standardized measurements such as the Glasgow Coma Scale,57 however, still 
depends on the judgment of a clinician. A patient is determined as conscious by 
giving a predicted response to an external prompt or command, and it is the 
clinician who surveys the patient's movements, and decides if they are most 
parsimoniously explained as responses, as predicted, as being under voluntary 
control. Such assessment "remains highly subjective" and "dependent on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See Jennet and Plum (1972) 
57 Proposed in 1974 by professors of neurosurgery at the University of Glasgow [Teasdale 
G, Jennett B.,1974], assessment with the scale involves measuring the patient's responses 
against certain criteria concerning eye, verbal and motor response to stimuli, and giving a 
score between 3 (deep coma) and 15 (fully awake). 
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patients exhibited behaviour" [Coleman et al., 2009, p2542]. It is with the intention 
of overcoming this necessary hermeneutics that several studies since 2000 have 
used neuro-imaging techniques to look directly at patterns of brain activation in 
response to different stimuli; Owen et al [2006] is the first to claim the technique’s 
detection of conscious awareness. 
 
5.3.  The Experiment: the Test-Subject  
 
 The subject of Owen et al's experiment was a 23-year old woman who had 
been in a road accident 5 months previously, in July 2005, where she had sustained 
severe traumatic brain injury. After an initial comatose state, she had opened her 
eyes and demonstrated sleep-wake cycles. However, even during waking periods, 
she remained unresponsive and manifested no spontaneous, intentional 
behaviours.58 
 
5.3.1. The Stimuli 
 
 In-ear headphones, intended to limit background noise from the scanner, 
are placed on the subject. The subject is moved into the scanner. Stimuli are then 
presented via the headphones as two types of pre-recorded spoken sentences.  
 Firstly, the patient is subjected to 237 'trials': 10 second phases in which 
either a sentence, a "noise-equivalent", or silence is played to the patient; the fMRI 
scan is made in the last 1.6 seconds of each phase. The sentences are such as  
 
 There was milk and sugar in his coffee.  
 
The "acoustically matched noise sequences" [Owen et al, 2006, p1402] that these 
sentences alternate with "had the same duration, spectral profile and amplitude as 
the original speech, but were entirely unintelligible" [Owen et al, 2006a, p1].59 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 The Italian Eluana Englaro, who died in 2009, was a similar age to Owen et al's subject - 
22 - when she entered a vegetative state, which, also like Owen et al's subject, followed 
injuries sustained in a car accident. And like Owen et al's patient, Englaro became a test 
subject - this time, an explicitly rather than implicitly political one - as Parliament, 
Supreme Court, Church and even Prime Minister contested her subjecthood. 
59 We might imagine how a poetry teacher emphasizes a line's meter - 'da da DUM ,da 
DUM da, da da DUM da', in the case of the above sentence; or the 'speech melodies', 
created by mimicking the intonations of recordings of speech on orchestral instruments, in 
Steve Reich's 1988 Different Trains. 
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sentences and their noise-equivalents are given in order to detect "speech-specific" 
brain activity: whether bare "speech perception and semantic processing" [Owen et 
al, 2006, p1402] are taking place. Some sentences contain ambiguous homophone 
words, for example "creak" and "creek", that when processed, are known to 
activate areas of the brain that subserve the selection of semantic knowledge 
among competing alternatives. Speech-specific brain activity, Owen et al (2006) 
admit, is not itself indicative of consciousness - its perception and processing can 
take place automatically, while asleep or under anesthetic. It is for this reason that 
the experimenters include a second input stage of mental imagery tasks, which 
require volition to be performed.   
 In this stage pre-recorded spoken instructions were given were at the 
beginning of 30-second periods. The instructions to imagine alternated with 
instructions to rest, in order to have a relative, relational difference to the activity 
of the mental imaging task. Task and rest were repeated ten times: “Imagine 
playing tennis [30 second pause] Now just relax. [30 second pause] Imagine 
playing tennis [30 second pause] Now just relax. …” The second instruction, a 
spatial navigation task, was to "[i]magine visiting the rooms in your house, starting 
from the front door." This was also repeated ten times, in alternation with the 
instruction to rest. 
 
5.3.2. The Responses 
 
 Owen et al found that speech-specific regions of the patient's brain were 
clearly activated by the sentences of the first input stage, where the acoustically 
matched noise sequences did not. The activation was equivalent to that observed in 
healthy volunteers listening to the same stimuli. The sentences containing 
ambiguous homophone words did indeed activate the expected additional brain 
regions. Patterns of brain activation observed during the second fMRI investigation 
were highly suggestive of a relevant, active mental performance. As Owen et al 
report, “Her neural responses were indistinguishable from those observed in 
healthy volunteers performing the same imagery tasks in the scanner” [Owen et al, 
2006, p1402]. 
  
5.4. Interpretation and Ascription  
 
 Owen et al interpret the neural activations in response to the sentences, 
noise-equivalents, and silences of the first experiment to be evidence that the 
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woman could perceive and process speech. Admitting that speech processing of the 
first experiment was involuntary, they go on to interpret the neural activations of 
the imagery tasks to show that, 
 
 despite fulfilling the clinical criteria for a diagnosis of vegetative state, this patient 
 retained the ability to understand spoken commands and to respond to them 
 through her brain activity, rather than through speech or movement. Moreover, her 
 decision to cooperate with the authors by imagining particular tasks when asked to 
 do so represents a clear act of intention, which confirmed beyond any doubt that 
 she was consciously aware of herself and her surroundings. [Owen et al., 2006, 
 p1402] 
 
The interpretation is radical on several counts: most notably that she decided to 
cooperate with the experimenters (and that the display of volition equalled 
consciousness), and that she communicated her cooperation through her brain 
activity.  
 
5.5. Objections  
 
 "Although it is theoretically possible that the mere instruction to imagine 
such actions triggers specific and automatic changes in brain activity," offered 
Owen et al in pre-emptive defence, 
 
 the complexity of the commands used here and the richness of the imagery that is 
 likely to be required to produce a response that is indistinguishable from that of 
 healthy individuals, make this possibility extremely unlikely. [Owen et al., 2006a, 
 p2] 
 
The explanation of their results met immediate objections, however, on exactly 
these grounds. The UCLA psychologist Daniel Greenberg disputed Owen et al's 
conclusion that the patient made a “decision to cooperate” that “represents a clear 
act of intention”. The observed brain activity may have been involuntarily 
triggered by the word 'tennis', rather than be the voluntary following of 
instructions, willfully imagine themselves playing tennis. What would happen, 
wonders Greenberg, if the experimenters presented sentences in a different, non-
instructive form, e.g. “Sharleen was playing tennis”? Or a more complex sentence, 
such as “Imagine visiting the rooms in your home after playing tennis” (Greenberg 
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2007) - where brain activation associated with tennis would suggest that the 
instruction had not been followed?  
 Parashkev Nachev and Masud Husain of Imperial College London also 
reminded Owen et al of the extensive literature demonstrating  "involuntary and 
elaborate activation of task-specific brain areas in response to passive exposure to 
stimuli associated with a specific action, with or without conscious awareness" 
[2007, p. 1221]. On this basis, instead of comparing responses to the instructions to 
imagine playing tennis with those to “relax,” Nachev and Husain suggest Owen et 
al could have compared “imagine playing tennis” with “do not imagine playing 
tennis.” All the activation reported  "could therefore have been wholly automatic 
and unconscious" [ibid.]. 
 
5.6. Response to the Objections   
 
 Owen et al reply that, although words such as “tennis” and “house” can 
elicit wholly automatic neural responses in the absence of consciousness, these 
responses tend to last for only a few seconds, and occur in areas of the brain 
associated with language processing. Their patient's nueral activity, by contrast, 
lasted for the full 30 seconds of each imagery task, and was observed in regions 
appropriate to the tasks, e.g., in response to the "tennis" instruction, a region 
known to be involved in purposefully imagining coordinated movements. "Such 
responses", write Owen et al, "are impossible to explain in terms of automatic brain 
processes." [Owen et al, 2007, p1221] 
 To Greenberg's suggestion - that non-instructive sentences (“Sharleen was 
playing tennis”) could have produced the observed pattern of activation - Owen et 
al respond by staging a supplementary control condition. In it, a healthy volunteer 
showed no activation in the relevant brain areas when presented with isolated 
words, such as ‘tennis’ and ‘house’. Owen et al. thus remained convinced that 
"[t]he most parsimonious explanation" of the results was that the patient "was 
consciously aware and purposefully following the instructions given to her, despite 
her diagnosis of vegetative state." [Owen et al, 2007, p1221] 
  
5.7. Fingerprint and Confession  
 
 As the medical ethicist John Stins points out, to claim that the woman 
communicated her conscious self to the researchers "by modulating her brain 
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activity" [Stins, 2008, p5]60 entails a far-reaching change in the ontological status 
of brain activity. The neuroscientific consensus is, put crudely, that neural activity - 
the brain - is the cause of behaviour; Owen et al (2006) however, treat the woman's 
brain activity itself as behavioural expression, as both cause and effect. A 
‘semiotic’ view of this shift reveals its ramifications. 
 "One fingerprint taken at the scene of the crime,' declares the 1931 Manuel 
de police technique, "is worth even more than the criminal's confession'. Citing the 
Manuel in support, Paul Virilio claims that the introduction of fingerprints as legal 
proof "marks the decline of the story, of the eye-witness account and the 
descriptive model, once the basis of every investigation" [1994, p42]. It is the 
accidentally-deposited fingerprint, not the voluntary confession or statement, that 
comes to be viewed as "immutable reality" [Virilio, 1994, p42].  
 The fingerprint, of course, is one of C S Pierce's 'indexical' signs: "a real 
thing or fact which is a sign of its object by virtue of being connected with it as a 
matter of fact" [Pierce, 1903, v.4, p447] (another being the bullet hole, which is an 
indexical sign that a gun was fired). Unlike the subjectively-mediated confession, 
an index is a sign not determined by interpretation; it is historically determined, 
says Pierce, by the event that produced it. In criminal trials, the prosecution will 
introduce indexical signs - which might equally be footprints or DNA - of the 
actual presence of the person in question at the scene of the crime. 
 
5.8. The Subject Must Confess to Being Conscious 
  
 It seems that something of this relationship between fingerprint and 
confession - both in its historical and synchronic aspects - is to be seen in the 
neuroscientific claim to detect awareness in the vegetative state. Firstly, the claim 
is made at a late stage in the decline of the (subjective) confession and the rise of 
the (neuroscientific) fingerprint. Advances in critical care allow increasing 
numbers of patients to survive out of coma and into the vegetative state, of which 
they can give no report, while concurrent growth in the availability and reliability 
of brain scanning techniques promotes the persuasive force of the neuro-image as 
replacement.61  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 It was on this basis that Owen et al conducted a follow-up experiment, reported in the 
The New England Journal of Medicine in 2010, in which an individual who been diagnosed 
as in a persistent vegetative state answered 'yes' and 'no' to questions solely by changing his 
patterns of fMRI activity. 
61 As brain imaging evolves, says Alan Gross, and the precision in the localization of brain 
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 Secondly, the clinical consensus is that brain activation or “imaging 
findings” is not enough to determine someone as conscious: a “reliable 
communication from the patient’’ [Kobylarz & Schill, 2004, p. 1358] is needed. As 
the neurologist Lionel Naccache claims, "[c]onsciousness is univocally probed in 
humans through the subject's report of his or her own mental states", and that "[t]he 
ability to report one's own mental state is the fundamental property of 
consciousness." [2006, p1396] From this "naturalistic" view, then, the giving of a 
'first-person', veridical report of consciousness's intrinsic aspects is itself the 
primary evidential act of a conscious subject; the subject must confess to being 
conscious in order to be so. 
 
5.9. Iconicity and Indexicality 
 
  Meanwhile, fMRI visuals are arguably indexical signs. Following Pierce 
in distinguishing mimetic, depictive iconicity (e.g. a drawing of a brain) from 
indexicality, Alan Gross (2008) suggests that there is a causal relationship between 
the brain and its fMRI rendering. fMRI visuals are not 'pictures of' the body's 
interior, after all - they are detections of hemodynamic or blood flow changes 
around the brain; these changes are then taken as indicative of neural activity (see 
Dumit 2004). Hence 'functional' imaging: it visualises physiological functions, not 
anatomical structures. The graphic records of fMRI are indexical "insofar as the 
visible tracks of [brain] events point back to their cause." [Gross, 2008, p382] 
 The etiology of the fMRI visual, however, is what most crucially 
distinguishes its indexicality, and at the same time implicates its iconicity. As 
Thomas Szasz writes (following Reichenbach rather than Pierce),  
 
 How do we distinguish indexical signs from iconic signs? By ascertaining whether 
 the sign is "given" by a person or "given off" by him. Iconic signs resemble 
 conventional signs: both are manufactured, more or less deliberately, by an agent, 
 that is a person, whereas indexical signs are given off passively by an organism or 
 thing." [Szasz, 2007, pp77-78] 
 
Hence the confession - a sign of which the iconicity is now affirmed - is "given" 
(more or less) voluntarily, the fingerprint is "given off" (more or less) 
involuntarily, accidentally. We can now see how the claim to detect awareness in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
functions increases, they draw attention away from a persistent constraint: "the brain 
functions so precisely located are just those that are not constitutive of our humanity." 
[Gross, 2008, p380] 
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the vegetative state appeals at once to both the indexicality and iconicity of the 
fMRI report:   
 1) Owen et al had resorted to the analysis of brain activity, after all, to 
avoid the need for interpretation of the patient's "ambiguous" exhibited behaviour. 
Thinking involuntarily gives off its neural image; like the crime scene fingerprint, 
it is taken as a sign of the actual presence of the person. 
 2) In saying that the woman "retained the ability to understand spoken 
commands and to respond to them through her brain activity, rather than through 
speech or movement", Owen et al claim brain activity to be instead of speech; it 
takes the place of the "report" that Naccache wants. As a voluntarily given response 
to commands, the fMRI visual was a confession of her consciousness.  
 
5.10 “The Soul Stark Naked”  
 
 This semiotic confusion demonstrates a more general confusion over to 
what extent Owen et al's subject is, in Szasz's terms, an 'agent' or 'person' who 
gives iconic signs, or an 'organism' or 'thing' which only gives off indexical signs. 
Specifically, it demonstrates that the confession of consciousness, which must 
necessarily be given voluntarily, is in fact taken from the subject, by the 
experimental apparatus. The imaging technology rolls back the boundary between 
physiology and behaviour, bringing the neurological to the observable surface. The 
subject is helpless to display the neural sign, which is seized as confession. 
 Although Owen et al seem to successfully refute the claim that the wording 
of the imagery tasks involuntarily triggered task-specific activity, their reply 
ignores another of Nachev and Husain's objections. This was to the assertion that 
the task-specific brain activity indicated the patient’s “decision to cooperate”: 
"[O]ne cannot speak of a decision," Nachev and Husain write, "when there is no 
evidence of choice" [2007, p1221]. The registering of no response from the woman 
in Owen et al's experiment would have signified in their paradigm that she was 
incapable of comprehension, rather than that she had decided not to cooperate. 
There was no means for her to actively refuse. 
 
Conclusion  
 
 Despite asking after the inner image from an entirely different perspective 
– the theory and practice of neuroscience, rather than art – it seems that the same 
issues have arisen. The "acoustically matched noise sequences" that test for bare 
"speech perception and semantic processing", the question of whether a mental 
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image of playing tennis is involuntarily triggered by the instruction to "[i]magine 
playing tennis”, or if the image is a result of voluntary effort, recourses to the 
Aristotalian specificity of human speech as being ‘meaningful sound’, as sound 
accompanied by phantasmata.    
 Meanwhile, as the ‘Momus glass’ of the chapter’s epigraph suggests, 
private, unobservable interiority is paradigmatically refuted. This ‘behaviouristic’ 
approach recourses to the positivist ‘bringing to observation’ of chapter 2’s 
naturalist theatre, as well as Adorno and Horkheimer’s suggestion of positivism’s 
“pure immanence” being “nothing other than a form of universal taboo [where] 
[n]othing is allowed to remain outside”  - that is, to remain unverifiable. This 
attitude to the inner image is different from, for example, J B Watson’s (1913) 
behaviourism, where mental images, because externally unobservable, are non-
existent. And it is different from the cognitive psychology that recognises the 
privacy of mental images, but, as inferred from the subject's account, assimilates 
them again to the field of observation (see Holt, 1964). Rather, for Owen et al, if 
the physiognomic behaviour of the brain scan correlates with the brain scan of a 
healthy subject during a certain task, then the interior, the ‘what-it-is-like’ to be 
that person, the inner image itself, is of no consequence. 
 What I want to focus on, however, is the way in which the specificity of 
the inner image is effaced by being made to communicate, and how this coincides 
with the apparatus’s constituting of the subject. The subject’s inner images are 
instrumentalized; there is an ‘autonomy’ – in the sense of both purposeless and 
dereistic - to imagining playing tennis, to imagining walking around one’s house, 
that is lost in their being made to communicate the subject’s sentience. Rather than 
being an activity that separates one from the world by negating it (as Lessing’s 
Einbildung does), imagining is made into something that returns the subject to the 
communicative fold. It seems, moreover, that the apparatus forces this return. 
Refusing to participate – by not following the instructions to imagine - would 
register the test-subject as being unable to participate, unable to understand the 
instructions, and insentient: the test-subject suffers the obligation to express.  
 
* 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Recapitulation of Argument 
 
 The aim of this thesis has been to trace the fate, valences and role of 
incommunicable, perception-like thought - what I call an “inner image” - in art’s 
reception. The central argument is that recent production and reception is beholden 
to a critique of interiority that programmatically outlaws such images. I argue that 
in the context of these prohibitions an inner image – as both experienced in 
engagement and as procedurally facilitated in practice - has a critical-utopian 
function. Reference to a historically and formally wide range of examples both 
supports the argument and explores the ramifications of the claim. 
 
Review of Methodology and Findings 
 
 The introduction set out a number of concepts and theories that served as 
frames through which to view the objects and texts in chapters 1 to 5, resulting in 
findings that are summarised below. There first follows a review of the 
interpretative concepts applied. These regarded both the manner in which practices 
refuse the subject engaging with them ‘inner images’, and the epistemological and 
social dynamics that effect the cancellation of the ‘inner image’. 
 Coextension of speech and thought: It was shown that one variant of 
‘relational’ art, associated with Nicolas Bourriaud, assumes that its subjects only 
speak, or interact, and that they do not have unsaid thought. Full and general 
exteriorization allows no-where for inner images.   
 Communicative plenitude: Another variant of relational art – Grant 
Kester’s ‘dialogic’ - grants its subjects no ‘privacy’ because it assumes its subjects 
to be purely rational and discursive, their thoughts then fully communicable and 
therefore wholly public. No non-discursive, inexpressible, private remainder is 
countenanced. 
 Perceptual absorption: The ‘immersive’ installation effaces the cognitive 
distance that allows for hypotheses, recollections, and associations. In the name of 
a quasi- or frankly religious ‘self transcendence’ - “you go inside - behind the eye - 
to greet the light” [Steward, 2010] remarks James Turrell - these works in fact 
entail a pure immanence and absorption that renders intensive and extensive 
undifferentiated, and ‘inner’ images nullified. 
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 Reification of signs: It was also suggested that language in art’s spatial 
field – after concrete poetry, after the text works of Smithson and Andre,  but also 
after Mallarmé and Broodthaers - is typically understood to efface signification 
with the materiality of its signifiers. This kind of postmodern “depthlessness”, as 
Frederic Jameson identified it, is naturalized, and no longer a radical critique of 
language’s conceptual, denominative function. It is then a given that language as 
‘reified’ sign does not deal in – does not  evoke or express - ‘inner images’.  
 Critique of individual spectatorship: The above state of affairs was 
attributed to a general rejection of models of subjectivity imputed by the 
Enlightenment – Descartes’s dualist, Kant’s transcendental subject – and their 
associated promotion of individualized spectatorship, and of spectatorship itself. 
 Matter as images: Henri Bergson’s attempt to annul Cartesian, 
psychological interiority by naming matter is an “aggregate of images” makes 
perception of images, not of matter that then becomes an image ‘in’ consciousness, 
as it does on Descartes’s model. 
 Nondistinction of appearance and essence: Bergson-Deleuze assimilate 
interiority to a pre-personal totality of appearances without essence. 
 Harmonizing of the utopian: This forsakes the contrast of interior to the 
surrounding external world. Utopia is then realized, and annulled, in the uniformity 
of the aggregate, as the “material universe itself”. 
 Realization of the utopian: The move also abolishes any utopian valence 
held by interiority as that without the exterior’s “realized facticity” [Adorno, 1976, 
p51]. The works that Nicolas Bourriaud describes, meanwhile, are “ways of living 
and models of action within the existing  real”, or “everyday micro-utopias”. 
 Precedence of abstract categories over objects: Adorno and 
Horkeheimer’s account of societal rationalization provided a means of thinking of 
the inner image as non-discursive, unexpressed and private “remainder” after 
conceptual thought has been expressed. The social theory of Paulo Virno seemed to 
extend this logic, with the contention that the increased demand on the post-Fordist 
worker’s intellectual capacities  leads to the formerly private, hidden structures of 
thought and speech, the  "common places" which make up the "life of the mind", 
being made exterior and public. 
 Positivism: According to Adorno, the ideology of Enlightenment, "the first 
enemy of both metaphysics and fantasy simultaneously" [1976, p51], that consigns 
the outwardly unverifiable to “poetry”. 
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 The above concepts then framed and guided my analysis of various 
artworks and texts - literary criticism, theatre, cinema, Conceptual art, 
neuroscientific research - to reveal the following.  
 Chapter 1 used 18th-century literary criticism to show the difference 
between “utopia” and “utopian function”, and the relationship between language 
and inner image.62 ‘Utopia’ for G E Lessing was found to be such perfected states 
as the liberal-humanist conclusion of Nathan der Weise and the end point of the 
progress described in the Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts. By contrast, it was 
found that the Einbildung of the Laokoon essay - the immaterial counterpart of the 
Bild and the ‘pictures’ that poetry engages in as opposed to painting’s pictures - 
operates as a form of utopian thought which is not a perfected state. Rather, the 
Einbildung owes its utopian function to Lessing’s denigration of description in 
poetry: it is that which is not described, an image that leaves its object, like 
Homer’s gods, unseen.  
 Reading nineteenth century theatre through Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
notion of ‘positivism’ showed, in chapter 2, how the naturalism of the mid-
nineteenth century bourgeois domestic drama necessarily entailed a cancellation of 
the kind of Einbildung that Lessing had proffered. Naturalist theatre’s speech could 
not in reference depart from the fully represented – and present - world of the 
stage. Exposition is thus always motivated, there are no soliloquies and no asides. 
In this way naturalist theatre carries out the positivist refusal, noted by Adorno and 
Horkheimer, to allow anything “to remain outside, since the mere idea of the 
"outside" is the real source of fear" [2002, p11]. 
 This chapter also showed the threat to the utopian function of the inner 
image from harmonization, realization, and depiction. It was shown that Elizabeth, 
the protagonist of Villiers de L'Isle-Adam La Révolte (1870), by repeatedly 
declaring her intention to leave, provides the conditions for an image of where she 
will go: a 'lonely house', in 'Iceland, Sicily or Norway', where there is 
contemplation, reading, silence, and ultimately, death (in the Schopenhauerian 
sense, of death of the Will). This image – which, without perceptual stimulus, is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 A critical review of the methodology implemented in the foregoing thesis must admit the 
historical and formal disparity of the case studies. Some defence of the choice of Lessing’s 
literary theory, for example, is required. Lessing stands for modernity’s signal 
characteristic: an embracing of scientific and philosophical rationalism, liberalism, and 
egalitarianism. Realization of this characterizes the utopian conclusion to of Nathan der 
Weise (and the ideal speech situations of WochenKlausur). Engaging with this aspect of 
Lessing allows us suggest modernism’s – rather than modernity’s – utopia: a form of 
thought.  
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‘inner’ - then exists in tension with the material presence of the stage, "le salon 
d'un banquier". The image was claimed to be utopian in form - in Mannheim’s 
sense of “incongruous with the immediate situation” – and content – a 
teleologically remote ‘elsewhere’ of perfected living.   
 Remy de Gourmont's 1890 novel Sixtine appropriates Elizabeth's 'dream' 
speech. Excised from the domestic drama's mis-en-scene as much as it is, being in 
a novel, freed from the theatre's spatial occlusions, the image no longer has a 
utopian value because it is no longer in tension with the realized presence of the 
stage. Meanwhile, via Elizabeth’s references to Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy, 
and the modernist appropriation of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics to utopian ends, the 
limits of the utopian function of the inner image implicated by La Revolte were 
discerned. We found that Elizabeth’s dream was doubly limited in this capacity, by 
being depictive in a way that the “inwardly utopian art” of Schopenhauer’s music 
is not, but also by what is depicted being ultimately bound to the “immediate 
situation” – that is, "le salon d'un banquier" – money, not abandoned, limits the 
radial imagination: “His accounts”, says Elizabeth, “have crippled my mind”.  
 Reading cinematic experience through the concepts of perceptual 
absorption and matter as images allowed us to discern the role of an ‘inner image’ 
in that medium. For Gilles Deleuze, “[t]he brain is the screen” and “[c]inema, 
precisely because it puts the image in motion, or rather endows the image with self-
motion, never stops tracing the circuits of the brain" [2000, p366]. The medium 
itself serves as an argument for the unification of thought and material, for matter 
as image and image as matter. Roland Barthes represents the opposite view: the 
fear of autonomous thought being subsumed to the moving image, of perceptual 
absorption preventing the formation of inner images.  
 It followed that one way that one does “add to the images in the movies”, 
as Barthes puts it, is as a viewer of constructive editing, but that Barthes passes 
over this addition because the viewer does not do it “freely”. Eisenstein’s Obraz, I 
suggested, is such an addition: the “global image” gained from the spectator’s 
mental unification of the fragmentary, partial cinematic representations or 
izobrazhenie. Kuleshov’s experiments, intercutting shots of an expressionless actor 
with shots of objects, had demonstrated that the image will “reach the viewer in the 
way intended by the editor, because the viewer himself will complete the sequence 
and see that which is suggested to him by the montage”. Eisenstein turns this to 
pedagogic ends, effectively attempting to instrumentalize the viewer’s ‘innate’ 
logical, meaning-making faculties and sculpt or shape the Obraz ‘within’ the 
viewer.   
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 I went on to show how Eisenstein’s endeavor is rejected as both ethically 
suspect and logocentric. Christian Metz considered the Kuleshov effect, which 
underpins Eisenstein’s montage, to confirm the logomorphism of cinema: “why 
must it be that, by some strange correlation, two juxtaposed photographs must tell 
something? Going from one image to two images, is to go from image to language” 
[1974, p46]. Later cinema would attempt to refute this logomorphism and in the 
process reduce cinematic experience to the cinematographic material itself. I 
described two logics of disabling the cinematagraphic material and preventing it 
from inducing these inner images: one, recommended by Deleuze, consisted of 
speeding up the cuts to a continuous flicker that acts im-mediately on the subject, 
on a pre-reflexive level; the other, recommended by Bazin, is effectively to reduce 
the cut rate to zero, to the continuous shot. However, on examination of films taken 
to be exemplary of these two logics - Brakhage’s Persian Series (1999) and Jeroen 
de Rijke and Willem de Rooij Of Three Men (1998) respectively – it was found 
that some form of ‘addition’ to the images yet persisted. If Barthes’s fear of 
perceptual absorption preventing the formation of inner images is ungrounded, and 
the viewing subject can resist the determinations of the cinematographic material, a 
reconsideration of the cinema’s spectating subject, or at least a practice of 
cinematic reception, would seem to be demanded. I will develop this below.  
 Chapter 4 showed that a notion of an ‘inner image’ could serve to critique 
‘communicative plenitude’. The chapter concerned a phase of artistic production in 
which totalization of the concept (as in Joseph Kosuth’s logical-positivism-inspired 
project) and the polemical critique of the visually perceived object in fact meets 
with its opposing logic (as in Broodthaers). As such, this would seem to be a phase 
in which an inner image is very much at stake, both asserted and refuted. Robert 
Barry and Marcel Broodthaers were taken to be indicative of the former and latter, 
respectively.  
 Two aspects of the work of Stéphane Mallarmé suggested these practices’ 
two attitudes to the inner image. In taking on Mallarmé’s spatialization of the 
lexical and typographic elements of language via the surrealist écriture’s rebus, the 
material form of language in Broodthaers’s films and vacuum-formed plaques is 
exaggerated to inhibit semantic ‘content’ and thus the formation of ‘inner’ images. 
Barry’s sentences, meanwhile, were shown to be conventionally ‘semantic’ or 
evocative, but exhibit Mallarmé’s auto-destructive, “negative logic” whereby what 
is evoked is immediately effaced: ‘pictures’ are promised but what is offered is 
unpicturable. What both practices contribute to – through paradigmatically 
opposing deployments of language - is a critique of the dominance of conceptual 
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thought over experience. The blankness evoked by Barry’s texts – I suggested that 
Barry’s reading subject is like a faulty television set that does not ‘get a picture’ 
from the broadcast signal - challenge universal communicability: the notion that 
every thought can be expressed, and that thought is therefore primarily – 
necessarily – conceptual. Broodthaers’s rebuses, in their resistance to being read, 
offer experience that refuses to be conceptualized.  
 Meanwhile the dual logics of the reification of signs and the precedence of 
abstract categories over objects played out in the difference between Krauss’s and 
Broodthaer’s notion of the rebus. Broodthaers’s ‘weak’ rebus is a combination of 
the visual and verbal to the semantic annulment of both, in line with the historical 
avant-garde's ‘wrecking’ of language in resistance to its positivist and 
instrumentalist subjection to meaning and communication; Krauss’s ‘strong’ rebus 
pursues the principle of effacing the visual image's contingent particularity with 
linguistic concepts, rendering transparent what was materially opaque, making the 
image communicate – which was exactly the fate of the inner image in the next 
chapter.   
 Chapter 5 showed “positivism’s” effect on the inner image. The test for 
awareness in the comatose via neuroscientific means paradigmatically refutes 
private, unobservable interiority - as did the inter-subjective, relational art 
encountered in the introduction (positivism and post-structuralism-theorized art 
meeting in their anti-metaphysical struggles; see Rose, 1984). This ‘behaviouristic’ 
approach sublates the attitude to the inner image entailed by J B Watson’s 
behaviourism - where mental images, because externally unobservable, are non-
existent – and the attitude of cognitive psychology that infers them from subject's 
account. Rather, for Owen et al, if the observed neural ‘behaviour’ matches the 
brain scan of a healthy subject during a certain task (Enlightenment’s making of 
“dissimilar things comparable by reducing them to abstract quantities”), then the 
interior, the ‘what-it-is-like’ to be that person, the inner image itself, is of no 
consequence. 
 What this section of the thesis shows most clearly is the way in which the 
specificity of the inner image – as inner - is effaced by being made to 
communicate, and how this coincides with the apparatus’s constituting of the 
subject. There is an ‘autonomy’ – in the sense of both purposelessness and dereistic 
separation - to imagining playing tennis, to imagining walking around one’s house, 
that is lost in those imaginings being made to communicate the subject’s sentience. 
The subject’s inner images are instrumentalized; rather than being an activity that 
separates one from the world by negating it (as Lessing’s Einbildung does), 
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imagining is made into something that returns the subject to the communicative 
fold. It seems, moreover, that the apparatus forces this return. Refusing to 
participate – by not following the instructions to imagine - would register the test-
subject as being unable to participate, unable to understand the instructions, and 
insentient. 
 
Reflection on the thesis and future developments   
 
 As the above summary of findings suggests, the investigation has covered 
a wide historical scope and a disparate array of media, that, at times, has proved 
difficult to marshal. While I have tried to suggest that the moments in which an 
inner image is at stake take part in common historical logics – the ‘fate’ of the title 
– and that those moments contribute different qualities to the notion in question, a 
contraction in the examined field will benefit future research. I intend this to be a 
development of issues arising in the last chapter: the nexus of artistic and scientific 
practices and the constitution of the political subject.    
 
On the relation of written thesis and practice 
 
 Before setting out the conclusion and implications of these findings, I want 
now to discuss the relationship of the written thesis to my art practice, and describe 
how the practice works as research and forms part of the overall project. I will then 
move to include findings from practice within a general conclusion.  
 I maintain an artistic practice in parallel with my theoretical research. By 
‘parallel’ I mean that the investigations that result in video installations and radio 
broadcasts share concerns with the investigations that result in the written thesis. I 
do not seek to reflect – and certainly not illustrate – the “inner image” in my studio 
practice. Rather, the studio practice draws upon ideas elucidated in written 
investigation and the direction of the written investigation is steered by findings of 
practical experiment in the studio. The two elements are thus mutually, dialogically 
impelling, moving between implicit and explicit articulation of shared ongoing 
concerns. I hope to make this relationship, and the nature of those concerns, 
apparent below. 
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Practice as research 
 
 This leads to a note on how I understand practice as research, or rather, 
how the practical element contributes to the overall research project. Christopher 
Frayling’s early (in terms of the developing field of art research in academic 
context) and much-cited distinctions are useful here. His 1994 article identifies:  
 
 1) Research for practice – the conducting of (often technical) research to 
 deliver tools and material knowledge to be applied in practice. This is 
 where “the thinking is, so to speak, embodied in the artefact, where the 
 goal is not primarily communicable knowledge in the sense of verbal 
 communication, but in the sense of visual or iconic or imagistic 
 communication” [Frayling p5].  
 
 2) Research into practice – interpretative observation at a theoretical 
 distance from the object of study, such as observing the working processes 
 of others, but also the kind of historical research represented in this thesis 
 by chapters 1 to 5. 
 
 3) Research through practice – where practice or creative enquiry is the 
 methodological vehicle, a field of practical experiment with communicable 
 results.   
 
My work involves, firstly, research for practice: I ‘find out’ about a subject in an 
explorative, non-hypothesized process, collating materials and texts, from which 
the work is built, through an editorial process of addition and removal. Then – and 
this is how the practical element contributes to the overall research project - I 
reflect upon the process and the results of the process. This reflection articulates 
the thinking “embodied” in the end product or artefact. To an extent, this becomes 
research into practice, as I submit the work to a descriptive analysis from a 
‘distance’, as well as from a position of first-person familiarity.  
 It is in fact this combined process of research for practice and research into 
practice that comprises research through practice, or ‘artistic research’. The 
process of exploration, intuitive decision, thinking through, collation, and editing 
in the production of a work – the “for” – is detached from the result of that process. 
Reflection on the work – the “into” - brings forth the thought embedded in the 
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object and critically develops that which contingently arises from it. Reflection on 
the pre- or non-reflective, then, constitutes research through practice.  
 As such, research through practice, or “practice as research”, as I conceive 
it, is open to the accusation of exactly the deleterious rationalization, the 
‘totalization of the concept’, that this thesis claims recent art and thought indulges 
in. Indeed there is a notion of ‘artistic research’, proposed recently by Henk 
Borgdorff, as that which “seeks not so much to make explicit the knowledge that 
art is said to produce, but rather to provide a specific articulation of the pre-
reflective, non-conceptual content of art.” [2011, p44] This artistic research 
somehow “convey[s] and communicate[s] content that is enclosed in aesthetic 
experiences, enacted in creative practices and embodied in artistic products” [ibid, 
p45]. What this notion misses, and what this thesis has shown, is that “pre-
reflective” and “non-conceptual” content cannot be articulated because articulation 
necessarily involves reflection and conceptualization. As Frayling points out, what 
distinguishes research from “the gathering of reference materials” [p5] is the 
communication of results – of practical experiment, or of theoretical investigation. 
Hence ‘artistic research’, to be research, appears as an inherently positivistic 
enterprise that cannot countenance the incommunicable experiential. It can only, as 
Andrew Bowie, rephrasing Adorno, has recently written, attempt to explicate “the 
fact that what art conveys is not reducible to what can be said about what it 
conveys” [2013, p141]; it can only, as this project attempts to, describe the 
conditions of the experience.  
 
Reflections on Practice: The Incoherence of the Incoherence 
 
 I include documentation of only two examples of my artistic practice as an 
appendix to this thesis. These works have been selected - from the research 
period’s extensive practical output, which includes performative texts and short 
films, besides the installation and radio work presented here - as most pertinent to 
the concerns of the thesis, and as most fruitfully submitted to analysis.  
 The Incoherence of the Incoherence (2010)63 consists of a fictional text and 
a 12 minute video projection. This written component of the work has been both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The title is taken from the Arab philosopher Averroes’s book (called in Arabic Tahafut 
al-Tahafut) and written around 1180. It is a refutation of Ghazali's Tahafut al-Falasifa (The 
Incoherence of the Philosophers), and a defense of the philosophical – rather than 
theologial - study of religion. 
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performed live as a lecture and presented as a printed hand out, with a footnote that 
it is a transcription of “a lecture presented on the 22nd of February 1969”. The 
significance of these differing modes of presentation I will arrive at shortly.  
 The text presents itself as one of a series on the archaeology of biblical 
miracle sites – this one discussing the site of the raising of Lazarus - suggesting 
that previous lectures examined “what remain of Bethesda, where the paralysed 
man was healed, and the pools of Siloam, where the blind man was given sight”. 
The narrative proceeds in a measured, rational tone going on to refer to slides of 
photographs – “This is El Aizarya, seen from a hill to the north” – and diagrams – 
“You can see that the passage meets the mosque at a … 90-degree angle” - of the 
archaeological sites.  The lecturer / narrator describes a progressive movement into 
the tomb of Lazarus’s purported resurrection, before concluding that such “close 
inspection … cannot take us very far”  - presumably that is, cannot confirm the 
authenticity of the site - or the miracle.   
 The narrator then introduces ‘aerial photography’ as a methodological 
corrective, on the basis that “what is undetectable at ground level” becomes 
apparent when seen from a distance. The effect is compared to standing back from 
a half-tone illustration: the indeterminate dots become a recognisable image. A 
history of ‘aerial archaeology’ and its employment in the Middle East follows, 
before the narrator introduces their own aerial images of the biblical site: “This is 
‘fifteen furlongs from Jerusalem’, as John’s gospel tells us, at an altitude of 500ft 
with oblique dawn light.” The rationally expository tone gives way: “the universal 
comes forth … as you can see in this photograph … the limestone array no less 
than revivifies Lazarus.” From “5000 feet”, claims the narrator, one can see 
something “restored to life”, become “flesh and blood”. The text ends with the 
narrator introducing the next lectures in the series.  
 Besides the text or performance is a 12 minute video. This begins with a 
sequence ‘point-of-view’ camera shots, moving in stages through a museum, 
approaching a painting – Joseph Wright’s A Philosopher Lecturing on the Orrery 
(1766) – and the actual orrery positioned in front of it. The sequence is 
accompanied by low orchestral music. It dissolves to a schematic representation of 
an orrery, before an abrupt cut, and cessation of music, to a static image of a 
middle-eastern settlement and the whirring sound of a slide projector. The image 
change is accompanied by the ‘click’ of the projector. Images of archeological sites 
follow, the point-of-view ever approaching the rock until it apparently ‘zooms into’ 
the print of the photograph itself, revealing the dispersed dots from which it is 
constituted. There is a cut to black before the following sequence progressively 
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‘zooms out’, the point of view higher and higher from the ground, before it fades to 
a close up of the museum orrery and the orchestral music recommences. The video 
concludes as the point-of-view reverses the opening sequence, withdraws from the 
museum, and fades to black.  
 How these two components that make up the work are presented is 
important. One mode of presentation is for the text to be performed (2nd December 
2010 at Waterside Project Space). The performer reads the text from a lectern to 
one side of the projection screen; the video is played, without introduction, the 
moment the performer finishes. In this version the connection of text and video is 
clear. The viewing subject recognises scenes recently described. It is possible that 
attention to the character and appearance of the performer diverts focus from 
imagining the scenes he describes. To this end the performer is instructed to 
‘minimize’ their performance.  
 Another mode of presentation is to play an audio recording of the lecture 
before playing the video (30th November 2010 at Made in Goldsmiths Gallery). 
This of course foregrounds the content of the speech (notwithstanding the ‘grain’ 
of the voice), but risks visual attention wandering to things outside the work – the 
room, the audience, and so on.  
 A third mode is to have the text printed as a ‘hand out’, and the video 
playing on a loop. The text is either offered as one copy on a lectern proximate to 
the screen, to be read by visitors on site, individually, or as a ‘multiple’, left on a 
table near to the projection screen, to be taken away by gallery visitors (Lecture 
Hall / Free School, Five Years Gallery, 2010).  
 If the text is read after seeing the video, as is possible in this third mode, 
the text becomes a stimulus to the recollection of the images from the video. The 
phenomenal experience of reading is then in some sense predetermined. In 
practical terms, this third mode means that the text is certainly not read before the 
video is watched, and probably not read at all. If the text is not read at all, one must 
accept that ‘the work’ is not encountered, and realize that ‘the work’ is not the 
video and not the text. These are, rather, the material conditions for ‘the work’, 
which is the interaction of the two elements: the play of imaginal anticipation, 
realization and annulment. 
 
Reflections on The Incoherence of the Incoherence in light of the thesis 
 
 The following considers these material conditions as they are in the first, 
optimum mode, described above.  
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 By spatio-temporally separating the text from the image that it would 
conventionally annotate or describe, acts of anticipation and recollection are 
encouraged. The text generates images - “El Aizarya, seen from a hill to the north”, 
“the passage meets the mosque at a … 90-degree angle”, and so on. Mental 
visualisation is encouraged because the references are to something that should be 
present - “This is … “, “You can see that …” – something that was or will be there. 
As they then watch the video, the viewing subject recognises the scenes referred to 
in the text. With the logic established, the viewing subject expects to recognise the 
miracle, to see the “the limestone array no less than revivify[ying] Lazarus.” The 
epiphany, the resurrection, the revelation, however, isn’t there. The viewer is then 
tasked with accounting for this disappointing desublimation. Is the narrator 
irrational or unreliable? Is the sublime aspect of the revivification only, as Jacques 
Ranciere says of Paradise Lost’s Satan, a “duplicitous play of words that do not 
really let us see what they pretend to show us” [2009, p123]? Or maybe there is no 
visual analogue for what the text intimates, which must remain unrealised, wherein 
lies its potency, as hope.  
 
Reflections on Practice: The Sorrows of Usefulness 
 
 The radio work The Sorrows of Usefulness (2010) begins with the sound of 
chairs scraping and the beginning of some kind of presentation to an audience. A 
female voice talks deliberately through the planning process, methodology and 
equipment for an “experiment”. A slide projector whirs and clicks in the 
background. It soon cuts to a male voice, and background noise ceases. The voice 
makes terse observations: “Subject rests head in hands”, etc, giving time references 
with each comment. There are pauses between each comment – “dead air” - 
sometimes long. Then a third person speaks, hesitantly describing a scene: “There 
are lots of people … and some kind of stage …”. Where the Monitor describes 
everything ‘external’ - the Subject’s behaviour, seating position, noises and 
possible ‘artefacts’ in and around the room - the Subject describes the ‘internal’, 
apparently attempting to describe what appears to his ‘mind’s eye’64. The first, 
female voice is heard again, telling us that the target “was not attained”. Then the 
voice of the ‘monitor’ is heard again, introducing the next experiment, and the 
sequence is repeated. This time the Subject and Monitor speak in unison. It 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 To emphasize the impression that these images are ‘occuring to’ the Subject, that he is 
striving to ‘receive’ them, the actor playing the Subject read the texts once, then attempted 
to remember and draw the spatial characteristics, verbalising as he did so.  
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becomes apparent the locale they are describing is the room in which they are 
conducting the experiment65. After the monitor’s reference to ‘wind outside’, the 
sound of a storm increases until it almost obscures the voices, and the play 
concludes.  
 This work for radio has been broadcast in 27 minute and 16 minute edits. It 
has also been disseminated in several modes:  
 Firstly, as part of an on-line web ‘magazine’ (radiauteur.com, 2011), in the 
context of other ‘radio art’, on which it can be heard at any time. Secondly, it has 
been broadcast ‘live’ (i.e. once, not looped or downloadable) as part of a web 
stream (Are You Experienced (?), [Space], 2010). This manifestation also had a 
performance element, in that it was heard from speakers on a stage within the 
gallery from which it was broadcast, as part of a number of other performances for 
radio. On stage was set up a rudimentary ‘set’: a table and two chairs, with two 
plastic cups and some pieces of blank paper – the mis-en-scene of the experiments 
in the radio play. Thus two separate presentations resulted: one for the absent 
audience and one for the present audience. For the present one, it appeared as a 
theatrical piece, with loud speakers taking the place of the protagonists; for the 
absent one it was more conventionally radiophonic. Since the work is intended to 
refer metaphorically to radiophonic experience, stage installation is, on reflection, 
not successful: attention is diverted to the aesthetic choice of recorded lines read 
through loud speakers over live protagonists.  
 A third mode I think is most successful: broadcast ‘live’ (not looped or 
downloadable), as part of self-curated series of internet broadcasts (Cast and 
Figment, Soundfjord, 2011). Thus it has no mandated, controlled, visual 
manifestation, appealing to precisely to qualities of conventional, pre-digital, (and 
non-repeatable) ‘radio’; it is also contextualized by radio works which are also 
concerned to foreground their own medium.  
 It is instructive to compare The Sorrows of Usefulness as a work for radio 
with The Incoherence of the Incoherence as a visio-verbal work for gallery 
installation. The possibility arises that the radio work, being without visual form, 
allows the generation of the ‘inner images’ referred to in the thesis, without the 
consequent annulment or dissipation in recognition caused by The Incoherence of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The Subject’s ‘visions’ are of the architecture of Dante’s hell and the scene of the first 
trial in Kafka’s novel. These were chosen as archetypical, mythic scenes of retribution, 
placing the setting of The Sorrows of Usefulness - the anonymous conference room with its 
neon strip light and fire-retardant ceiling panels – in the same lineage, and presenting such 
attempts at instrumentalization as forms of governance.  
	   114	  
the Incoherence’s sequence of visual images. Unrestrained imaginal production 
would seem to be the result. However, what in fact happens is that the inter-
subjective ‘restraint’ of imaginal acts becomes embodied thematically within the 
narrative. The radio work foregrounds the way in which the verbal stimulation of 
the imagination is also the control of the imagination, a sculpting over which the 
listener has no voluntary control: verbal description causes the listener to 
involuntarily ‘see’. 
 This is indeed why I selected the redacted findings of a Ministry of 
Defence study of ‘remote viewing’, released in response to a Freedom of 
Information request66, as the source material for a radio play. ‘Remote viewing’ 
seemed to be a dynamic metaphor for radiophonic experience – thought caused by 
something distant. Moreover, the metaphor is performed: as the Subject receives 
the vision and describes it, so do the audience.  
 
Reflections on The Sorrows of Usefulness in light of the thesis 
 
 The narrative makes clear (as the source material does) that the ‘targets’ 
are not ‘accessed’ – that the claim to telepathically see something outside 
perceptual range is not substantiated. If telepathy is not taking place then the 
Subject is simply imagining, engaged in ‘mere’ reverie. The experiment can then 
be understood to be an attempt to put daydream-like, dereistic states (illogical, 
idiosyncratic, disconnected from reality) to use: an attempt to instrumentalize 
reverie. 
 This can profitably be compared to the operations of the neuroscientific 
attempt to detect awareness in the vegetative state that I set out in chapter 5. In 
both cases the autonomy of imagining - imagination as expression of the subject’s 
autonomy, as it is for Sartre - is denigrated. In the case of Owen et al’s experiment, 
imagining is put to use as communication; the remote viewing of The Sorrows of 
Usefulness attempts to put imagining to use as perception.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121026065214/http://www.mod.uk/Defenc
eInternet/FreedomOfInformation/DisclosureLog/SearchDisclosureLog/RemoteViewing.
htm (last accessed December 2013) 
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Conclusion and Implications of Findings 
 
 What is at stake in the question of the ‘inner image’ is the conception and 
status of the subject that encounters the work. The denial of interiority to the 
subject denies it certain capacities as a subject, at the same time as denying the 
encounter certain critical-utopian valences; it is the role of an ‘inner image’ to give 
form to these capacities and valences.   
 The critique of interiority, when naturalized, leads to a positivistic state. As 
the foregoing thesis has shown, in this state the theatre’s mis-en-scene is a 
framework of reality that allows nothing beyond itself; in this state, artworks are 
everyday micro-utopias, ways of living within the existing real; in this state, the 
neuroscientist regards consciousness as the ability to respond suitably to stimuli. 
 This is because for positivism, as Horkheimer (1972) points out, the 
distinction between what an entity is and what it appears to be is meaningless: the 
world of appearances constitutes the structure of reality and one can only know that 
which is given in experience. For positivism, concrete realities are corporeal things 
in the pure state, abstracted from subjectivity and from human praxis. Positivism’s 
attempt to abstract subjectivity, its refusal to recognize subjectivity’s role in human 
praxis, in creating the world, makes it complicit with a politics which accepts the 
world as finished reality. There results a fatal resignation to circumstance. In an 
universal taboo of pure immanence, positivism prohibits “fantasy” [Adorno et al, 
1976, p51]: that which is not sensuously realized, which retains a halo of 
indeterminacy, which does not yet exist. 
 It is in this way that the excision of interiority from the encounter removes 
with it critical-utopian thought: the unrealized, the indeterminate, the not yet 
existent. And it is in this sense that the denial of interiority to the encounter denies 
the subject the capacity as a subject to resist circumstance, if only by turning away. 
 But what does it mean to say that perception-like thought	   - an ‘inner 
image’ - is an articulation of the capacity to refuse what is given to perception? It 
means that what is encountered must work paradoxically and provide the 
conditions for its own negation. We have seen this in the protagonist that describes 
an extra-diegetic elsewhere, we have seen this in the film without movement and 
no expectation of it: situations in which the subject is provided with the textual 
means to think against what is materially presented to them. 	  
 Is, then, the inner image as set out here merely a psychic site of refuge? 
Should it not be disparaged in the terms that Adorno disparages bourgeois 
‘inwardness’? At first a protest against a social order heteronomously imposed on 
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its subjects, inwardness becomes “the mirage of an inner kingdom where the silent 
majority are indemnified for what is denied them socially … [it] becomes 
increasingly shadowy and empty, indeed contentless in itself.” [2004, p116]. What 
has been described in this thesis, rather, is an inner image whose contentlessness is 
of itself a resistance to heteronomously imposed content. Its utopian function 
consists not in complete escape, but in tensional relationships: unrealized against 
the realized, indeterminate against the determinate, the not yet existent against the 
present.  
 To reiterate, this time in terms of Aristotle’s phantasma: practices that 
operate on a naturalized refutation of interiority would seek to be environments 
with which thought can only correlate. What is at stake in the question of the inner 
image is the capacity for thought to be other than correlative with the environment, 
that is, to deviate from the way things are.  
 
 
* 
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APPENDIX 
 
 My practical investigations mainly result in visio-verbal works for gallery 
installation and sound works for radio. The former consist of combinations of 
extended text and visual images. The text may be performed live, read in a printed 
supplement, or included in the video as voiceover or subtitle. Visual sequences are 
temporally and / or spatially dislocated from the verbal elements, provoking acts of 
memory, imaging and anticipation – the ‘inner image’ I explore in the thesis - that 
are doubled in the narratives. In a similar manner, the radio works reflexively 
pursue the characteristics of radiophonic experience through metaphor. The visio-
verbal and aural works then can be understood as experiments in relations between 
language, image and subjectivity: how they may produce - and critically disrupt - 
each other. 
 The following examples of my practice relevant to the thesis will also be 
exhibited at the viva examination: 
 
 The Incoherence of the Incoherence (2010): a lecture on the archeology of 
 biblical miracle sites, accompanied by slides, The Incoherence of the 
 Incoherence consists of a 12 minute video and text (to be performed, or 
 read independently of viewing the video).  
 
 The Sorrows of Usefulness (2010): based on released, redacted Ministry of 
 Defense documentation, The Sorrows of Usefulness is a dramatization for 
 radio of experiments in ‘remote viewing’ [cast: Olivia Armstrong as the 
 Supervisor, Simon King as the Monitor and Adam Loxley as the Subject.]  
 
The enclosed disc contains the video component of The Incoherence of the 
Incoherence and a recording of The Sorrows of Usefulness. The text component of 
The Incoherence of the Incoherence follows. 
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